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Explaining	  the	  Case	  of	  Srikirin	  Institute	  of	  Ophthalmology:	  Context	  
In	  December	  of	  2008,	  I	  traveled	  to	  the	  rapidly	  developing	  coastal	  city	  of	  Kakinada,	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  India.	  There,	  I	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  have	  a	  detailed	  look	  at	  the	  health	  delivery	  in	  South	  Asia	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  a	  nonprofit	  organization	  providing	  critical	  eye	  care	  to	  hundreds	  of	  thousands.	  Along	  the	  lines	  of	  health	  delivery,	  I	  would	  also	  see	  the	  interacting	  issues	  of	  medical	  education,	  outreach	  in	  rural	  areas,	  and	  coordination	  nationally	  and	  locally	  with	  hospitals	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations.	  The	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  was	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  of	  Ophthalmology.	  Researching	  and	  being	  embedded	  within	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  allowed	  me	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  number	  of	  central	  issues	  within	  the	  health	  delivery	  at	  the	  district,	  state,	  and	  national	  level	  in	  India.	  	  
I	  should	  also	  mention	  the	  fairly	  extreme	  political	  circumstances	  that	  struck	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  during	  my	  stay.	  There	  were	  frequent	  agitations	  and	  some	  violent	  protests	  in	  efforts	  to	  partition	  the	  existing	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  The	  political	  climate	  had	  been	  simmering	  between	  the	  various	  regions	  within	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  for	  decades,	  and	  it	  finally	  came	  to	  a	  boil	  at	  the	  exact	  time	  of	  my	  visit.	  Fortunately,	  my	  research	  was	  mostly	  unaffected	  by	  the	  agitations.	  However,	  everyday	  bandhs	  (a	  complete	  halt	  of	  economic	  activity)	  permeated	  daily	  life	  with	  uncertainty	  of	  being	  able	  to	  travel	  and	  work	  normally.	  	  
The	  time	  in	  Srikirin	  gave	  me	  insight	  into	  the	  development	  process	  in	  the	  field:	  the	  burgeoning	  hospital	  led	  by	  a	  charismatic	  leader	  was	  a	  fascinating	  case	  study	  for	  international	  nonprofit	  health	  work.	  Srikirin	  focused	  in	  on	  the	  plague	  of	  blindness	  in	  India,	  a	  state	  of	  illness	  that	  plagues	  the	  poorest	  individuals	  to	  a	  disproportionate	  degree	  when	  simple	  preventative	  and	  curative	  methods	  would	  alleviate	  it.	  In	  order	  to	  contextualize	  the	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degree	  of	  suffering	  inflicted	  by	  the	  condition,	  I	  have	  provided	  a	  brief	  background	  about	  the	  epidemiology	  of	  eye	  conditions	  in	  India.	  Additionally,	  I’ve	  told	  the	  story	  of	  Srikirin	  and	  its	  founder,	  Dr.	  Chandrasekhar	  Sankurathri,	  since	  they	  are	  fundamentally	  intertwined,	  as	  the	  narratives	  of	  many	  nonprofit	  organizations	  are.	  	  	  
Background	  of	  Eye	  Health	  Conditions	  in	  India	  
Worldwide,	  there	  are	  45	  million	  blind	  individuals,	  and	  one-­‐third	  of	  those	  people	  are	  located	  in	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent.	  India	  has	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  this	  huge	  number:	  poor	  diet,	  high	  ultraviolet	  radiation,	  lifestyle	  factors,	  and	  high	  genetic	  tendencies	  for	  diabetes,	  which	  can	  often	  lead	  to	  blindness	  due	  to	  problems	  with	  blood	  supply.	  The	  subcontinent	  is	  the	  blind	  capital	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  blindness	  is	  rampant	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  In	  India,	  an	  enormous	  62.4%	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  blindness	  are	  as	  a	  result	  of	  cataracts.	  Cataracts	  are	  essentially	  clouding	  of	  the	  lens	  that	  refracts	  light	  to	  neurological	  tissue	  to	  allow	  sight.	  Many	  mature	  cataracts	  are	  identifiable	  by	  the	  deeply	  unsettling	  mucosal	  whites	  that	  block	  the	  central	  pupil	  of	  the	  eye.	  Due	  to	  the	  early	  curative	  (and	  preventive)	  nature	  of	  cataracts,	  they	  are	  much	  more	  common	  in	  developing	  countries	  like	  India	  due	  to	  low	  awareness	  and	  lackluster	  infrastructure	  to	  tackle	  such	  a	  problem	  on	  a	  nationwide	  scale.	  Other	  than	  cataracts,	  common	  eye	  problems	  and	  causes	  of	  blindness	  include	  ptosis	  (“drooping	  eyelid”),	  diabetic	  retinopathy,	  vitamin	  A	  deficiency,	  and	  glaucoma.	  	  
The	  Srikirin	  Institute:	  Foundation	  and	  Current	  Operations	  
Dr.	  Chandrasekhar	  Sankurathri	  (hereafter	  Dr.	  Chandra)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  and	  current	  manager	  of	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  of	  Ophthalmology.	  Learning	  the	  history	  and	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development	  of	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute,	  which	  is	  inherently	  tied	  to	  Dr.	  Chandra’s	  own	  past,	  was	  essential	  for	  me	  to	  understand	  the	  mandate	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  organization:	  the	  engine	  that	  motivated	  the	  organization	  to	  continue	  its	  progress.	  We	  communicated	  at	  length	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis.	  Dr.	  Chandra,	  at	  times	  bluntly	  and	  unreservedly,	  recounted	  his	  commentary	  on	  this	  history	  piece	  by	  piece	  in	  several	  conversations	  to	  me.	  However,	  I	  have	  detailed	  it	  here	  in	  chronological	  order,	  with	  my	  own	  emphasis	  at	  important	  junctions.	  
	   In	  1985,	  Dr.	  Chandra	  lost	  his	  wife,	  son,	  age	  six,	  and	  daughter,	  three,	  in	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  on	  an	  Air	  India	  Flight.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  had	  been	  working	  in	  Ottawa	  as	  a	  biologist	  for	  the	  Canadian	  government.	  	  Driven	  by	  the	  grief	  of	  his	  tremendous	  loss,	  five	  years	  after	  the	  attack,	  Dr.	  Chandra	  was	  compelled	  to	  devote	  his	  life	  to	  serving	  others.	  He	  decided	  to	  return	  to	  India,	  where	  he	  grew	  up	  and	  had	  been	  educated.	  He	  began	  to	  build	  a	  house	  in	  Kakinada,	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  a	  rural	  town	  at	  the	  time,	  where	  his	  brother-­‐in-­‐law	  lived.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  hoped	  to	  build	  an	  orphanage	  where	  he	  could	  shepherd	  twenty	  or	  thirty	  parentless	  children	  to	  a	  better	  future.	  After	  travelling	  to	  the	  area	  though,	  he	  had	  observed	  and	  spoken	  to	  many	  extremely	  low-­‐income	  children	  who	  were	  working	  in	  the	  field	  during	  the	  day,	  at	  their	  parent’s	  behest.	  Since	  they	  could	  not	  attend	  school	  during	  normal	  school	  hours,	  they	  were	  losing	  the	  opportunity	  to	  be	  educated.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  saw	  the	  chance	  to	  help	  them,	  and	  began	  night	  classes	  in	  the	  newly	  constructed	  building	  to	  explain	  basic	  arithmetic	  and	  language	  skills.	  Soon,	  the	  children	  that	  attended	  government	  schools,	  who	  were	  still	  not	  proficient	  in	  even	  these	  basic	  categories,	  began	  attending	  the	  classes	  as	  well.	  With	  the	  government	  schoolchildren,	  the	  ranks	  swelled	  to	  forty-­‐five.	  By	  1992,	  it	  had	  become	  a	  full	  time	  school,	  named	  for	  his	  daughter,	  Sarada	  Vidyalayam.	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   When	  I	  asked	  Dr.	  Chandra	  what	  motivated	  him	  to	  even	  begin	  such	  an	  endeavor,	  he	  replied	  emphatically,	  “You	  know,	  nearly	  70%	  of	  children	  do	  not	  even	  have	  access	  to	  primary	  education.	  This	  is	  the	  country’s	  future,	  and	  it	  is	  being	  squandered.	  This	  generation’s	  education	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  generations	  to	  come.”	  In	  terms	  of	  his	  own	  motivations,	  I	  could	  see	  Dr.	  Chandra	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  patriotism	  for	  the	  country	  that	  had	  raised	  him.	  However,	  he	  also	  spoke	  of	  “building	  a	  more	  compassionate	  world,”	  a	  statement	  that	  struck	  me	  as	  more	  universal.	  
	   From	  the	  beginning,	  Dr.	  Chandra	  utilized	  his	  personal	  network	  from	  his	  time	  living	  in	  Canada	  to	  fundraise.	  He	  had	  attained	  nonprofit	  status	  for	  the	  “Manjuri	  Sankurathri	  Memorial	  Foundation”	  in	  Canada,	  allowing	  him	  to	  accept	  donations.	  In	  1996,	  the	  Sankurathri	  Foundation	  leaped	  an	  evolutionary	  bound	  and	  began	  their	  first	  project	  in	  eye	  care	  specifically.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  was	  approached	  by	  a	  Canadian	  non-­‐profit	  organization,	  the	  Help	  the	  Aged	  Canada	  (HTAC).	  HTAC	  wanted	  assistance	  with	  field	  support	  on	  a	  proposal	  on	  elderly	  sight	  improvement	  in	  the	  area,	  with	  the	  funding	  provided	  by	  the	  Canadian	  International	  Development	  Agency	  (CIDA).	  CIDA	  is	  the	  body	  within	  the	  Canadian	  government	  that	  administers	  foreign	  aid	  and	  often,	  as	  in	  this	  case,	  it	  partners	  with	  non-­‐government	  entities	  and	  international	  bodies.	  
	  	   Suddenly,	  the	  organization	  had	  found	  itself	  deeply	  involved	  with	  eye	  care	  in	  the	  region.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  himself	  had	  been	  aware	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  problem	  for	  a	  few	  years	  now.	  His	  childhood	  friend,	  Dr.	  VK	  Raju,	  was	  an	  ophthalmologist	  in	  West	  Virginia.	  Dr.	  Raju	  had	  told	  Dr.	  Chandra	  about	  the	  real	  need	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  for	  sustainable	  eye	  care.	  Although	  he	  had	  come	  to	  India	  every	  year	  and	  set	  up	  shop	  to	  perform	  his	  own	  tests	  and	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procedures,	  the	  real	  impact	  on	  blindness	  rates	  in	  the	  area	  was	  miniscule	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  infrastructure,	  especially	  in	  the	  more	  rural	  areas	  where	  health	  infrastructure	  and	  accessibility	  is	  even	  lower.	  
	   The	  HTAC	  elderly	  sight	  project	  was	  continuously	  approved	  for	  funding,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  MSMF	  initiated	  another	  proposal	  with	  CIDA.	  This	  time,	  MSMF	  initiated	  a	  pediatric	  eye	  health	  project,	  which	  would	  include	  school	  screenings.	  Eventually,	  the	  pediatric	  eye	  health	  project	  would	  continue	  for	  three	  years	  with	  CIDA	  partnership,	  but	  with	  partnerships	  with	  other	  international	  non-­‐profits	  it	  would	  continue	  and	  expand	  along	  with	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute.	  
	   At	  first,	  as	  the	  hospital	  began,	  it	  was	  mostly	  for	  paid	  patients	  and	  consisted	  of	  only	  one	  floor.	  Each	  week,	  on	  Thursday,	  patients	  who	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  pay	  could	  receive	  free	  treatment.	  However,	  word	  spread	  quickly,	  and	  soon	  the	  volume	  of	  patients	  on	  Thursdays	  was	  too	  much	  for	  too	  handle	  in	  one	  day.	  The	  hospital	  began	  to	  expand,	  and	  separate	  facilities	  for	  paid	  and	  nonpaid	  patients	  were	  built.	  However,	  the	  surgeons	  and	  operating	  rooms	  were	  the	  same	  for	  patients,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  pay	  or	  not.	  This	  is	  how	  the	  hospital	  is	  run	  to	  this	  day,	  although	  both	  facilities	  have	  expanded	  greatly.	  	  
	   It	  was	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  the	  organization’s	  mandate	  formation	  and	  Dr.	  Chandra’s	  own	  history	  and	  decision	  making	  were	  inherently	  linked.	  Even	  the	  smallest	  interactions	  spoke	  volumes	  about	  the	  structure	  and	  organizational	  capacity	  of	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  of	  Ophthalmology.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  was	  involved	  in	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  organization	  intimately,	  ranging	  from	  broad	  goal	  creation	  and	  fundraising	  to	  signing	  off	  on	  a	  free	  pair	  of	  
	   11	  
eyeglasses	  for	  a	  poor	  farmer.	  However,	  a	  key	  issue	  I	  saw	  was	  that	  the	  organization	  relied	  on	  him	  so	  heavily	  that	  without	  him,	  I	  couldn’t	  see	  it	  even	  functioning	  at	  this	  moment.	  Fundraising	  was	  directly	  linked	  to	  his	  friends	  and	  personal	  connections	  that	  he	  had	  made	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  and	  even	  in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  organization,	  I	  did	  not	  see	  anyone	  that	  could	  step	  into	  Dr.	  Chandra’s	  shoes	  and	  run	  the	  organization	  as	  efficiently.	  Sustainability	  of	  the	  progress	  that	  had	  been	  made	  was,	  at	  least	  currently,	  correlated	  directly	  with	  Dr.	  Chandra’s	  level	  of	  involvement.	  When	  I	  asked	  him	  about	  it	  directly,	  he	  replied	  that	  he	  recognized	  the	  issue,	  and	  was	  looking	  for	  someone	  (or	  a	  group	  of	  people)	  he	  could	  train	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time	  to	  take	  his	  place.	  However,	  that	  person	  would	  have	  to	  have	  a	  cultural	  understanding	  of	  India	  as	  well	  as	  be	  able	  to	  fundraise	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
	   MSMF	  has	  a	  Canadian	  Board	  of	  Directors,	  with	  five	  members.	  Each	  of	  these	  members	  comes	  from	  a	  diverse	  professional	  background.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  described	  the	  process	  of	  choosing	  board	  members,	  as	  one	  without	  considerations	  to	  “North	  or	  South	  Indian,	  White	  or	  Brown,	  regardless	  of	  caste,	  creed,	  or	  social	  status.”	  The	  Board	  includes	  a	  French	  Canadian	  and	  North	  Indian,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  conscious	  variety	  in	  perspectives	  by	  including	  nurses	  and	  non-­‐doctors.	  The	  Board	  of	  Directors	  works	  without	  an	  actual	  office,	  and	  has	  extremely	  low	  functioning	  costs	  (a	  point	  of	  pride	  for	  the	  organization).	  They	  teleconference	  with	  Dr.	  Chandra,	  and	  he	  lets	  them	  know	  what	  the	  highest	  priority	  needs	  for	  the	  hospital	  are,	  while	  they	  in	  turn	  respond	  with	  how	  financially	  feasible	  each	  of	  those	  goals	  is.	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   Current	  Hospital	  Facilities	  
The	  central	  hospital	  is	  located	  on	  the	  site	  that	  Dr.	  Chandra	  first	  bought	  in	  1990,	  and	  is	  located	  right	  next	  to	  the	  school	  that	  Dr.	  Chandra	  also	  runs.	  It	  has	  grown	  to	  be	  four	  floors,	  along	  with	  a	  cafeteria,	  optical	  shop,	  glass	  manufacturing	  factory,	  and	  a	  pharmacy.	  The	  Srikirin	  Institute	  performs	  about	  15,000	  surgeries	  a	  year	  with	  their	  staff	  of	  160	  total	  hospital	  staff	  and	  4,	  usually	  51,	  ophthalmological	  surgeons.	  They	  perform	  the	  second	  most	  eye	  surgeries	  of	  any	  hospital	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  
	   For	  a	  comparison,	  the	  juggernaut	  eye	  hospital	  L.V.	  Prasad	  Eye	  Institute	  is	  the	  largest	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  It	  is	  located	  in	  the	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  cities	  in	  India	  (and	  capital	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh),	  Hyderabad,	  and	  has	  80	  ophthalmologists	  on	  site	  and	  performs	  22,000	  surgeries	  a	  year.	  They	  also	  largely	  operate	  on	  a	  for-­‐profit	  basis.	  A	  key	  tool	  that	  Srikirin	  uses	  to	  maintain	  such	  a	  high	  volume	  of	  surgeries	  without	  compromising	  at	  all	  on	  cost	  is	  the	  assembly	  line	  procedure.	  The	  surgeons	  are,	  admittedly,	  underpaid	  for	  their	  skill	  level,	  about	  50,000-­‐60,000	  rupees	  per	  month.	  	  
	   The	  actual	  setup	  is	  modeled	  after	  the	  famous	  Aravind	  Eye	  Care	  System,	  in	  Tamil	  Nadu,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  Harvard	  Business	  School	  study.	  In	  the	  setup,	  the	  smaller	  percentage	  of	  paid	  surgeries	  allows	  the	  hospital	  to	  be	  sustainable,	  while	  performing	  essential	  surgeries	  for	  patients	  that	  are	  unable	  to	  pay.	  However,	  the	  Aravind	  Eye	  Care	  System	  is	  30-­‐40%	  paid,	  while	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  is	  only	  10%	  are	  paying	  patients.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  One	  surgeon	  is	  currently	  on	  a	  exchange	  program	  fellowship	  in	  Canada	  to	  become	  a	  retinal	  specialist	  and	  will	  return	  in	  January	  2010	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   In	  terms	  of	  costs,	  MSMF	  fundraising	  mostly	  funds	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute.	  Ten	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  volume	  of	  surgeries	  is	  paid,	  but	  these	  surgeries	  contribute	  relatively	  little	  to	  offset	  the	  total	  budget	  for	  nonpaid	  surgeries	  as	  well.	  Those	  crucial	  fundraising	  efforts	  are	  generated	  through	  an	  annual	  public	  engagement	  seminar	  series	  that	  Dr.	  Chandra	  presents	  in	  Canada.	  There	  are	  also	  partnerships	  with	  other	  international	  NGOs	  and	  development	  agencies	  for	  specific	  proposals.	  All	  foreign	  donations	  must	  be	  specific,	  and	  have	  to	  be	  deposited	  into	  a	  special	  bank	  account	  with	  special	  government	  imposed	  regulations	  (due	  to	  fears	  of	  terrorist	  financing).	  There	  is	  a	  district	  investigator	  that	  checks	  financial	  records	  about	  every	  six	  months.	  	  
	   When	  I	  asked	  about	  his	  fundraising	  strategy,	  Dr.	  Chandra	  stated	  plainly,	  “I	  never	  ask	  for	  money	  directly.	  I	  only	  try	  to	  make	  people	  aware	  of	  the	  work	  we	  are	  doing.	  If	  they	  want	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  it,	  then	  the	  money	  will	  come	  by	  itself.	  I	  wouldn’t	  give	  my	  money	  if	  someone	  just	  asked	  me,	  so	  why	  should	  I	  expect	  them	  to?”	  It	  is	  a	  viewpoint	  that	  is	  borne	  of	  empirical	  experience.	  In	  Canada,	  the	  number	  of	  donations	  exploded	  when	  the	  public	  television	  channel	  CBC	  ran	  a	  documentary	  special	  detailing	  Dr.	  Chandra’s	  mission	  in	  2002.	  There	  were	  barely	  any	  donations	  coming	  from	  within	  India	  until	  Eenadu,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  Andhra	  newspapers,	  ran	  a	  long	  article	  about	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute.	  It	  is	  a	  “if	  you	  build	  it,	  they	  will	  come”	  philosophy.	  There	  is	  little	  awareness	  or	  coordination	  in	  the	  United	  States	  currently	  though.	  Any	  donations	  there	  are	  coordinated	  through	  a	  nonprofit	  run	  by	  a	  friend	  of	  Dr.	  Chandra’s.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  was	  also	  recently	  nominated	  for	  CNN	  Heroes,	  which	  boosted	  his	  American	  profile	  considerably.	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   The	  Srikirin	  Institute	  uses	  some	  of	  the	  best	  surgical	  equipment	  in	  India,	  and	  has	  quality	  standards	  equivalent	  to	  the	  best	  eye	  hospitals	  in	  the	  country	  and	  world	  (mostly	  due	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  fundraise).	  Along	  with	  this,	  Dr.	  Chandra	  emphasized	  the	  organization’s	  focus	  on	  providing	  choice	  to	  the	  customers,	  with	  paying	  packages	  ranging	  from	  2,000	  rupees	  (40	  USD)	  to	  20,000	  (400	  USD),	  prices	  that	  are	  still	  lower	  than	  other	  hospitals	  around	  the	  country	  with	  equivalent	  equipment	  and	  quality.	  Consistently,	  they	  have	  been	  setting	  the	  standard	  for	  eye-­‐care	  quality	  in	  the	  district	  and	  region	  for	  both	  public	  hospitals	  and	  private	  hospitals,	  simply	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  competition.	  A	  very	  basic	  cataract	  procedure,	  the	  implantation	  of	  a	  replacement	  intraocular	  lens	  (IOL)	  after	  removal	  of	  the	  calcified	  lens,	  was	  not	  even	  available	  in	  Kakinada	  until	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  began	  using	  it.	  Soon	  after,	  every	  hospital	  in	  the	  area	  was	  forced	  to	  raise	  their	  standards	  to	  use	  the	  IOL.	  	  
In	  October,	  there	  was	  a	  visit	  from	  a	  consulting	  service	  from	  Bangalore	  in	  order	  to	  focus	  on	  improving	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  organization.	  They	  gave	  Dr.	  Chandra	  several	  key	  suggestions	  from	  improving	  the	  organization.	  First,	  because	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  is	  a	  non-­‐profit,	  charitable	  entity,	  many	  potential	  paying	  customers	  associate	  it,	  misguidedly,	  with	  lower	  quality	  care.	  They	  often	  travel	  to	  Hyderabad	  or	  Mumbai	  to	  receive	  the	  same	  level	  of	  care	  that	  they	  could	  find	  very	  close	  in	  Kakinada,	  usually	  for	  a	  lower	  price.	  These	  customers	  could	  help	  to	  offset	  the	  90%	  nonpaid	  surgeries	  that	  are	  conducted,	  and	  bring	  the	  Institute	  closer	  to	  full	  self-­‐sustainability.	  In	  addition,	  they	  found	  that	  actual	  awareness	  of	  the	  Institute	  and	  its	  goals	  and	  mission	  might	  be	  high	  in	  Toronto	  and	  Vancouver	  (where	  the	  fundraising	  comes	  from),	  but	  within	  Kakinada,	  many	  did	  not	  have	  a	  working	  knowledge	  about	  the	  level	  of	  eye	  care	  it	  provided.	  This	  basic	  awareness	  within	  the	  local	  community	  (from	  which	  the	  paying	  customers	  are	  drawn)	  is	  essential,	  and	  during	  my	  time	  there	  we	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tried	  to	  tackle	  it	  with	  some	  initial	  steps.	  This	  meant	  advertising	  heavily,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  increasing	  awareness	  of	  the	  high	  quality	  of	  its	  eye	  care	  services,	  along	  with	  the	  charitable	  focus.	  	  
	   Another	  aspect	  that	  Dr.	  Chandra	  hoped	  to	  focus	  on	  more	  was	  partnering	  with	  private	  organizations.	  In	  the	  “Wild	  West”	  healthcare	  system	  in	  India	  with	  government	  spending	  being	  extremely	  limited,	  private	  partnerships	  are	  even	  more	  important.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  talked	  of	  partnering	  with	  companies	  that	  had	  employee-­‐healthcare	  plans,	  since	  it	  brought	  in	  a	  large	  group	  of	  paying	  patients	  at	  once.	  Also,	  Dr.	  Chandra	  wanted	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  corporations	  that	  had	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  clauses,	  where	  it	  is	  stipulated	  that	  a	  certain	  percentage	  of	  profits	  annually	  are	  to	  be	  given	  to	  charitable	  causes.	  This	  often	  stems	  from	  a	  moral	  responsibility	  that	  the	  corporation	  feels,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  good	  advertising	  and	  PR	  for	  the	  corporation.	  The	  challenge,	  on	  the	  non-­‐profit’s	  side,	  is	  convincing	  the	  corporation	  that	  their	  cause	  is	  the	  most	  worthwhile	  causes	  to	  give	  to.	  For	  the	  charitable	  organization,	  this	  involves	  having	  an	  already	  well-­‐known	  profile,	  and	  personally	  appealing	  and	  lobbying	  the	  corporation.	  For	  example,	  after	  nearly	  three	  years	  of	  persistent	  calling	  and	  communication	  from	  Dr.	  Chandra,	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  received	  a	  45,000	  USD	  donation	  from	  the	  technology	  company	  Infosys.	  
	   Another	  key	  point	  of	  expansion	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  been	  the	  construction	  and	  self-­‐sustainability	  of	  four	  “vision	  centers,”	  which	  are	  compounds	  staffed	  only	  by	  technicians.	  They	  are	  spread	  around	  the	  city	  of	  Kakinada,	  and	  exist	  as	  fully	  functional	  appendages	  of	  the	  main	  hospital	  in	  the	  rural	  areas	  where	  this	  level	  of	  infrastructure	  is	  rare.	  The	  vision	  centers	  charge	  a	  nominal	  fee	  for	  checkups,	  and	  serve	  as	  awareness	  outposts.	  To	  date,	  there	  have	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been	  over	  along	  50,000	  outpatients,	  nearly	  13,000	  children	  screened,	  and	  20,000	  pairs	  of	  glasses	  prescribed.	  Because	  of	  the	  low	  cost	  of	  maintaining	  a	  vision	  center,	  the	  operating	  costs	  are	  completely	  paid	  for	  with	  the	  fee	  charged	  for	  consultations.	  	  
Eye	  Camps	  and	  Community	  Outreach	  Program	  
The	  eye	  camps	  are	  easily	  the	  most	  complex	  part	  of	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute’s	  organization,	  and	  are	  the	  source	  of	  the	  most	  needy	  patients	  that	  come	  through	  the	  doors	  of	  the	  Institute.	  All	  patients	  that	  participate	  in	  the	  camps	  are	  treated	  for	  absolutely	  no	  fee,	  so	  this	  is	  the	  largest	  charitable	  operation	  as	  well.	  The	  camps	  serve	  4	  major	  districts	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  and	  serve	  a	  population	  of	  ten	  million	  people.	  Each	  camp	  is	  meant	  to	  cover	  about	  10,000	  people,	  usually	  about	  20	  villages.	  	  
The	  initial	  step	  of	  the	  camps	  coming	  to	  fruition	  could	  come	  in	  two	  forms:	  either	  a	  local	  sponsor	  would	  come	  to	  Srikirin	  and	  ask	  to	  set	  up	  a	  camp,	  or	  Srikirin,	  through	  their	  Outreach	  staff,	  would	  identify	  an	  area	  of	  need	  themselves.	  The	  latter	  is	  much	  more	  common	  than	  the	  former.	  In	  that	  case,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Outreach	  team	  would	  visit	  the	  area	  searching	  for	  a	  local	  partner	  who	  could	  co-­‐sponsor	  the	  camp	  with	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute.	  This	  local	  co-­‐sponsor	  could	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  NGO,	  a	  government	  hospital,	  or	  anyone	  prominent	  locally.	  This	  step,	  I	  realized,	  requires	  an	  immense	  amount	  of	  cultural	  awareness	  and	  acuity.	  The	  outreach	  team	  initially	  just	  asks	  around	  a	  village	  or	  locality,	  or	  goes	  through	  connections	  that	  Srikirin	  already	  has	  in	  the	  areas.	  Finding	  sponsors	  in	  rural	  areas,	  where	  more	  of	  the	  need	  is,	  since	  doctors	  are	  less	  willing	  to	  work	  there,	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  compared	  to	  urban	  areas.	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   The	  local	  sponsors	  usually	  put	  in	  about	  15,000	  rupees	  (330	  USD)	  of	  financial	  help,	  and	  pay	  for	  lunch	  for	  everyone	  at	  the	  camp.	  But	  along	  with	  the	  financial	  assistance,	  they	  serve	  just	  as	  important	  of	  a	  role	  logistically,	  by	  picking	  out	  a	  suitable	  location	  (usually	  a	  school	  or	  hospital),	  setting	  up	  tents	  and	  seating,	  and	  making	  the	  local	  population	  more	  aware.	  “When	  it	  comes	  time	  to	  give	  credit	  and	  advertising,”	  Dr.	  Chandra	  told	  me,	  “We	  always	  put	  their	  name	  at	  the	  top	  and	  embolden	  it.	  This	  is	  not	  an	  ego-­‐battle	  for	  us,	  and	  it	  is	  probably	  better	  for	  local	  awareness	  since	  they	  know	  them	  better	  than	  us.	  It	  is	  some	  level	  of	  local	  involvement.”	  
	   The	  camp	  location	  choice	  and	  partnering	  with	  the	  local	  sponsor	  are	  both	  completed	  at	  least	  a	  month	  before	  the	  date	  of	  the	  eye	  camp,	  along	  with	  printing	  and	  distribution	  of	  brochures	  and	  posters.	  The	  camps	  begin	  at	  8:00am,	  and	  the	  first	  step	  is	  to	  inaugurate	  the	  camp	  as	  a	  partnership	  by	  cutting	  the	  ribbon	  together.	  The	  Srikirin	  Institute	  sends	  only	  primary	  technicians,	  most	  of	  whom	  are	  high-­‐school	  educated,	  to	  the	  camps.	  “Sending	  our	  doctors	  is	  not	  an	  efficient	  use	  of	  resources,”	  Dr	  Chandra	  told	  me.	  	  For	  the	  next	  five	  hours,	  full	  registration	  of	  each	  camp	  attendee	  is	  conducted.	  In	  addition,	  the	  technician	  would	  complete	  all	  essential	  tests,	  including	  testing	  intraocular	  pressure	  (an	  indicator	  of	  glaucoma),	  blood	  pressure,	  and	  vision	  testing,	  as	  well	  as	  looking	  for	  signs	  of	  cataract	  development	  with	  a	  flashlight.	  Usually,	  about	  150	  to	  300	  people	  are	  tested	  throughout	  the	  day.	  After	  lunch,	  which	  the	  local	  partner	  provides,	  the	  bussing	  of	  all	  patients	  who	  need	  further	  treatment	  at	  the	  main	  campus	  begins.	  The	  Srikirin	  Institute	  has	  2	  large	  buses	  and	  3	  smaller	  buses	  that	  are	  used	  to	  transport	  all	  the	  camp	  attendees	  from	  where	  they	  are	  to	  the	  hospital.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  distance	  could	  be	  up	  to	  250	  km,	  which	  could	  take	  several	  hours	  on	  the	  poor	  roads.	  Donkorai,	  a	  tribal	  region	  where	  three	  camps	  have	  taken	  place	  recently,	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is	  210	  km	  away.	  The	  patients	  are	  served	  dinner	  and	  they	  stay	  overnight	  in	  the	  ward	  of	  the	  main	  hospital.	  The	  next	  day,	  patients	  are	  scanned	  for	  corneal	  size	  (to	  determine	  the	  size	  of	  the	  replacement	  lens	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  implanted	  if	  cataract	  surgery	  is	  necessary),	  and	  readied	  for	  surgery.	  They	  rest	  for	  the	  day,	  and	  the	  next	  morning,	  at	  5:30	  AM,	  the	  technicians	  and	  doctors	  begin	  the	  marathon	  process	  of	  running	  all	  post-­‐surgery	  diagnostic	  tests,	  showing	  safety	  videos,	  distributing	  eyewear,	  and	  bussing	  all	  the	  patients	  back	  to	  their	  hometowns.	  	  
	   The	  whole	  process	  takes	  three	  days,	  but	  all	  the	  patients	  are	  consulted	  to	  return	  to	  the	  main	  hospital	  ten	  days	  and	  forty	  days	  after	  surgery,	  in	  order	  to	  run	  diagnostic	  tests	  and	  prevent	  any	  complications.	  Unlike	  many	  other	  hospitals,	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  has	  an	  extremely	  high	  rate	  of	  patient’s	  returning	  for	  follow-­‐ups,	  over	  90%,	  versus	  around	  70%	  for	  most	  eye	  hospitals	  that	  provide	  free	  surgeries,	  because	  of	  the	  free	  bussing	  and	  services.	  When	  the	  patients	  return,	  they	  pay	  a	  fee	  (40	  rupees	  or	  about	  one	  U.S.	  dollar)	  for	  the	  consultations	  and	  also	  pay	  for	  any	  medicines.	  There	  are	  some	  other	  providers	  in	  the	  districts	  for	  free	  surgeries,	  but	  none	  with	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute.	  	  	  
Programs	  with	  International	  NGOs	  
	   Dr.	  Chandra	  has	  participated	  in	  a	  number	  of	  partnerships	  with	  International	  NGOs,	  which	  have	  been	  essential	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute.	  It	  is	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship;	  the	  organizations	  often	  provide	  financial	  support	  for	  a	  specific	  project	  and	  Srikirin	  fulfils	  their	  mission	  with	  the	  resources	  that	  they	  have	  at	  hand.	  Rotary	  International	  is	  a	  partner	  that	  has	  sponsored	  many	  eye	  camps,	  through	  their	  local	  members	  in	  villages	  across	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  ORBIS	  International	  is	  another	  organization	  that	  Srikirin	  has	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partnered	  with	  in	  the	  past.	  ORBIS	  focuses	  on	  building	  capacity	  by	  partnering	  with	  local	  partners	  (NGOs,	  government	  health	  departments,	  and	  eye	  banks)	  on	  three-­‐year	  projects,	  in	  addition	  to	  its	  celebrated	  “flying	  eye	  hospital,”	  a	  DC-­‐10	  jet	  aircraft	  that	  houses	  a	  full	  hospital.	  ORBIS	  International	  partnered	  with	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  on	  developing	  a	  pediatric	  center,	  especially	  with	  infrastructure	  and	  training.	  
	   The	  Christoffel-­‐Blindenmission	  (CBM),	  of	  Germany,	  has	  also	  worked	  with	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute.	  They	  are	  a	  global	  organization	  focused	  on	  people	  in	  developing	  countries	  afflicted	  with	  disabilities.	  In	  1997,	  representatives	  from	  CBM,	  including	  their	  scientific	  advisor	  and	  G.N.	  Rao,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  L.V.	  Prasad	  (mentioned	  earlier),	  came	  to	  visit	  Dr.	  Chandra	  and	  were	  immediately	  impressed	  by	  the	  school	  and	  facilities.	  They	  started	  funding	  Srikirin,	  with	  the	  condition	  of	  thorough	  annual	  financial	  reports.	  Over	  the	  years,	  Srikirin	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  best	  performing	  organizations	  that	  CBM	  provides	  support	  to	  in	  India.	  However,	  Dr.	  Chandra	  recounted	  that,	  when	  he	  had	  last	  met	  with	  them,	  many	  more	  financial	  resources	  were	  being	  shifted	  to	  Africa	  from	  India.	  The	  reasons	  for	  the	  shift	  were	  varied.	  In	  India,	  CBM	  had	  been	  cheated	  by	  many	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  that	  were	  corrupt.	  CBM	  had	  relied	  on	  these	  organizations	  heavily,	  due	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  cultural	  integration	  to	  be	  effective.	  	  
	   However,	  the	  widest	  reaching	  program	  is	  the	  Vision	  2020	  Right	  to	  Sight	  program.	  	  In	  1999,	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  and	  the	  International	  Agency	  for	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Blindness	  (IAPB),	  an	  umbrella	  organization	  consisting	  of	  multiple	  blindness	  prevention	  NGOs,	  came	  together	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  eliminating	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  avoidable	  blindness	  by	  2020.	  Vision	  2020	  is	  a	  global	  program,	  and	  tries	  to	  bring	  together	  NGOs,	  Ministries	  of	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Health,	  corporations,	  and	  eye	  hospitals.	  Each	  country	  that	  they	  work	  in	  has	  a	  national	  coordinating	  committee,	  which	  develops	  technical	  plans	  to	  raise	  national	  capacities	  and	  mobilize	  resources.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  told	  me	  that	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  pays	  about	  20,000	  rupees	  (440	  USD)	  a	  month	  to	  attain	  membership	  of	  Vision	  2020	  and	  attend	  the	  meetings.	  There	  is	  also	  significant	  government	  representation	  at	  the	  meetings,	  including	  the	  head	  of	  the	  National	  Programme	  for	  Control	  of	  Blindness	  (NPCB)	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health.	  Truly,	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  points	  of	  interaction	  between	  the	  government	  and	  nonprofits	  on	  a	  national	  scale.	  The	  President	  of	  the	  Indian	  chapter	  of	  Vision	  2020	  is	  Thulasiraj	  Ravilla,	  who	  also	  happens	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  administrator	  at	  the	  aforementioned	  Aravind	  Eye	  Care	  System.	  	  
Public,	  Private,	  and	  Non-­‐profit	  Interaction	  in	  Delivering	  Eye	  Care	  
	   In	  1976,	  the	  Indian	  government	  began	  NPCB	  to	  tackle	  the	  rampant	  blindness	  nationwide,	  the	  first	  program	  of	  its	  scope.	  In	  terms	  of	  administration,	  the	  central	  government	  provides	  funding	  and	  broad	  guidelines	  that	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  money	  for	  the	  district	  level.	  The	  responsibility	  for	  the	  DBCS	  at	  the	  district	  level	  falls	  to	  the	  District	  Collector,	  civil	  servants	  who	  are	  the	  most	  powerful	  government	  officials	  of	  the	  district.	  Among	  their	  responsibilities	  are	  revenue	  collection,	  law	  and	  order,	  and	  emergency	  response.	  Currently,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  NPCB	  is	  on	  cataracts	  (as	  the	  primary	  cause	  of	  avoidable	  blindness	  in	  India),	  but	  recently	  they	  have	  initiated	  programs	  for	  diabetic	  retinopathy	  and	  pairs	  of	  spectacles.	  Theoretically,	  the	  DBCS	  should	  be	  leading	  the	  coordination	  of	  all	  the	  eye	  care	  providers	  in	  the	  district,	  efficiently	  refunding	  all	  cataract	  surgeries	  performed	  by	  any	  eye	  hospital	  for	  needy	  patients,	  and	  working	  to	  increase	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awareness	  district-­‐wide.	  In	  reality,	  administration	  is	  much	  more	  convoluted	  and	  complex,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  East	  Godavari	  district	  that	  I	  observed.	  	  
	   There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  NPCB	  at	  the	  district	  level,	  among	  them	  the	  lack	  of	  constant	  coordination	  (both	  at	  the	  district	  and	  national	  level),	  accountability,	  and	  transparency.	  Although	  it	  may	  be	  making	  a	  dent	  in	  the	  incidence	  rate	  of	  cataracts,	  it	  is	  not	  nearly	  as	  effective	  a	  program	  as	  it	  could	  be.	  First,	  the	  backlog	  of	  the	  DBCS	  in	  paying	  back	  hospitals	  for	  performing	  cataract	  surgeries	  for	  low-­‐income	  surgeries	  is	  enormous.	  In	  order	  to	  receive	  the	  funding,	  a	  printout	  of	  the	  exact	  patient	  details	  has	  to	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  district	  controller’s	  office	  
Without	  accountability,	  corruption	  is	  a	  major	  obstacle	  for	  efficient	  distribution.	  First,	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  DBCS	  falls	  to	  the	  District	  Collector,	  the	  most	  powerful	  government	  official	  of	  the	  district.	  The	  District	  Collector	  has	  many	  other	  responsibilities	  in	  the	  district	  and	  has	  little	  time	  to	  coordinate	  health	  issues	  in	  their	  district	  alone.	  At	  this	  moment,	  the	  district	  owes	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  dollars	  in	  refunds	  for	  cataract	  surgeries.	  If	  Srikirin	  were	  not	  so	  able	  in	  terms	  of	  fundraising,	  they	  literally	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  survive.	  The	  outlook	  is	  extremely	  bleak	  for	  smaller	  NGOs	  and	  hospitals	  that	  are	  looking	  to	  start	  up	  in	  the	  district,	  if	  they	  hope	  to	  receive	  the	  refunds.	  Often,	  the	  collector	  will	  ask	  for	  a	  3-­‐4%	  bribe	  in	  order	  to	  release	  the	  monies	  at	  a	  faster	  pace,	  and	  the	  first	  hospitals	  in	  the	  district	  to	  receive	  the	  funding	  when	  it	  comes	  from	  the	  central	  government	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  have	  paid	  the	  bribe.	  On	  purely	  ethical	  standards,	  Dr.	  Chandra	  refuses	  to	  pay	  the	  bribe,	  and	  because	  of	  his	  size,	  he	  is	  able	  to	  take	  that	  stand.	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   As	  mentioned,	  preventing	  blindness	  is	  not	  the	  highest	  priority	  task	  for	  the	  district	  collector.	  When	  I	  asked	  Dr.	  Chandra	  when	  the	  last	  district	  wide	  meeting	  of	  the	  DBCS	  had	  been,	  he	  recalled	  the	  last	  one	  had	  taken	  place	  four	  or	  five	  years	  ago.	  At	  the	  meeting,	  the	  District	  Collector,	  who	  had	  decided	  to	  take	  some	  action	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  blindness,	  had	  called	  together	  all	  the	  major	  providers	  of	  eye	  care	  services	  for	  a	  meeting.	  In	  the	  East	  Godavari	  District,	  populated	  by	  4.9	  million	  people,	  there	  are	  fifty-­‐four	  ophthalmologists	  total.	  Among	  the	  major	  providers	  were	  seven	  NGOs	  (including	  Srikirin),	  one	  teaching	  hospital,	  and	  one	  specialty	  hospital.	  At	  the	  time,	  out	  of	  the	  22,000	  annual	  cataract	  surgeries	  in	  the	  district,	  Srikirin	  performed	  a	  sizeable	  17,000,	  or	  65%,	  of	  them.	  	  
	   At	  the	  meeting,	  the	  District	  Collector	  had	  asked	  each	  of	  the	  hospital	  to	  put	  forth	  an	  estimate	  of	  about	  how	  many	  cataract	  surgeries	  they	  could	  perform	  daily.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  estimated,	  extremely	  conservatively,	  that	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  could	  perform	  about	  50	  surgeries	  a	  day	  with	  a	  staff	  of	  four	  ophthalmologists.	  The	  government	  teaching	  hospital	  though,	  with	  its	  staff	  of	  nearly	  20	  surgeons,	  estimated	  about	  5	  per	  day.	  When	  the	  Collector	  asked	  if	  they	  could	  perform	  at	  least	  ten	  a	  day,	  they	  replied	  that	  it	  was	  an	  impossible	  task.	  The	  District	  Collector	  could	  do	  little	  but	  request	  each	  hospital	  to	  perform	  slightly	  more	  surgeries,	  and	  even	  those	  requests	  could	  be	  shot	  down.	  Rather	  than	  the	  district	  wing	  of	  the	  NPCB	  giving	  vision	  and	  mission	  to	  all	  the	  eye	  health	  providers	  in	  the	  area,	  little	  was	  being	  accomplished.	  The	  DBCS	  served	  as	  little	  more	  than	  an	  unsatisfactory	  middleman	  for	  refunding	  the	  basic	  cataract	  surgeries.	  	  	  
	   Communication	  is	  insufficient,	  and	  often	  the	  hospitals	  are	  left	  in	  the	  dark	  as	  to	  which	  procedures	  are	  refundable	  and	  on	  new	  programs	  from	  the	  Centre	  Government.	  For	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example,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  Dr.	  Chandra	  attended	  the	  annual	  Vision	  2020	  meeting,	  which	  Srikirin	  pays	  a	  monthly	  fee	  to	  for	  membership,	  that	  he	  discovered	  that	  the	  NPCB	  program	  now	  refunded	  both	  diabetic	  retinopathy	  and	  spectacles.	  Unlike	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  eye	  care	  providers	  in	  India	  do	  not	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  directly	  in	  national	  Vision	  2020	  meetings,	  and	  are	  not	  privilege	  to	  this	  crucial	  health	  information.	  Somewhere,	  the	  important	  information	  is	  not	  being	  delivered	  fully.	  	  
	   	  On	  top	  of	  the	  inefficiency	  and	  corruption,	  the	  actual	  refund	  itself	  is	  insubstantial.	  The	  lowest	  cost	  cataract	  surgery	  at	  Srikirin,	  at	  the	  minimum	  quality	  standards,	  costs	  the	  hospital	  1500	  rupees	  (about	  30	  USD),	  without	  accounting	  for	  transportation	  of	  the	  patient.	  However,	  the	  government	  refund	  gives	  only	  half	  of	  that	  amount,	  about	  750	  rupees	  (15	  USD).	  This	  lower	  payment	  encourages	  a	  lower	  standard	  of	  surgical	  care,	  especially	  for	  average	  teaching	  hospitals	  or	  private	  hospitals	  that	  cannot	  afford	  to	  subsidize	  the	  difference	  as	  Srikirin	  can.	  	  
Ration	  Card	  System	  and	  Relation	  to	  Health	  Outcomes	  
Andhra	  Pradesh	  has	  a	  system	  of	  ration	  cards,	  in	  which	  citizens	  at	  different	  income	  levels	  receive	  color-­‐coded	  cards.	  The	  lowest	  income	  bracket	  receives	  white	  cards,	  which	  are	  important	  for	  receiving	  rice	  and	  oil	  rations.	  These	  white	  cards	  also	  serve	  to	  identify	  the	  below	  poverty	  line	  (BPL)	  citizens	  (less	  than	  an	  annual	  income	  of	  11,000	  rupees),	  and	  these	  identifications	  play	  out	  in	  many	  other	  government	  programs.	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  there	  are	  separate	  annual	  income	  limits	  for	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas.	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In	  practice,	  the	  NPCB	  program	  should	  only	  be	  serving	  patients	  that	  are	  below	  poverty	  line,	  and	  the	  only	  standard	  indicator	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  is	  whether	  the	  patient	  is	  a	  white	  cardholder.	  There	  are	  several	  problems	  with	  hospitals	  using	  the	  white	  card	  as	  the	  only	  indicator	  of	  poverty	  status.	  For	  one,	  fraudulence	  and	  counterfeit	  cards	  are	  rampant,	  and	  even	  fairly	  middle	  class	  citizens	  can	  get	  a	  hold	  of	  a	  counterfeit	  white	  card	  for	  a	  few	  hundred	  rupees.	  Dr.	  Chandra	  told	  me	  that	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  hesitated	  to	  mention	  the	  white	  card	  system	  at	  all	  in	  association	  with	  their	  free	  cataract	  surgeries,	  because	  it	  was	  so	  rampant	  with	  fake	  cards.	  There	  had	  been	  some	  cases	  where	  he	  had	  refused	  to	  treat	  a	  patient	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  white	  card	  because	  it	  was	  so	  obvious	  by	  looking	  at	  their	  jewelry	  and	  clothing	  that	  they	  were	  wealthier	  than	  the	  poverty	  line.	  	  While	  the	  white	  card	  is	  the	  primary	  indicator	  of	  poverty	  status,	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  treats	  many	  patients	  without	  white	  cards	  that	  are	  simply	  unable	  to	  pay.	  This	  highlights	  another	  problem:	  many	  of	  the	  actual	  impoverished	  do	  not	  receive	  the	  white	  card	  and	  therefore	  are	  not	  able	  to	  get	  full	  health	  benefits.	  	  
In	  addition,	  the	  process	  for	  distributing	  the	  white	  cards	  and	  then	  verifying	  the	  actual	  income	  status	  of	  the	  recipient	  is	  flawed.	  The	  Mandal	  Revenue	  Officer	  is	  the	  chief	  presiding	  officer	  for	  the	  rationing	  system,	  and	  oversees	  the	  “mandal”	  or	  an	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  administrative	  term	  for	  a	  grouping	  of	  villages	  that	  lies	  within	  a	  district.	  The	  mandal	  serves	  as	  a	  form	  of	  local	  government,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  mandals	  lie	  within	  each	  district.	  Administratively	  below	  the	  mandal	  is	  each	  village,	  termed	  the	  “Gram	  Panchayat.”	  The	  Mandal	  Revenue	  Officer	  issues	  all	  new	  cards,	  after	  conducting	  a	  detailed	  interview	  of	  each	  applicant,	  including	  details	  on	  occupation,	  dependents,	  and	  annual	  income.	  One	  could	  see	  all	  the	  opportunities	  for	  inefficiency,	  and	  the	  significant	  logistical	  issues	  in	  determining	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honestly	  who	  actually	  lives	  below	  the	  poverty	  line.	  There	  are	  many	  cases	  of	  cards	  being	  issued	  to	  dead	  persons,	  and	  even	  to	  the	  extremely	  affluent.	  
An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Health	  Reform	  movement:	  Aarogyasri	  and	  Eye	  Care	  
In	  2008,	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Chief	  Minister	  (Governor)	  Y.S.	  Rajashekhara	  Reddy,	  initiated	  a	  health	  program	  called	  the	  Rajiv	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  to	  provide	  health	  care	  for	  the	  poor.	  I	  visited	  an	  Aarogyasri	  health	  camp	  in	  a	  rural	  area;	  with	  a	  number	  of	  physicians,	  including	  some	  from	  Srikirin,	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  specialists,	  the	  camps	  were	  able	  to	  provide	  accessible	  care	  to	  citizens.	  
I	  interviewed	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Medical	  Camp	  Coordinator	  (AMCCO)	  at	  Srikirin,	  and	  he	  explained	  to	  me	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust,	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations	  at	  Srikirin.	  Essentially,	  the	  AMCCO	  serves	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  government	  program,	  and	  each	  hospital	  that	  participates	  in	  Aarogyasri	  has	  its	  own	  AMCCO.	  The	  Aarogyasri	  program	  was	  created	  in	  2007.	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  help	  all	  below	  poverty	  line	  (BPL)	  citizens	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  by	  having	  government	  funds	  pay	  the	  co-­‐payments	  on	  health	  bills	  of	  several	  essential	  procedures.	  The	  earliest	  program	  was	  termed	  “Phase	  I,”	  and	  was	  limited	  to	  a	  few	  districts	  and	  procedures	  for	  heart,	  brain,	  and	  kidney	  ailments.	  	  
In	  order	  for	  a	  person	  to	  show	  that	  they	  were	  eligible	  for	  the	  benefits	  of	  Aarogyasri,	  they	  had	  to	  be	  in	  possession	  of	  an	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Card.	  The	  distribution	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Card	  was	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  white	  card	  system,	  and	  really	  highlighted	  the	  intersections	  between	  the	  various	  levels	  of	  government	  in	  India.	  First,	  the	  elected	  official	  in	  each	  village,	  the	  “Panchayat	  Sarpanch”	  or	  chairperson,	  goes	  door	  to	  door	  and	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determines	  the	  financial	  status	  of	  every	  member	  of	  the	  village	  or	  town.	  From	  these	  door-­‐to-­‐door	  surveys,	  the	  aforementioned	  Mandal	  Revenue	  Officer	  compiles	  a	  list.	  There	  are	  1128	  Mandals	  in	  the	  state,	  and	  each	  Mandal	  is	  apportioned	  with	  30,000-­‐50,000	  people.	  The	  MRO	  reports	  the	  financial	  listings	  to	  a	  sub	  district	  level	  administrator	  called	  the	  Revenue	  Divisional	  Officer,	  whose	  responsibility	  it	  is	  to	  issue	  the	  cards.	  The	  card	  will	  have	  an	  image	  of	  the	  BPL	  family	  and	  dependents	  on	  it.	  	  
When	  the	  Aarogyasri	  program	  began,	  it	  was	  limited	  in	  scope	  and	  the	  free	  treatment	  was	  only	  given	  at	  primary	  health	  centers,	  community	  health	  centers,	  or	  government	  general	  hospitals.	  However,	  many	  of	  these	  health	  centers	  did	  not	  have	  the	  full	  capacity	  to	  treat	  many	  ailments,	  and	  the	  program	  was	  extended	  to	  private	  hospitals	  and	  corporate	  hospitals.	  Determining	  which	  hospitals	  are	  registered	  with	  the	  Aarogyasri	  health	  trust	  is	  a	  process	  unto	  itself.	  First,	  the	  hospital	  requests	  involvement	  with	  the	  program.	  Then	  representatives	  from	  the	  Board	  of	  Aarogyasri,	  which	  resides	  in	  Hyderabad	  and	  is	  made	  up	  of	  members	  of	  the	  Health	  Ministry,	  goes	  to	  each	  hospital	  and	  oversees	  proficient	  instruments,	  doctors,	  specialists,	  and	  bed	  strength.	  If	  a	  hospital	  becomes	  an	  Aarogyasri	  partner,	  1/3	  of	  their	  beds	  must	  be	  allotted	  to	  patients	  with	  the	  Aarogyasri	  program.	  If	  all	  specifications	  are	  met,	  the	  hospital	  signs	  an	  enormously	  complicated	  legal	  document	  and	  is	  endowed	  with	  the	  title	  of	  “network	  hospital.”	  There	  are	  727	  total	  network	  hospitals	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  	  
Under	  the	  Aarogyasri	  program,	  five	  eye	  procedures,	  and	  specifically	  does	  not	  include	  adult	  cataract	  surgeries	  (since	  these	  are	  already	  covered	  under	  the	  NPCB).	  The	  process	  for	  having	  a	  patient	  qualify	  for	  Aarogyasri	  begins	  by	  mailing	  a	  photo	  and	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preauthorization	  form.	  Then,	  the	  clinical	  notes	  must	  satisfy	  the	  panel	  of	  doctors	  in	  Hyderabad.	  The	  whole	  process	  is	  a	  cashless	  transaction	  for	  the	  patient.	  This	  is	  possible	  with	  the	  involvement	  of	  a	  private	  insurer,	  the	  Star	  Health	  and	  Allied	  Insurance	  Co.	  Ltd.	  In	  2007,	  Star	  Health	  went	  through	  a	  competitive	  bidding	  process	  to	  be	  chosen	  for	  the	  Aarogyasri	  program.	  In	  that	  year,	  the	  government	  paid	  66	  crores	  rupees	  (14.5	  million	  USD)	  to	  Star	  Health	  to	  cover	  2.3	  million	  people.	  	  The	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  is	  under	  the	  chairmanship	  of	  the	  Chief	  Minister,	  and	  they	  consult	  with	  the	  insurance	  specialists	  and	  medical	  professionals,	  and	  pay	  the	  premium	  to	  the	  private	  insurer,	  who	  in	  turn	  covers	  the	  hospital	  bills	  of	  the	  poor.	  	  
Another	  facet	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  program	  is	  the	  mandated	  camp	  program	  they	  run	  each	  month	  with	  every	  network	  hospital.	  Four	  to	  six	  camps	  are	  required	  of	  each	  hospital	  per	  month.	  The	  camps	  seek	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  more	  rural	  inaccessible	  areas.	  Usually,	  there	  will	  be	  three	  or	  four	  specialties	  at	  each	  camp,	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  resources.	  First,	  the	  AMCCO	  of	  each	  network	  hospital	  and	  the	  Regional	  Coordinator	  of	  Aarogyasri	  agree	  on	  several	  dates	  for	  camps.	  
My	  research	  trip	  to	  Srikirin	  to	  study	  the	  eye	  care	  networks	  in	  South	  India	  provided	  me	  a	  “day	  in	  the	  life”	  perspective	  of	  a	  health	  provider,	  with	  the	  myriad	  of	  interactions	  that	  the	  nongovernmental	  hospital	  underwent	  everyday	  with	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sector.	  It	  was	  also	  a	  shining	  example	  of	  an	  unadulterated	  success	  story.	  The	  Indian	  health	  landscape	  is	  riddled	  with	  failures	  from	  every	  angle;	  what	  I	  sought	  in	  my	  experience	  was	  an	  example	  success	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  ruin,	  and	  I	  tried	  to	  gleam	  what	  specific	  and	  generalizable	  lessons	  I	  could	  from	  Srikirin.	  It	  was	  the	  trip	  that	  would	  ignite	  my	  interest	  in	  this	  massive	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1.1. Public	  Health	  Systems	  as	  a	  Whole	  and	  Motivations	  for	  Reform	  
Reform	  within	  the	  health	  sector	  is	  a	  central	  issue	  for	  nations	  across	  the	  globe	  of	  all	  income-­‐levels	  and	  a	  fundamentally	  political	  process.	  Many	  health	  systems	  do	  not	  perform	  their	  central	  task	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  health	  status	  of	  their	  population	  to	  a	  maximal	  level.	  Health	  policy	  reform	  processes	  take	  on	  various	  forms	  and	  seek	  to	  improve	  diverse	  aspects	  of	  a	  complex	  health	  sector.	  These	  differences	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  ultimate	  ends	  of	  the	  health	  sector	  reform	  process:	  the	  expectations	  of	  what	  a	  health	  system	  should	  ultimately	  deliver,	  and	  how	  it	  should	  be	  structured.2	  Defining	  “health”	  along	  with	  the	  goals	  and	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  health	  sector	  in	  providing	  for	  the	  health	  of	  a	  population	  is	  essential	  before	  tackling	  the	  complexity	  inherent	  in	  the	  health	  reform	  process.	  These	  definitions	  and	  ends	  are	  ultimately	  politically	  determined,	  and	  shape	  the	  health	  reform	  process.	  	  
The	  ways	  in	  which	  health	  and	  the	  health	  sector	  are	  defined	  as	  goals	  within	  the	  development	  framework	  has	  transformed	  at	  least	  the	  language	  of	  the	  health	  policy	  debate	  in	  many	  developing	  nations,	  including	  India.	  This	  language	  has	  in	  turn	  affected	  the	  shape	  that	  health	  reform	  movements	  have	  taken;	  within	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  developing	  individual	  Indian	  states,	  the	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  what	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  the	  development	  process	  itself	  is.	  Along	  with	  investment	  in	  education	  and	  technological	  advancement,	  investment	  in	  health	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  inputs	  through	  which	  a	  state	  can	  impact	  its	  development.	  The	  form	  of	  the	  investment,	  the	  role	  of	  governments	  and	  markets,	  and	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  reform	  should	  take	  are	  still	  up	  for	  debate.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Hammer	  JS,	  Berman	  PA.	  Ends	  and	  means	  in	  public	  health	  policy	  in	  developing	  countries.	  In:	  Berman	  PA,	  editor.	  Health	  sector	  reform	  in	  developing	  countries:	  making	  health	  development	  sustainable.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  
	   31	  
Reform	  of	  the	  health	  sector	  is	  also	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  the	  development	  project.	  Health	  is	  clearly	  a	  central	  aspect	  to	  any	  development	  effort.	  It	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  poverty	  and	  economic	  deprivation.	  The	  definition	  of	  development	  itself	  is	  in	  contention,	  but	  it	  can	  largely	  be	  characterized	  as	  an	  effort	  towards	  improvement	  of	  the	  existing	  status	  of	  individuals	  and	  the	  human	  condition.	  Modernization	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  increased	  economic	  growth	  is	  often	  one	  essential	  aspect	  of	  development.	  Per	  capita	  income	  has	  been	  used	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  level	  of	  development	  of	  a	  nation	  and	  has	  come	  to	  define	  broad	  categories	  of	  developed	  and	  developing	  nations.	  India,	  clearly,	  falls	  into	  the	  latter	  group	  of	  low	  and	  middle-­‐income	  nations.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  economic	  growth,	  numerous	  studies	  have	  confirmed	  the	  notion	  that	  good	  health	  outcomes	  would	  translate	  to	  positive	  economic	  growth.	  Poor	  health	  directly	  causes	  reduced	  work	  productivity,	  preventing	  an	  individual	  from	  contributing	  to	  the	  larger	  economy.	  In	  addition,	  poor	  health	  can	  cripple	  whole	  families	  and	  communities	  and	  leave	  them	  further	  embedded	  in	  the	  “cycle	  of	  poverty.”	  
Disease	  has	  both	  direct	  and	  indirect	  economic	  costs	  to	  stricken	  impoverished	  households.	  Direct	  costs	  include	  the	  costs	  of	  seeking	  direct	  treatment,	  like	  transport,	  while	  indirect	  costs	  are	  characterized	  by	  loss	  of	  productive	  labor	  time.3	  	  With	  greater	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  high	  relative	  costs	  of	  healthcare,	  the	  result	  can	  be	  devastating.	  Studies	  in	  India	  on	  the	  impacts	  of	  tuberculosis,	  a	  chronic	  disease,	  showed	  that	  the	  average	  period	  of	  loss	  of	  wages	  was	  3	  months,	  and	  a	  20%	  of	  educational	  activities	  were	  prematurely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Russell	  S,	  2004.	  The	  economic	  burden	  of	  illness	  for	  households	  in	  developing	  countries:	  catastrophic	  or	  manageable?	  A	  review	  of	  studies	  focusing	  on	  malaria,	  tuberculosis,	  and	  human	  immuno-­‐deficiency	  virus/acquired	  immunodeficiency	  syndrome.	  Am	  J	  Trop	  Med	  Hyg	  71(Suppl	  2):	  147–155.	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discontinued	  due	  to	  the	  disease.4	  These	  expenditures	  are	  a	  larger	  portion	  of	  total	  expenditures,	  and	  the	  costs	  are	  debilitating	  for	  families	  that	  have	  already	  low	  household	  incomes.	  If	  certain	  diseases	  are	  left	  untreated	  due	  to	  high	  cost	  of	  treatment	  for	  impoverished	  families,	  they	  can	  compound	  the	  distress	  they	  cause,	  impeding	  educational	  and	  therefore	  economic	  progress.	  Health	  infrastructure	  is	  also	  lacking	  for	  the	  impoverished,	  in	  terms	  of	  sanitation,	  water	  systems,	  sufficient	  nutrition,	  and	  access	  to	  primary	  and	  secondary	  health	  care.	  These	  factors	  increase	  the	  burden	  of	  disease	  on	  those	  in	  the	  lowest	  income	  brackets.	  	  
Well-­‐being	  is	  an	  essential	  precursor,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  dividend,	  of	  economic	  growth.	  Health	  serves	  an	  instrumental	  role	  in	  providing	  economic	  growth	  and	  increasing	  GDP	  per	  capita.	  Historical	  studies	  on	  developed	  nations	  have	  showcased	  this	  instrumental	  role	  that	  health	  plays	  in	  economic	  development.5	  	  One	  WHO	  study	  correlated	  low	  infant	  mortality	  rates	  with	  higher	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth,	  where	  nations	  with	  an	  IMR	  of	  between	  50	  and	  100/1000	  live	  births	  had	  3.7%	  growth,	  while	  nations	  with	  an	  IMR	  of	  over	  150	  had	  only	  0.1%	  growth	  per	  year,	  on	  average.6	  	  
While	  high	  capacity	  health	  systems	  are	  correlated	  with	  economically	  productive	  citizens,	  some	  schools	  of	  thought	  have	  come	  to	  question	  this	  central	  notion	  of	  economic	  productivity	  as	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  development	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  Notably,	  the	  “capability	  approach,”	  spearheaded	  by	  Amartya	  Sen	  and	  Martha	  Nussbaum,	  questioned	  the	  use	  of	  per	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Rajeswari	  R,	  Balasubramanian	  R,	  Muniyandi	  M,	  Geetharamani	  S,	  Thresa	  X,	  Venkatesan	  P,	  1999.	  Socio-­‐economic	  impact	  of	  tuberculosis	  on	  patients	  and	  family	  in	  India.	  Int	  J	  Tuberc	  Lung	  Dis	  3:	  869–877.	  5	  Sachs,	  J.	  et	  al.	  Commission	  on	  Macroeconomics	  and	  Health.	  Macroeconomics	  and	  health:	  investing	  in	  health	  for	  economic	  development.	  Geneva:	  WHO,	  2001	  6	  Lustig,	  N.,	  Gonzalez,	  E.	  Mexican	  Commission	  on	  Macroeconomics	  and	  Health.	  Investing	  in	  health	  for	  economic	  development:	  Executive	  Summary.	  Puebla,	  Mexico:	  Universidad	  de	  las	  Americas,	  2004.	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capita	  GDP	  as	  a	  marker	  for	  economic	  development.	  Without	  consideration	  of	  distribution	  of	  the	  benefits	  or	  integrality	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  per	  capita	  GDP	  becomes	  the	  end.	  Instead,	  the	  capability	  approach	  views	  poverty	  not	  solely	  through	  a	  financial	  lens,	  but	  also	  sees	  it	  as	  deprivation	  of	  the	  capabilities	  of	  man	  and	  those	  means	  that	  allow	  freedom,	  like	  sanitation,	  access	  to	  physicians,	  and	  education.	  7	  
In	  the	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  functioning,	  political	  arrangements	  should	  be	  directed	  towards	  a	  structure	  that	  maximizes	  a	  “good	  life,”	  beyond	  attainment	  of	  wealth	  as	  its	  own	  end.8	  Health	  is	  an	  essential	  portion	  of	  the	  human	  good	  that	  Aristotle	  circles	  as	  the	  end	  for	  political	  action.	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  functioning	  rests	  on	  the	  fundamental	  obligation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  society	  to	  provide	  and	  empower	  its	  citizens	  towards	  the	  goal	  of	  “human	  flourishing.”9	  Health	  care,	  as	  the	  focal	  determinant	  of	  health	  and	  a	  main	  line	  of	  intervention	  by	  the	  state,	  holds	  weight	  in	  allowing	  the	  human	  flourishing	  to	  be	  enabled.	  This	  line	  of	  thought	  has	  influenced	  Amartya	  Sen’s	  capabilities	  approach	  to	  development.	  He	  argues	  that	  poverty	  is	  not	  only	  defined	  by	  lack	  of	  material	  resources,	  but	  also	  by	  ill	  health.	  Here,	  health	  is	  an	  end	  and	  not	  only	  a	  means	  to	  the	  end	  of	  economic	  growth.	  Poverty,	  then,	  is	  not	  only	  a	  cause	  and	  result	  of	  ill	  health.	  In	  this	  paradigm,	  ill	  health	  itself	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  poverty.	  	  
Rights-­‐based	  approaches,	  whether	  to	  development	  as	  a	  collective	  right	  or	  to	  health	  as	  an	  individual	  right,	  have	  had	  normative	  consequences	  for	  global	  and	  national	  health	  law.	  The	  UN	  declared	  a	  right	  to	  health	  as	  early	  as	  1966,	  where	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	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  Sen	  A.	  Development	  as	  Freedom.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999.	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  Ruger	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  Health	  and	  Social	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  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010.	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  Ruger	  JP.	  Health	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Economic,	  Social,	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (ICESCR)	  enshrined	  “the	  right	  of	  everyone	  to	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  highest	  attainable	  standard	  of	  physical	  and	  mental	  health”.10	  Still,	  this	  individual	  right	  to	  health	  has	  faced	  criticism	  as	  both	  not	  matching	  up	  to	  state	  beliefs	  in	  their	  own	  obligations	  to	  citizens	  as	  well	  as	  having	  little	  explanatory	  power	  for	  the	  true	  determinants	  of	  health.	  An	  alternative	  has	  been	  the	  ‘right	  to	  development’	  that	  focuses	  on	  social	  justice.	  The	  various	  interdependent	  rights	  contribute	  to	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  ‘right	  to	  development’	  that	  are	  all	  equally	  important.	  In	  the	  case	  study	  for	  Andhra,	  we	  will	  see	  how	  this	  interdependence	  of	  financial	  security	  and	  health	  status	  towards	  an	  emergent	  ‘right	  to	  development’	  informed	  the	  reform	  movement,	  even	  though	  the	  reforms	  were	  focused	  on	  solely	  providing	  healthcare.	  	  	  	  
Developing	  the	  nature	  of	  health	  as	  a	  goal	  in	  development	  is	  a	  process	  that	  has	  informed	  and	  transformed	  at	  least	  the	  language	  of	  the	  health	  policy	  debate	  in	  many	  developing	  nations,	  including	  India.	  This	  language	  has	  in	  turn	  affected	  the	  shape	  that	  health	  reform	  movements	  have	  taken;	  within	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  developing	  individual	  Indian	  states,	  the	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  what	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  the	  development	  process	  itself	  is.	  Along	  with	  investment	  in	  education	  and	  technological	  advancement,	  investment	  in	  health	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  inputs	  through	  which	  a	  state	  can	  impact	  its	  development.	  The	  form	  of	  the	  investment,	  the	  role	  of	  governments	  and	  markets,	  and	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  reform	  should	  take	  are	  still	  up	  for	  debate.	  	  
What	  is	  the	  health	  sector?	  The	  health	  sector	  differs	  widely	  across	  nations,	  and	  across	  individual	  states	  within	  India.	  It	  encompasses	  all	  institutions	  that	  enable	  citizenry	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  A.	  M.	  Fox	  and	  B.	  M.	  Meier,	  “Health	  as	  freedom:	  Addressing	  social	  determinants	  of	  global	  health	  inequities	  through	  the	  human	  right	  to	  development,”	  Bioethics	  23/2	  (2009),	  pp.	  112–122.	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have	  improved	  health	  outcomes.	  The	  World	  Health	  Organization	  states	  that	  a	  well	  functioning	  health	  system	  improves	  the	  health	  status	  of	  individuals,	  families,	  and	  communities,	  defends	  against	  threats	  to	  the	  population’s	  health,	  protects	  individuals	  against	  financial	  consequences	  of	  disease,	  and	  provides	  equitable	  access.	  11	  These	  institutions	  can	  be	  governmental	  or	  nongovernmental,	  and	  include	  preventative,	  primary,	  and	  secondary	  health	  services.	  In	  sum,	  the	  health	  sector	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  “totality	  of	  policies,	  programs,	  institutions,	  and	  actors	  that	  provide	  health	  care	  -­‐	  organized	  efforts	  to	  treat	  and	  prevent	  disease.”12	  	  
The	  health	  system	  can	  be	  viewed	  in	  either	  an	  “inventory”	  approach,	  in	  which	  the	  elements	  are	  associated	  by	  the	  common	  function	  of	  providing	  healthcare,	  or	  a	  “relational”	  approach,	  in	  which	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  various	  units	  are	  also	  taken	  into	  account.13	  The	  second	  approach	  will	  be	  utilized	  within	  this	  paper;	  in	  seeking	  to	  understand	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  reform,	  the	  individual	  elements	  driving	  the	  system	  towards	  providing	  health	  care	  must	  be	  understood	  within	  a	  network	  of	  bidirectional	  interactions.	  The	  political	  and	  economic	  changes	  in	  a	  health	  system	  come	  from	  various	  actors’	  actions,	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  actions	  on	  other	  units	  within	  the	  health	  system,	  and	  the	  institutional	  backdrop	  that	  allows	  or	  prevents	  certain	  actions	  from	  being	  possible.	  Different	  actors	  have	  different	  modes	  of	  participation	  within	  the	  system:	  the	  state,	  for	  example,	  can	  participate	  non-­‐exclusively	  through	  regulation,	  financing,	  and	  service	  provision,	  and	  studies	  of	  OECD	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (2010).	  	  “Key	  Components	  of	  a	  Well	  Functioning	  Health	  System.”	  12	  Berman,	  P.	  (1995)	  Health	  sector	  reform:	  making	  health	  development	  sustainable.	  In	  Health	  Sector	  Reform	  in	  Developing	  Countries:	  Making	  Health	  Development	  Sustainable,	  ed.	  P.	  Berman,	  pp.	  13±36.	  Harvard	  School	  of	  Public	  Health,	  Boston.	  13	  Frenk,	  J.(1994).Dimensions	  of	  health	  system	  reform.	  Health	  Policy,	  27,	  19–34.	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nations	  have	  shown	  an	  increasing	  trend	  towards	  a	  mixed	  approach	  for	  governments.14	  Complexity	  is	  also	  a	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  the	  health	  system,	  and	  one	  that	  requires	  a	  corresponding	  deftness	  in	  political	  analysis.	  	  
The	  health	  sector	  serves	  as	  a	  central	  means	  to	  the	  end	  of	  beneficial	  health	  outcomes	  and	  positive	  health	  status	  and	  well	  being	  for	  the	  citizenry	  of	  a	  state.	  With	  ethical	  clarity	  on	  the	  ultimate	  end-­‐goal	  of	  providing	  for	  the	  health	  of	  the	  people,	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  procedural	  shape	  that	  the	  health	  system	  should	  take	  in	  moving	  towards	  this	  end	  goal	  can	  take	  place.	  Reform	  is	  ultimately	  centered	  on	  transformation	  of	  the	  existing	  system	  into	  one	  that	  aligns	  more	  sharply	  with	  the	  capability	  to	  provide	  better	  health	  outcomes	  effectively,	  
efficiently,	  and	  equitably.	  Financial	  sustainability	  and	  distributive	  justice	  concerns	  are	  often	  the	  driving	  force	  of	  reform	  efforts.15;16	  In	  both	  categories,	  there	  are	  negotiations	  around	  concerns	  of	  quality,	  access,	  and	  cost.	  	  These	  three	  characteristics	  of	  a	  health	  care	  system	  compose	  the	  “iron	  triangle”	  of	  health	  care,	  with	  which	  any	  single	  corner	  of	  the	  triangle	  cannot	  be	  improved	  without	  compromising	  the	  other	  two.17	  Reform	  of	  the	  health	  sector	  is	  occurring	  in	  many	  nations	  across	  the	  world,	  and	  various	  methods	  of	  reform	  are	  being	  experimented	  with	  at	  different	  scales.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Rothgang,	  H.,	  Cacace,	  M.,	  Grimmeisen,	  S.	  and	  Wendt,	  C.	  (2005)	  ‘The	  Changing	  Role	  of	  the	  State	  in	  Health	  Care	  Systems’,	  European	  Review	  13	  (1):	  187–212.	  15	  Norman	  Daniels,	  "Justice,	  Health,	  and	  Healthcare,"	  American	  Journal	  of	  Bioethics	  1	  (	  2001):3.	  16	  Thomson	  S,	  Foubister	  T,	  Figueras	  J,	  Kutzin	  J,	  Permanand	  G,	  Bryndová	  L.	  Addressing	  financial	  sustainability	  in	  health	  systems.	  Colombia:	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  European	  Observatory	  on	  Health	  Systems	  and	  Policies;	  2009.	  	  	  	  17	  William	  L.	  Kissick,	  Medicine's	  Dilemmas:	  Infinite	  Needs	  Versus	  Finite	  Resources	  (1994).	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The	  health	  care	  system	  has	  three	  types	  of	  inputs	  that	  reform	  can	  affect:	  health	  care	  law,	  financing,	  and	  organization.18	  Policies	  include	  actions	  like	  regulation	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  legal	  codifications	  of	  a	  “right	  to	  health	  care.”	  	  Level	  of	  expenditure	  and	  salaries	  of	  health	  care	  providers	  fall	  under	  financing,	  and	  the	  actual	  organization	  of	  the	  health	  system	  can	  include	  the	  proportion	  of	  public	  and	  private	  providers	  along	  with	  the	  geographical	  distribution	  of	  health	  facilities.	  Health	  systems	  can	  be	  evaluated	  on	  their	  outcomes	  in	  the	  population	  served:	  satisfaction	  of	  participants	  within	  the	  system,	  improvement	  in	  health	  status,	  maximization	  of	  value	  of	  resources,	  fair	  distribution,	  and	  accessibility	  to	  disadvantaged	  groups.	  	  
Equity	  is	  often	  the	  stated	  goal	  of	  health	  reform	  movements,	  including	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  	  Whitehead	  defines	  health	  inequity	  as	  “differences	  in	  health	  that	  are	  unnecessary,	  avoidable,	  unfair,	  and	  unjust.”19	  As	  confronted	  in	  the	  Whitehead	  document,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  inequities	  in	  the	  provision	  and	  distribution	  of	  health	  services	  and	  the	  level	  and	  quality	  of	  health.	  However,	  the	  provision	  of	  health	  services	  is	  causally	  linked	  to	  the	  eventual	  output	  of	  health	  outcomes,	  while	  biological	  and	  environmental	  determinants	  do	  play	  a	  role.	  The	  goal	  of	  health	  equity	  is	  not	  to	  reduce	  the	  differences	  in	  quality	  of	  health,	  but	  provide	  “fair	  opportunity	  to	  attain	  full	  health	  potential.”	  Amartya	  Sen	  highlights	  this	  distinction	  between	  achievement	  of	  health	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  Kruk	  ME,	  Freedman	  LP.	  Assessing	  health	  system	  performance	  in	  developing	  countries:	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature.	  Health	  Policy	  2008;85:263-­‐76	  19	  Whitehead	  M.	  The	  concepts	  and	  principles	  of	  equity	  and	  health.	  Copenhagen:	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  1990.	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and	  capability	  to	  achieve	  good	  health,	  and	  further	  distinguishes	  the	  fairness	  and	  nondiscrimination	  of	  the	  processes	  of	  health.20	  
	   Equity	  is	  related	  to	  the	  social	  justice	  tenet	  of	  reform	  movements.	  It	  relies	  on	  the	  just	  distribution	  of	  resources	  that	  are	  communal	  in	  nature.	  Health	  equity	  can	  also	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  “absence	  of	  systematic	  disparities	  in	  health	  (or	  its	  social	  determinants)	  between	  more	  and	  less	  advantaged	  social	  groups.”21	  Fundamentally,	  equity	  in	  health	  is	  a	  normative	  concept	  that	  drives	  reform	  to	  drive	  health	  resources	  to	  be	  broadly	  accessible.	  The	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  saw	  worldwide	  health	  equity	  reform	  movements,	  including	  the	  “health	  for	  all”	  movement’s	  emergence	  out	  of	  the	  WHO-­‐UNICEF	  1978	  Alma-­‐Ata	  Conference	  that	  pushed	  for	  expansion	  of	  primary	  and	  preventative	  care	  to	  the	  poor.22	  These	  movements	  focused	  on	  the	  substantial	  gap	  between	  health	  outcomes	  along	  geographical,	  gender,	  and	  racial	  lines.	  	  In	  addition	  there	  was,	  and	  continues	  to	  be,	  a	  substantial	  focus	  on	  the	  socioeconomic	  “gradient,”	  in	  which	  a	  lower	  socioeconomic	  status	  is	  tied	  to	  worse	  health.	  This	  phenomenon	  has	  been	  shown	  globally	  in	  nations	  of	  all	  income	  levels.23	  
	   According	  to	  the	  WHO,	  responsiveness	  of	  a	  health	  system	  is	  a	  key	  criteria	  for	  measuring	  performance,	  and	  is	  composed	  of	  respect	  for	  patient	  dignity,	  autonomy,	  confidentiality,	  prompt	  attention,	  quality	  of	  amenities,	  and	  choice	  of	  care	  providers.24	  Often	  in	  low	  and	  middle-­‐income	  nations,	  public	  health	  services	  benefit	  the	  wealthiest	  rather	  than	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  Sen	  A.	  Why	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  Health	  Econ	  2002;	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  Braveman	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  Gruskin	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  Journal	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  57:254-­‐8.	  	  22	  Gwatkin,	  D.R.	  2001.	  The	  Need	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  Health	  Sector	  Reforms.	  International	  Journal	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  Epidemiology	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  Lancet	  2007;	  370:	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  Kim	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  public	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  health	  system	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the	  poor.25	  Lack	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  the	  socioeconomically	  disadvantaged	  and	  the	  regressive	  status	  of	  health	  systems	  has	  inspired	  “pro-­‐poor”	  reforms,	  rather	  than	  reforms	  that	  emphasize	  cumulative	  gains.26	  The	  two	  main	  mechanisms	  of	  transforming	  a	  health	  system	  to	  be	  more	  equitable	  are	  service	  delivery	  and	  financing.27	  Free	  or	  low-­‐cost	  procedures	  for	  poor	  citizens	  can	  often	  make	  up	  the	  framework	  for	  a	  “pro-­‐poor”	  reform	  process.	  Financing	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  major	  source	  of	  inequity;	  even	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  health	  costs	  can	  leave	  the	  vulnerable	  poor	  in	  financial	  ruin.	  In	  some	  Indian	  states,	  the	  poor	  are	  even	  more	  likely	  to	  borrow	  in	  public	  sector	  hospitals	  than	  the	  private	  sector.28	  Additionally,	  expansion	  of	  available	  health	  facilities	  to	  geographies	  previously	  lacking	  them	  can	  transform	  access	  to	  service	  delivery.	  	  
In	  assessing	  the	  performance	  and	  quality	  of	  a	  health	  system	  to	  evaluate	  its	  potential	  for	  reform,	  two	  other	  key	  pillars	  remain:	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness.	  These	  two	  characteristics	  of	  health	  systems	  highlight	  the	  economic	  forces	  that	  often	  drive	  political	  and	  ideological	  pushes	  for	  health	  reform.	  Effectiveness	  relies	  on	  the	  processes	  of	  healthcare	  resulting	  in	  an	  improvement	  in	  health	  and	  quality	  of	  life,	  while	  efficiency	  is	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  maximization	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  health	  resources.29	  Through	  either	  process	  indicators	  or	  health	  outcomes,	  the	  two	  can	  be	  measured	  and	  evaluated.	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Effectiveness,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	  evaluated	  through	  the	  framework	  of	  patient	  satisfaction	  or	  the	  quality	  of	  procedures,	  both	  ways	  of	  determining	  social	  benefits	  and	  comparing	  to	  the	  social	  costs	  and	  unique	  challenges.	  Efficiency	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  various	  ways:	  technical	  (maximizing	  improvement	  from	  a	  single	  intervention),	  productive	  (comparatively	  efficient	  versus	  the	  alternative),	  or	  efficiency	  of	  allocation(from	  a	  global	  perspective).	  In	  evaluating	  efficiency,	  health	  care	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  the	  intermediary	  between	  health	  resources	  allocated	  and	  health	  outcomes	  produced.	  These	  “resource	  inputs”	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  costs	  (including	  health	  expenditures	  as	  a	  portion	  of	  GDP).	  30	  
Reform,	  once	  these	  goals	  are	  clarified,	  occurs	  on	  varying	  levels	  within	  the	  health	  care	  system	  and	  to	  various	  degrees.	  Frenk	  isolates	  four	  potential	  policy	  levels	  for	  reform	  within	  the	  system:	  systemic,	  programmatic,	  organizational,	  and	  instrumental.31	  Among	  these	  “levels,”	  differences	  arise	  in	  goals,	  mechanism	  and	  difficulty	  of	  institution	  of	  reform,	  and	  central	  issues.	  For	  systemic	  reform,	  for	  example,	  eligibility	  and	  institutional	  arrangements	  themselves	  may	  be	  altered	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  seeing	  an	  improvement	  in	  equitability	  of	  the	  system.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  lower	  “level”	  such	  as	  the	  organizational	  one	  may	  be	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  technical	  efficiency	  through	  either	  an	  increase	  in	  productivity	  or	  quality	  of	  care.	  	  
One	  can	  imagine	  the	  significant	  difficulties	  inherent	  in	  a	  transformational	  reform.	  Reforms	  that	  call	  for	  larger-­‐scale,	  institutional	  change	  are	  also	  beholden	  to	  political	  resistance	  from	  actors	  with	  vested	  interests	  within	  the	  system.	  If,	  however,	  the	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simultaneous	  push	  for	  reform	  is	  pursued	  in	  a	  politically	  feasible	  atmosphere	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  right	  interest	  groups	  in	  the	  right	  institutional	  context,	  systemic	  reform	  can	  occur.	  Additionally,	  systemic	  reform	  within	  a	  nation	  is	  most	  often	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  within	  the	  system.	  In	  calls	  for	  equity	  and	  changes	  of	  interrelations	  of	  the	  many	  aforementioned	  components	  within	  the	  health	  care	  system,	  only	  governmental	  bodies	  have	  the	  authority	  and	  jurisdiction	  to	  institute	  systemic	  change	  through	  policy	  formation.	  This	  holds	  true	  even	  if	  the	  governmental	  bodies	  have	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  reform,	  for	  good	  or	  for	  ill.	  	  	  
Hsaio	  defines	  “control	  knobs”	  as	  the	  main	  centers	  of	  adjustment	  for	  health	  reform	  efforts:	  financing,	  payment,	  organization,	  regulation,	  and	  consumer	  behavior.32	  In	  doing	  so,	  one	  can	  differentiate	  substantial,	  “big	  R”	  reform,	  in	  which	  multiple	  knobs	  are	  effected,	  from	  “small	  R”	  reforms.	  Examples	  of	  “small	  R”	  reforms	  include	  the	  introduction	  of	  user	  charges	  in	  public	  clinics.33	  The	  topic	  of	  study	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  a	  “big	  R”	  reform	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  India.	  A	  multitude	  of	  political	  factors	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  encompassing	  reform	  movement,	  culminating	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Rajiv	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Community	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  among	  other	  significant	  policy	  changes.	  Fundamentally,	  how	  did	  a	  substantial	  health	  care	  reform	  program	  arise	  in	  a	  political	  context?	  Additionally,	  how	  did	  the	  political	  backdrop	  for	  the	  reform	  movement	  within	  the	  state	  impact	  its	  ultimate	  shape	  and	  breadth?	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1.2. Indian	  Public	  Health	  Infrastructure	  
The	  health	  care	  system	  in	  India	  is	  in	  a	  perilous	  state.	  Viable	  options	  for	  care	  are	  few	  for	  the	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  that	  live	  in	  abject	  poverty.	  In	  addition,	  the	  preventative	  public	  health	  infrastructure,	  consisting	  of	  community	  health	  and	  primary	  health	  care	  centers,	  along	  with	  larger	  scale	  interventions	  like	  water	  sanitation	  and	  healthcare	  worker	  availability,	  are	  woefully	  inadequate.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  situation,	  state	  spending	  in	  India	  remains	  low,	  even	  for	  developing	  nations;	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  GDP	  is	  spent	  on	  health.	  34	  This	  is	  troubling	  in	  both	  the	  public	  health	  and	  medical	  spending,	  where	  health	  needs	  are	  vastly	  overshadowing	  the	  health	  systems	  that	  seek	  to	  address	  them.	  	  
A	  still-­‐rapidly	  expanding	  population,	  modernization	  with	  rapid	  urbanization,	  the	  nutrition	  transitions,	  and	  the	  looming	  threat	  of	  pandemics	  in	  infectious	  disease	  bring	  new	  health	  issues	  to	  the	  forefront,	  and	  emphasize	  old	  ones	  as	  well.	  	  Building	  a	  sustainable	  and	  universal	  health	  system	  that	  can	  address	  multiple	  health	  targets	  will	  be	  essential,	  especially	  for	  developing	  nations	  like	  India.	  In	  India,	  less	  than	  15%	  of	  the	  population	  is	  currently	  covered	  under	  a	  health	  plan.35	  The	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  payments	  to	  private	  providers	  that	  make	  up	  most	  health	  transactions	  in	  the	  nation	  disproportionately	  impact	  the	  poor,	  who	  have	  little	  to	  no	  savings.	  The	  result	  is	  enormous	  amounts	  of	  crippling	  indebtedness	  that	  pushes	  the	  inescapable	  cycle	  of	  poverty	  forward.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Lancet	  medical	  journal,	  costs	  of	  health	  care,	  including	  the	  high	  reliance	  on	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  payments,	  brings	  about	  37	  million	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people	  into	  poverty	  in	  India	  annually.36	  The	  health	  system	  leaves	  much	  of	  the	  population	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  whims	  of	  illness	  and	  disease.	  One	  study	  showcased	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  inverse	  care	  law,	  in	  which	  those	  with	  the	  greatest	  need	  have	  the	  greatest	  difficulty	  in	  accessing	  health	  care,	  in	  relation	  to	  maternal	  and	  child	  services	  in	  India.37	  
While	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  may	  be	  shocking,	  equally	  shocking	  is	  the	  level	  of	  inconsistencies	  among	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  nearly	  every	  health	  marker.	  In	  terms	  of	  vaccination	  coverage,	  for	  example,	  the	  rates	  range	  from	  above	  70%	  in	  Tamil	  Nadu	  all	  the	  way	  to	  ranging	  from	  10-­‐20%	  in	  Nagaland.38	  State	  to	  state	  differences	  in	  prominent	  development	  markers,	  including	  health	  ones,	  showcase	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  state	  level	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  nation.	  India	  is	  a	  federation,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  and	  most	  reforms	  and	  programs	  occur	  at	  the	  state	  jurisdiction.	  	  States	  in	  India	  are	  the	  main	  actor	  of	  public	  good	  distribution,	  and	  political	  accountability	  by	  the	  citizenry	  does	  not	  buck	  the	  trend.39	  
State	  borders	  are	  not	  the	  limit	  of	  vast	  disparities	  and	  enormous	  variation	  in	  health	  outcomes.	  As	  Bajpai	  noted,	  “health	  status	  in	  India	  varies	  systematically	  between	  rural-­‐urban	  location,	  membership	  of	  scheduled	  caste	  and	  tribe,	  and	  by	  age	  and	  gender.”40	  Questions	  of	  distributive	  justice	  are	  embedded	  in	  India’s	  health	  structure.	  It	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  “structural	  violence”	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  preventable	  illness.	  Paul	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Farmer,	  et	  al,	  describe	  structural	  violence	  as	  “structural	  because	  they	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  organization	  of	  our	  social	  world;	  they	  are	  violent	  because	  they	  cause	  injury	  to	  people	  (typically,	  not	  those	  responsible	  for	  perpetuating	  such	  inequalities).”41	  It	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  research	  paper	  to	  look	  at	  an	  example	  of	  a	  movement	  to	  conduct	  structural	  interventions	  to	  improve	  the	  social	  machinery	  that	  drives	  health	  outcomes.	  	  
The	  path	  of	  liberalization	  that	  India	  began	  in	  1991	  has	  transformed	  the	  health	  care	  industry.	  Eighty	  percent	  of	  the	  healthcare	  economy	  is	  made	  up	  of	  private	  providers-­‐	  a	  total	  valued	  of	  more	  than	  $34	  billion.42	  Rising	  rates	  of	  chronic	  conditions	  and	  a	  growing	  middle-­‐class	  with	  disposable	  income	  have	  enabled	  this	  growth.	  The	  quality	  of	  care	  at	  many	  of	  these	  institutions,	  almost	  all	  urban,	  is	  extremely	  high.	  World-­‐class	  care	  at	  the	  rapidly-­‐growth	  corporate	  sector	  has	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  medical	  tourism.	  Even	  preceding	  liberalization	  though,	  the	  private	  sector	  remained	  the	  haven	  for	  higher	  quality	  medical	  care	  despite	  higher	  cost.	  India’s	  health	  system	  lacked	  sufficient	  funding	  initially	  for	  the	  public	  sector,	  and	  even	  further	  reductions	  in	  spending	  resulted	  from	  recession	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  restructuring	  of	  international	  loans.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  lackluster	  public	  sector	  and	  a	  growth	  of	  technical	  expertise	  and	  innovation	  limited	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  for	  decades.	  Private	  health	  care	  accounts	  for	  80-­‐85%	  of	  all	  physicians	  and	  93%	  of	  hospitals.43	  Additionally,	  the	  overall	  share	  of	  private	  sector	  within	  health	  is	  upwards	  of	  70%.44	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The	  result	  has	  been	  a	  two-­‐tiered	  system:	  the	  efficient	  and	  high	  quality	  care	  that	  constitutes	  the	  rapidly	  proliferating	  private	  industry	  and	  the	  lackluster	  and	  disintegrating	  public	  sector.	  This	  health	  care	  system,	  stemming	  from	  the	  wave	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	  policies	  initiated	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  serves	  two	  distinct	  populations	  bifurcated	  along	  socioeconomic	  lines.	  Between	  8-­‐12%	  of	  the	  second	  lowest	  quintile	  socioeconomically	  falls	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  due	  to	  health	  expenditures.	  .45	  Curative	  care	  can	  devastate	  a	  family	  at	  an	  inopportune	  time,	  driving	  them	  into	  further	  debt.	  Households	  in	  the	  bottom	  twenty	  percent	  of	  the	  income	  brackets	  receive	  10.10%	  of	  public	  subsidies,	  while	  the	  top	  20%	  receive	  30%.46	  
Government	  dollars	  consist	  of	  most	  public	  health	  and	  primary	  health	  care	  spending	  in	  India,	  while	  the	  opposite	  is	  true	  for	  curative	  care.	  Still,	  the	  public	  health	  and	  primary	  health	  care	  system	  is	  insufficient	  for	  the	  need	  of	  the	  population	  it	  seeks	  to	  serve.	  In	  terms	  of	  infrastructure,	  personnel,	  and	  patient	  satisfaction,	  the	  public	  sector	  is	  sorely	  lacking.	  	  
The	  dilemma,	  for	  Indian	  state	  governments	  as	  well	  as	  the	  federal	  government,	  has	  been	  translating	  the	  economic	  success	  to	  the	  larger	  populace	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  development.	  This	  issue	  has	  been	  recognized	  as	  the	  centerpiece	  of	  the	  twelfth	  five-­‐year	  plan	  (2007-­‐2012),	  which	  highlighted	  “inclusive	  growth”	  as	  a	  primary	  objective.	  47	  Yet,	  only	  one-­‐tenth	  of	  the	  populace	  has	  health	  insurance	  access.48	  On	  both	  a	  national	  and	  state	  level,	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building	  an	  equitable	  health	  care	  system	  that	  is	  affordable,	  accessible,	  and	  high	  quality	  is	  a	  policy	  priority.	  The	  state	  of	  Kerala	  shows	  the	  highest	  Human	  Development	  Index	  score	  at	  0.625.	  49	  
Historically,	  Kerala	  has	  been	  a	  unique	  experiment	  in	  social	  spending	  and	  public	  sector	  involvement	  in	  the	  health	  sector.	  Education	  and	  health	  compose	  the	  highest	  portion	  of	  public	  spending.50	  The	  majority	  of	  this	  public	  sector	  growth,	  especially	  in	  the	  health	  sector,	  was	  between	  1961	  and	  1986,	  during	  which	  the	  number	  of	  government	  hospital	  beds	  nearly	  tripled.	  Since	  then,	  fiscal	  problems	  in	  the	  state	  government	  caused	  significant	  cutbacks	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  the	  private	  healthcare	  industry	  grew.	  	  
There	  is	  broad	  consensus	  among	  political	  actors	  that	  reform	  is	  needed	  in	  the	  health	  sector	  of	  India.	  However,	  the	  meaning	  of	  “health	  reform,”	  what	  change	  it	  actually	  requires	  and	  which	  form	  it	  comes	  in	  is	  hotly	  debated.	  Various	  health	  reform	  programs	  have	  been	  undertaken	  across	  the	  nation,	  most	  implemented	  and	  experimented	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  state.	  State	  governments	  are	  chiefly	  responsible	  for	  financing	  and	  organizing	  the	  health	  sector.	  The	  promise	  of	  universality	  of	  the	  health	  care	  within	  the	  Indian	  constitution,	  too,	  is	  also	  primarily	  a	  task	  left	  to	  the	  state	  level	  of	  governance.	  This	  accounts	  for	  the	  distinct	  paths	  that	  reform	  processes,	  and	  policy	  processes	  more	  generally,	  have	  taken	  in	  individual	  states.	  	  
In	  India	  and	  other	  developing	  nations,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  health	  reform	  can	  be	  instrumentally	  good	  in	  providing	  for	  higher	  economic	  gains	  and	  more	  efficient	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  of	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resources.	  Reform,	  however,	  can	  also	  be	  normatively	  good.	  In	  terms	  of	  tackling	  fairness,	  justice,	  and	  capability	  to	  achieve	  good	  health,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  health	  reform	  can	  contribute	  positively	  to	  these	  issues	  as	  well.	  Why,	  then	  does	  reform	  occur	  so	  rarely?	  Problems	  of	  accessibility,	  cost,	  equitability,	  and	  effectiveness	  plague	  health	  care	  systems	  the	  world	  over,	  yet	  few	  are	  addressed	  in	  the	  policy	  realm	  in	  a	  competent,	  methodical	  manner.	  Understanding	  why	  certain	  health	  care	  systems’	  problems	  are	  addressed,	  and	  how	  these	  problems	  are	  addressed,	  is	  essential	  in	  health	  policy	  to	  exporting	  the	  reform	  process	  and	  creating	  the	  conditions	  to	  proliferate	  reform.	  There	  is	  a	  broadly	  converging	  consensus	  on	  how	  health	  systems	  should	  be	  conceptualized	  and	  performance	  measured;	  however,	  approaches	  to	  strengthen	  health	  systems	  are	  lacking.51	  
Ultimately,	  health	  reform	  occurs	  in	  a	  political	  context,	  yet	  political	  explanations	  for	  why	  reform	  occurs	  are	  sorely	  lacking	  within	  the	  health	  reform	  literature.	  What	  political	  factors	  contribute	  or	  detract	  from	  an	  initiation	  of	  health	  reform	  and	  how	  this	  health	  reform	  looks	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  reach	  and	  shape?	  Electoral	  politics,	  party	  linkages,	  associational	  life,	  elite	  political	  actors,	  and	  institutional	  structures	  all	  mediate	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  policy	  and	  its	  outcomes,	  whether	  measured	  in	  financial	  or	  human	  terms.	  How	  much	  each	  of	  these	  factors	  played	  into	  the	  development	  of	  a	  “big	  R”	  reform	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  in	  the	  Hsaio’s	  lexicon,	  in	  which	  regulation,	  financing,	  and	  overall	  organization	  of	  the	  healthcare	  system	  was	  impacted,	  is	  the	  question	  that	  will	  be	  contemplated	  through	  a	  descriptive	  analysis.	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  Shakarishvili,	  G.,	  et	  al.,	  2010.	  Converging	  health	  systems	  frameworks:	  towards	  a	  concepts-­‐toactions	  roadmap	  for	  health	  systems	  strengthening	  in	  low	  and	  middle	  income	  countries.	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  Governance,	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Scholars	  have	  often	  pointed	  to	  vague	  factors	  for	  explanatory	  power	  on	  why	  some	  health	  reform	  movements	  work	  while	  others	  flounder	  and	  fail.	  As	  Reich	  and	  others	  have	  stated,	  World	  Bank	  reports	  on	  health	  reform	  have	  attributed	  these	  successes	  and	  failures	  to	  “political	  will”	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  “capable	  planners	  and	  managers,”	  both	  nebulous	  terms	  that	  do	  not	  serve	  any	  informative	  capacity.52	  “Political	  will”	  is	  an	  insufficient	  variable	  for	  explaining	  how	  and	  when	  political	  agendas	  are	  set.	  	  
There	  are	  theoretical	  frameworks	  which	  hold	  enormous	  analytical	  power	  in	  this	  case,	  however.	  Stakeholder	  analysis	  has	  increasingly	  become	  used	  in	  policy	  analysis,	  an	  import	  from	  business	  management.53	  Understanding	  various	  stakeholders	  and	  their	  roles	  in	  the	  policy	  formation	  process,	  along	  with	  their	  perspectives,	  relative	  power	  levels,	  and	  ultimate	  goals	  for	  the	  policy	  process,	  allows	  fuller	  characterization	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  process.54	  Additionally,	  describing	  social,	  cultural,	  historical,	  and	  economic	  context	  is	  essential	  to	  providing	  generalizable	  facets	  of	  a	  policy	  process,	  and	  also	  understanding	  the	  constraints	  under	  which	  stakeholders	  work.	  	  
	   The	  “multiple	  streams”	  approach	  remains	  a	  prominent	  conceptualization	  of	  policy	  formation.	  John	  Kingdon	  first	  enunciated	  the	  theory	  in	  1984	  in	  opposition	  to	  purely	  rational	  and	  linear	  models	  of	  policy	  formation.	  It	  states	  that	  when	  multiple	  sets	  of	  activities,	  “streams,”	  coincide	  in	  the	  public	  realm,	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  opens	  up	  for	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  Reich,	  Michael	  R.	  1997.	  “Review	  of	  World	  Development	  Report:	  Investing	  in	  Health	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993).”	  Economic	  Development	  and	  Cultural	  Change	  45:	  899-­‐	  903.	  	  53	  	  54	  Brugha	  R,	  Varvasovszky	  Z.	  2000.	  Stakeholder	  analysis:	  a	  review.	  Health	  Policy	  and	  Planning	  15:	  239-­‐46.	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policymakers.55	  These	  streams	  are	  composed	  of	  problems	  (perception	  by	  the	  general	  public),	  politics	  (electoral	  pressures	  and	  other	  political	  events),	  and	  policy	  solutions	  (generated	  by	  mid-­‐level	  bureaucrats).	  The	  multiple	  streams	  approach	  can	  provide	  description	  that	  stakeholder	  analysis	  can	  often	  miss:	  why	  certain	  policies	  emerge	  when	  they	  do	  in	  an	  anarchic	  and	  irrational	  policy	  environment.	  
	   Finally,	  the	  “method”	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  also	  serves	  as	  an	  important	  contextualizing	  force	  in	  understanding	  the	  creation	  of	  health	  reform	  programs.	  While	  previous	  theories	  assume	  institutions	  are	  static	  loci	  in	  which	  policies	  are	  coordinated	  and	  negotiated,	  historical	  institutionalism	  seeks	  to	  provide	  the	  shared	  cultural	  meanings	  and	  norms	  that	  are	  socially	  constructed	  within	  institutions.56	  It	  has	  often	  been	  used	  to	  address	  direct	  empirical	  problems	  of	  change.	  	  
1.3. Preview	  of	  Thesis	  
In	  the	  following	  pages,	  the	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  reform	  movement	  will	  be	  described	  fully.	  Impact	  on	  a	  health	  system	  level,	  along	  with	  impact	  on	  a	  micro	  scale	  on	  the	  accessibility	  and	  cost-­‐burden	  for	  an	  individual	  citizen	  will	  be	  described.	  The	  reform	  process	  was	  transformative	  systemically,	  and	  its	  effects	  trickled	  down	  to	  the	  health,	  opportunities,	  and	  lives	  of	  individuals.	  Semi-­‐	  and	  unstructured	  interviews	  with	  central	  actors	  in	  the	  health	  policy	  formation	  process	  will	  contribute	  heavily	  to	  the	  descriptive	  analysis,	  along	  with	  primary	  media	  sources	  and	  communication	  materials.	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  Shiffman	  J,	  Schneider	  H,	  et	  al.	  ‘Doing’	  health	  policy	  analysis:	  methodological	  and	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  1999.	  “Historical	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  Review	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After	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  health	  care	  system	  and	  its	  economic	  and	  political	  contexts,	  tracking	  roughly	  two	  decades,	  Chapter	  3	  will	  seek	  to	  extract	  non-­‐political	  factors	  for	  why	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  occurred.	  Chapter	  4	  will	  seek	  to	  explicate	  the	  political	  factors,	  and	  which	  political	  factors	  contributed	  most	  heavily,	  seeking	  both	  prospective	  and	  retrospective	  analysis	  before	  and	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  health	  policy.	  This	  will	  include	  analysis	  using	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  theories	  in	  political	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  policy	  formation	  and	  subsequent	  implementation	  in	  the	  fullest	  possible	  sense.	  	  
It	  was	  a	  thornier	  process	  to	  study	  implementation	  than	  policy	  formation;	  finding	  out	  exactly	  how	  the	  health	  policy	  played	  out	  on	  the	  field	  is	  difficult	  to	  assess	  completely	  and	  without	  bias.	  However,	  attempts	  using	  the	  publicly	  available	  metrics	  of	  the	  health	  programs	  (a	  central	  facet	  of	  the	  reform	  movement	  being	  public	  information)	  and	  other	  more	  qualitative	  observations	  serve	  to	  inform.	  Objectives	  and	  actual	  implementation	  processes	  are	  often	  divided	  by	  a	  large	  gap,	  even	  larger	  so	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Corruption,	  lack	  of	  stated	  funding,	  poor	  institutional	  capacity,	  and	  bureaucratic	  malaise	  all	  afflict	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  health	  policy	  and	  serve	  to	  widen	  this	  gap.	  	  
This	  project	  uses	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  health	  reform	  programs,	  including	  Aarogyasri,	  to	  inform	  public	  policy	  investigations	  of	  health	  sector	  reform	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  research	  will	  also	  generate	  generalizable	  policy	  prescriptions	  for	  low	  and	  middle-­‐income	  nations	  in	  instigating	  the	  creation	  of	  and	  implementing	  health	  sector	  reform	  effectively,	  efficiently,	  and	  equitably.	  The	  generalizability	  of	  the	  case	  here	  will	  be	  extricated	  from	  historical	  and	  contextual	  influences	  that	  are	  specific	  to	  the	  case.	  It	  is	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retrospective	  in	  this	  sense:	  a	  history	  of	  the	  health	  system’s	  development,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  political	  context	  surrounding	  welfare	  and	  reform,	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  extricate	  causal	  factors	  for	  the	  health	  reform	  movement’s	  emergence.	  Largely,	  though,	  the	  study	  is	  prospective,	  with	  the	  relevant	  policy	  cycles	  being	  within	  the	  decade.	  Through	  description,	  empiricism,	  and	  theory,	  a	  well-­‐rounded	  study	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  elicited.	  It	  will	  also	  be	  an	  institutional	  study,	  through	  which	  the	  institutional	  structures	  that	  impact	  and	  allow	  health	  reform	  is	  analyzed.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  both	  the	  ontology	  (the	  state	  of	  the	  reformed	  health	  system)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  epistemology	  (how	  the	  reform	  itself	  came	  about)	  can	  be	  addressed.	  	  
Primarily,	  how	  was	  Andhra	  an	  example	  of	  “big	  R”	  reforms	  in	  Hsiao’s	  framework	  	  by	  affecting	  the	  control	  knobs	  of	  financing,	  payment,	  organization,	  regulation,	  and	  consumer	  behavior?	  What	  political	  factors	  led	  to	  such	  an	  expansive	  program	  being	  implemented	  and	  shaped	  the	  way	  it	  was?	  These	  questions	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  work.	  We	  are	  primarily	  looking	  at	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  existing	  health	  system-­‐	  something	  the	  MDG’s	  recognize	  as	  essential	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  multiple	  health	  targets	  simultaneously.	  The	  health	  system	  is	  primarily	  designated	  as	  a	  public	  activity:	  governments,	  in	  developing	  nations,	  are	  usually	  both	  the	  source	  of	  financing	  and	  delivery	  of	  care.	  This	  reform	  created	  new	  rules	  for	  the	  private	  and	  public	  health	  sectors	  to	  follow.	  	  
The	  research	  methodology	  included	  collecting	  scholarly	  accounts	  of	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  Additionally	  thorough,	  unstructured	  interviews	  with	  key	  actors	  in	  the	  government	  and	  health	  sectors	  were	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  the	  research	  methods.	  Understanding	  their	  perspective	  in	  formulating	  and	  implementing	  the	  health	  reform	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2.1. 	  Introduction	  
In	  Chapter	  1,	  normative	  and	  instrumental	  reasons	  why	  any	  nation	  would	  undertake	  the	  health	  reform	  project	  were	  provided,	  followed	  by	  a	  description	  of	  types	  and	  levels	  of	  health	  sector	  reform,	  methods	  of	  analysis	  in	  health	  policy,	  and	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  existing	  health	  infrastructure	  across	  the	  Indian	  nation.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  an	  understanding	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  health	  reform	  movement	  will	  be	  described	  in	  complete	  context:	  historical,	  political,	  and	  geographical.	  For	  the	  meta-­‐policy	  approach	  undertaken,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  that	  must	  be	  considered	  to	  fully	  discern	  both	  the	  process,	  how	  and	  within	  which	  limitations	  the	  policy	  comes	  to	  be,	  as	  well	  as	  power,	  who	  is	  influential	  and	  why	  these	  individuals	  hold	  power.	  Complexity	  abounds,	  and	  a	  full	  understanding	  can	  only	  be	  attained	  with	  descriptive	  analysis	  that	  seeks	  to	  provide	  context	  for	  the	  health	  reform	  movement.	  	  
An	  understanding	  of	  where	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  fits	  within	  the	  Indian	  context,	  its	  history,	  recent	  political	  transmutations,	  and	  economic	  and	  social	  structures,	  are	  essential	  to	  understand	  the	  overarching	  environment	  for	  policy	  transformation.	  Deep	  institutional	  histories	  are	  the	  limiting	  factors;	  they	  set	  the	  fences	  for	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  possible	  within	  the	  “arena”	  of	  government.	  These	  institutional	  histories,	  borne	  of	  overarching	  historical	  and	  political	  factors,	  help	  gain	  wisdom	  into	  why	  the	  events	  unfolded	  the	  way	  they	  did,	  rather	  than	  in	  an	  alternative	  way.	  	  
As	  stated	  in	  Gill	  Walt’s	  fundamental	  text	  of	  health	  policy,	  “By	  focusing	  on	  the	  political	  system	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  build	  up	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  how	  societies	  allow	  people	  within	  them	  to	  express	  demands	  and	  wishes	  and	  how	  these	  are	  translated	  into	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policy	  by	  their	  governments…Processes	  do	  not	  have	  a	  life	  of	  their	  own,	  but	  are	  dependent	  on	  actors	  to	  give	  them	  expression,	  analysis	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  is	  interwoven	  with	  an	  exploration	  of	  which	  actors	  are	  involved,	  and	  how	  far	  each	  may	  be	  exerting	  influence	  on	  policy.”57	  
In	  demonstrating	  the	  policy	  process,	  there	  is	  much	  debate	  about	  whether	  group	  models	  and	  mass	  appeal	  models	  are	  even	  relevant	  in	  a	  developing	  world	  context.	  They	  are	  relevant,	  along	  with	  the	  elite	  model,	  in	  understanding	  why	  and	  how	  these	  policies	  come	  to	  be.	  While	  not	  perfect,	  the	  general	  robustness	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  structures	  within	  India	  provide	  for	  this	  allowance.	  Even	  within	  India,	  there	  are	  varying	  depths	  of	  democracy,	  and	  the	  “substantive-­‐ness”	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  democracy	  is	  up	  for	  debate.	  The	  lack	  of	  clientelism	  and	  corruption,	  civil	  society,	  the	  relative	  power	  of	  associations:	  these	  are	  among	  the	  factors	  that	  promote	  democracies	  beyond	  the	  procedural	  dimension.	  58	  
The	  political	  system	  is	  a	  byproduct	  of	  geographical,	  economic,	  and	  social	  forces.	  Only	  through	  understanding	  the	  specific	  conditions	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  political	  system	  can	  the	  generalizable	  prescription	  for	  health	  reform	  elsewhere,	  in	  either	  developing	  or	  developed	  nations,	  be	  realized.	  	  	  
2.2. 	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  within	  India	  
“The	  Indian	  state,	  then,	  for	  historical	  reasons	  associated	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  colonialism,	  the	  international	  geopolitical	  situation,	  the	  ideological	  orientation	  of	  its	  policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Walt	  G:	  Health	  Policy:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Process	  and	  Power.	  London,	  Zed	  Books	  1994,	  (6).	  	  	  58	  Heller,	  Patrick.	  2000.	  “Degrees	  of	  Democracy:	  Some	  Comparative	  Lessons	  from	  India.”	  World	  Politics	  52	  (July):	  484-­‐519.	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makers,	  and	  the	  economic	  realities	  of	  India,	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  agent	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  transformation.”-­‐Pradeep	  Chhibber,	  Democracy	  without	  Associations59	  
India	  uses	  a	  federal	  political	  system,	  in	  which	  states	  are	  afforded	  relative	  freedom	  fiscally	  and	  politically	  to	  organize	  social,	  agricultural,	  and	  industrial	  policy.	  This	  fact	  of	  Indian	  politics	  accounts	  for	  the	  vast	  interstate	  disparities	  described	  in	  every	  socioeconomic	  indicator	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  To	  understand	  the	  political	  process,	  there	  are	  undoubtedly	  macro-­‐level	  national	  factors	  at	  play,	  but	  the	  policy	  arena	  exists	  primarily	  at	  a	  state	  level.	  Divided	  along	  linguistic	  and	  cultural,	  lines,	  the	  states	  have	  sharply	  diverged	  over	  the	  last	  half-­‐century	  of	  Indian	  independence	  from	  colonial	  rule.	  	  
The	  federal	  system	  in	  India	  allows	  management	  of	  rich	  diversity	  in	  a	  country	  that,	  when	  it	  gained	  independence,	  had	  15	  languages	  with	  over	  20	  million	  speakers	  each.	  The	  1950	  Indian	  Constitution	  was	  constructed	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  unity	  among	  such	  diversity	  in	  mind;	  devolution	  of	  power	  from	  the	  center	  (the	  federal	  government)	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  preserve	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  whole.60	  The	  orator,	  social	  reformer	  of	  the	  caste	  system,	  and	  economist	  B.R.	  Ambedkar,	  who	  served	  as	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Constitution	  Drafting	  Committee,	  attributed	  the	  demise	  of	  both	  the	  Austrian	  and	  Turkish	  empire	  to	  multi-­‐lingual	  states,	  and	  stated,	  “India	  cannot	  escape	  this	  fate	  if	  it	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  congery	  of	  mixed	  [multi-­‐lingual]	  States.”61	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  Chhibber,	  P.	  K.	  (1999).	  Democracy	  without	  associations:	  Transformation	  of	  the	  party	  system	  and	  social	  cleavages	  in	  India.	  Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press.	  28.	  60	  Alfred	  Stepan,	  “Federalism	  and	  Democracy:	  Beyond	  the	  U.S.	  Model.”	  Journal	  of	  Democracy	  10:	  19-­‐33.	  61	  Ambedkar,	  B.R.	  (1955).	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  on	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The	  focus	  of	  this	  work	  is	  on	  specifically	  changes	  occurring	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  The	  state	  is	  an	  interesting	  case	  study,	  both	  for	  its	  unique	  characteristics,	  some	  cultural,	  political,	  and	  economic,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  generalizable	  conclusions,	  due	  to	  its	  status	  as	  a	  rapidly	  developing	  region.	  	  
By	  either	  geographic	  mass	  or	  population,	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  is	  among	  India’s	  top	  five	  largest	  states.	  It	  was	  linguistically	  constructed	  with	  the	  language	  of	  Telugu	  as	  its	  unifying	  factor,	  only	  after	  a	  fast	  to	  the	  death,	  rioting,	  and	  subsequent	  police	  firings	  forced	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  Indian	  national	  government.	  Lying	  along	  the	  southeast	  coast,	  limited	  by	  the	  Bay	  of	  Bengal	  to	  the	  east,	  Andhra	  is	  a	  fertile	  land	  mass	  overall	  with	  vast	  differences	  in	  climate,	  ranging	  from	  delta	  regions	  along	  the	  rich	  Godavari	  and	  Krishna	  rivers	  to	  tropical	  regions.	  
These	  geographic	  conditions	  translate	  into	  cultural	  and	  economic	  realities,	  impacting	  inequalities	  in	  resource	  availability	  and	  affecting	  political	  representations,	  discourses,	  and	  narratives.	  With	  over	  77%	  of	  the	  crop	  output	  being	  rice,	  Andhra	  has	  been	  known	  as	  the	  “Rice	  Bowl	  of	  India.”	  Historically,	  Hyderabad,	  the	  capital	  city	  of	  almost	  8	  million	  in	  the	  metropolitan	  area,	  had	  been	  ruled	  as	  a	  separate	  State	  under	  independent,	  monarchic	  Muslim	  rule,	  first	  under	  various	  Sultanates,	  and	  then	  under	  the	  Nizams,	  beginning	  in	  the	  early	  18th	  century.	  Under	  both	  later	  Mughal	  and	  British	  rule,	  Hyderabad	  remained	  a	  political	  sovereign	  of	  the	  Nizams.62	  	  
The	  result	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  Nizams	  was	  enormous	  wealth	  for	  the	  Hyderabad	  State:	  palaces,	  jewels,	  and	  other	  luxuries	  became	  a	  mainstay	  over	  seven	  generations.	  Along	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Karen	  Leonard,	  ‘The	  Hyderabad	  Political	  System	  and	  its	  Participants’,	  Journal	  of	  	  Asian	  Studies,	  30(3),	  1971,	  pp.	  569-­‐582.	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the	  palatial	  atmosphere,	  though,	  was	  a	  mixed	  record	  in	  the	  social	  dimension.	  The	  autocratic	  Nizams	  institutionalized	  a	  patron-­‐client	  system,	  and	  Nobles	  held	  steep	  control	  over	  grants	  and	  positions	  in	  the	  bureaucracy.	  Literacy	  rates	  were	  low	  and	  public	  health	  responses	  to	  malaria	  epidemics	  were	  weak	  at	  best.63	  At	  the	  same	  time	  though,	  economic	  industrialization,	  the	  creation	  of	  hospitals	  and	  universities,	  and	  the	  foundation	  of	  a	  civil	  service	  all	  fomented	  under	  the	  Nizam	  rule.64	  	  An	  additional	  effect	  was	  cultural	  (the	  major	  language	  being	  Urdu)	  and	  political	  isolation	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  what	  would	  become	  Andhra	  Pradesh:	  a	  fact	  that	  continues	  to	  trigger	  divisions	  in	  modern	  Andhra	  Politics	  today,	  especially	  as	  the	  spoils	  of	  economic	  development	  schemes	  and	  agricultural	  riches	  are	  disputed.	  	  
The	  united	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  was	  formed	  from	  three	  separate	  regions,	  with	  distinctive	  histories	  and	  polities,	  the	  unifying	  bind	  being	  the	  language	  of	  Telugu.	  Coastal	  Andhra	  borders	  the	  Bay	  of	  Bengal,	  and	  was	  originally	  part	  of	  the	  Madras	  state	  to	  the	  south.	  A	  prolific	  agricultural	  base,	  from	  the	  basins	  of	  multiple	  rivers,	  allowed	  the	  growth	  of	  a	  “productive	  and	  commercialized	  agrarian	  economy	  in	  the	  19th	  century,”	  with	  the	  fishing	  industry	  along	  the	  coastal	  lines.65	  This	  commercialization	  led	  to	  greater	  development	  of	  the	  region	  than	  the	  other	  two	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  The	  second	  of	  the	  three	  major	  regions	  that	  unified	  to	  form	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  was	  Rayalaseema,	  bordering	  Karnataka	  and	  Tamil	  Nadu	  to	  the	  South.	  Under	  British	  Rule	  and	  preceding	  unification	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  both	  Coastal	  Andhra	  and	  Rayalaseema	  were	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Madras	  Presidency	  to	  the	  south.	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(rather	  than	  Urdu)	  was	  the	  de	  jure	  language	  throughout	  the	  Madras	  Presidency,	  a	  signifier	  of	  the	  differing	  trajectories	  these	  regions	  took,	  and	  the	  fault	  lines	  those	  trajectories	  create.	  	  
The	  third	  region,	  Telangana,	  was	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Nizams	  historically.	  While	  Urdu	  was	  the	  official	  language	  of	  Hyderabad,	  Telugu	  was	  spoken	  widely,	  both	  in	  the	  Hyderabad	  State	  as	  well	  as	  more	  widely	  across	  the	  Telangana	  districts.	  The	  splendor	  and	  prosperity	  of	  the	  Nizams	  in	  Hyderabad	  was	  not	  spread	  equally	  across	  the	  Telangana	  State.	  D.B.	  Forrester	  states,	  “For	  two	  hundred	  years	  Telangana	  was	  separate	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Telugu	  country,	  maintained	  in	  a	  rather	  backward	  feudal	  condition	  by	  the	  Nizams	  of	  the	  Asaf	  Jahi	  dynasty.	  The	  jagirdar	  system	  of	  landholding	  seems	  to	  have	  stood	  in	  the	  way	  of	  agricultural	  development…the	  Telangana	  backwardness	  has	  essentially	  political	  roots:	  with	  better	  administration	  the	  considerable	  water	  resources	  could	  have	  been	  more	  fully	  tapped	  for	  irrigation.”66	  	  
Economic	  and	  social	  development	  had	  proceeded	  with	  significant	  disparities	  in	  the	  Telangana	  region,	  creating	  fault	  lines	  of	  some	  permanence	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  Unification	  was	  not	  an	  entirely	  smooth	  process.	  The	  November	  1956	  mandate	  for	  political	  unification	  from	  the	  national	  government	  also	  included	  attempts	  at	  safeguards,	  including	  reservations	  of	  jobs	  for	  citizens	  of	  each	  region.67	  These	  various	  regions	  have	  seen	  distinct	  patterns	  of	  mobilization,	  an	  expression	  of	  their	  differing	  political	  processes	  and	  cultural	  development.	  Agricultural	  areas	  in	  the	  Telangana	  region	  were	  the	  wellspring	  of	  the	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Communist	  (Marxist/Leninist)	  Party’s	  growth,	  growth	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  Naxal	  militant	  groups.68	  	  
The	  economy	  in	  Andhra	  today	  is	  driven	  by	  two	  streams:	  agriculture	  (formed	  from	  the	  irrigation	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  Godavari	  and	  Krishna	  rivers)	  and	  technological	  (exports	  of	  which	  are	  in	  the	  billions	  of	  USD).	  Growth	  of	  the	  Information	  Technology	  (IT)	  and	  computer	  software	  sectors	  have	  been	  enormous	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades;	  in	  the	  twelve	  year	  period	  between	  1993	  and	  2005,	  the	  average	  growth	  of	  the	  industry	  was	  75%.69	  Hyderabad,	  especially,	  has	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  this	  “high-­‐tech”	  explosion,	  and	  numerous	  multinational	  corporations	  have	  built	  their	  Indian	  or	  Asian	  headquarters	  there.	  Still,	  questions	  about	  the	  inequitable	  nature	  of	  this	  development	  have	  been	  raised,	  with	  literacy	  rates,	  wealth	  concentration,	  water	  supply,	  and	  health	  care	  access	  as	  a	  focus.70	  
How	  developed	  is	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  both	  absolutely	  and	  relative	  to	  other	  states	  in	  India?	  How	  equitable	  has	  development	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  been?	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  key	  indicators,	  Andhra	  has	  a	  mixed	  record.	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  GDP	  was	  $85.7	  billion	  in	  2009.	  According	  to	  the	  Economist,	  its	  nearest	  the	  equivalent	  was	  Slovakia	  for	  total	  GDP,	  but	  Nicaragua	  for	  GDP	  per	  person.71	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With	  a	  life	  expectancy	  of	  64.4	  years,	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  measurements	  are	  slightly	  higher	  than	  the	  all-­‐India	  life	  expectancy	  of	  63.5,	  far	  exceeding	  the	  58.0	  years	  of	  Madhya	  Pradesh,	  but	  far	  below	  the	  gold	  standard	  of	  Kerala:	  74.0	  years.72	  According	  to	  the	  UNDP	  2011	  Human	  Development	  Index	  study,	  Andhra	  loses	  rank	  when	  inequality	  is	  adjusted	  for	  using	  the	  Inequality-­‐Adjusted	  Human	  Development	  Index	  (IHDI).	  Globally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  India	  falls	  short	  of	  the	  world	  average,	  0.504	  to	  a	  global	  average	  of	  0.624,	  categorizing	  it	  as	  a	  nation	  with	  “Medium	  Human	  Development.”	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  however,	  falls	  in	  the	  “Low	  Human	  Development”	  category	  based	  on	  its	  HDI	  of	  0.485.	  Nations	  closest	  to	  AP’s	  human	  development	  level	  are	  Pakistan,	  the	  Congo,	  and	  Bangladesh.	  	  
Health	  indicators	  are	  stark	  too.	  The	  infant	  mortality	  rate	  decreased	  from	  2001	  to	  2005	  from	  66	  to	  53.	  Still,	  according	  to	  the	  state	  government	  document	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  Human	  Development	  Report	  2007,	  “It	  is	  a	  level	  that	  is	  unacceptably	  high.	  Moreover,	  the	  earlier	  sharp	  decline	  in	  IMR	  has	  not	  continued	  in	  the	  recent	  past.”73	  Health	  facilities	  are	  also	  meager:	  there	  are	  four	  hospitals	  for	  every	  million	  people.	  Even	  for	  primary	  healthcare	  centers	  	  (PHCs),	  there	  are	  only	  1570	  for	  the	  rural	  population	  of	  60	  million.	  This	  number	  falls	  fall	  under	  the	  standard	  of	  1	  PHC	  for	  30,000	  individuals.	  The	  rural-­‐urban	  divide	  is	  deep:	  79	  percent	  of	  the	  physicians	  are	  in	  urban	  areas,	  and	  absenteeism	  is	  rampant	  in	  the	  public	  hospitals	  and	  health	  institutions	  common	  in	  rural	  areas.	  	  
	   2.3	  Political	  History	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  (After	  1956)	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On	  November	  1,	  1956,	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  was	  unified	  as	  a	  single	  state	  under	  the	  States	  Reorganisation	  Act.	  The	  political	  developments	  that	  have	  occurred,	  in	  both	  policy	  process	  and	  electoral	  cycles,	  have	  left	  profound	  indents	  and	  fault	  lines	  in	  the	  government	  of	  AP.	  Examining	  this	  political	  history	  will	  provide	  an	  underlying	  structure	  for	  what	  individuals,	  factions	  and	  interest	  groups	  hold	  sway,	  how	  power	  is	  held,	  accumulated,	  and	  used	  by	  central	  actors,	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  existing	  social	  and	  political	  environment	  that	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  moved	  into.	  To	  understand	  Indian	  politics,	  and	  Andhra	  politics	  especially,	  parties,	  castes,	  identities,	  and	  personalities	  must	  be	  fleshed	  out.	  Indian	  political	  life	  consists	  of	  weak	  associational	  ties,	  leaving	  political	  parties	  to	  bridge	  state	  and	  society.74	  
Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  political	  system	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  Congress	  Party	  for	  a	  quarter	  decade	  period	  directly	  after	  the	  state’s	  creation.	  Although	  the	  Congress	  Party	  had	  significant	  struggles	  with	  finding	  a	  central	  “ruling”	  figure,	  they	  were	  consistently	  able	  to	  find	  the	  center	  between	  the	  party	  of	  the	  right,	  Swatantra,	  and	  the	  left-­‐leaning	  Communist	  Party.	  75	  This	  fact,	  combined	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  alternatives	  and	  the	  deft	  use	  and	  abuse	  of	  caste	  divisions	  to	  drum	  up	  votes	  during	  election	  time,	  led	  to	  the	  consistency	  of	  the	  Congress	  Party’s	  successes.	  Even	  throughout	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  separatist	  movement,	  during	  which	  students	  where	  incited	  to	  form	  bandhs	  (stopping	  of	  all	  economic	  activity	  and	  public	  protesting),	  the	  Congress	  Party	  sputtered	  on.	  In	  fact,	  Channa	  Reddy,	  who	  led	  the	  separatist	  Telangana	  movement,	  would	  eventually	  become	  Chief	  Minister.	  Power,	  and	  the	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holding	  of	  power,	  depended	  on	  one’s	  closeness	  to	  the	  national	  government	  and	  Indira	  Gandhi,	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  	  
During	  the	  1983	  elections	  however,	  N.T.	  Rama	  Rao	  (NTR),	  a	  charismatic	  star	  in	  the	  Telugu	  film	  industry,	  led	  a	  new	  party,	  the	  Telugu	  Desam	  Party	  (TDP),	  one	  that	  would	  become	  a	  force	  in	  the	  Andhra	  political	  scene.	  As	  K.C.	  Suri	  describes,	  NTR	  was	  able	  to	  unify	  both	  anti-­‐Congress	  and	  non-­‐Congress	  factions,	  taking	  on	  players	  from	  far-­‐opposing	  ends	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  Demeaning	  the	  corrupt	  and	  kleptocratic	  nature	  of	  the	  Congress	  Party	  rule	  in	  Andhra,	  and	  doubly	  painting	  the	  TDP	  as	  the	  populist	  party	  through	  a	  promise	  of	  no	  agricultural	  taxes,	  NTR	  and	  his	  party	  coasted	  to	  a	  landslide	  victory.	  The	  ensuing	  years	  where	  politically	  hostile	  ones	  between	  the	  TDP	  and	  Congress,	  and	  would	  set	  the	  formative	  network	  for	  a	  bipolar	  party	  distribution	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  for	  decades	  to	  come.	  Pingle	  notes	  the	  workings	  of	  caste	  politics	  here	  too:	  the	  TDP	  movement	  was	  led	  by	  the	  Kamma	  caste	  of	  coastal	  Andhra,	  which	  suppressed	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  separate	  Telangana	  state	  that	  would	  simmer	  under	  the	  surface	  of	  Andhra	  politics.76	  As	  Suri	  commented:	  
	  “TDP–Congress	  relations	  showed	  that	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  democratic	  polity	  in	  a	  developing	  society	  with	  too	  many	  social	  cleavages	  and	  mutually	  conflicting	  economic	  interests,	  political	  parties,	  especially	  the	  main	  opposition,	  seem	  to	  give	  less	  importance	  to	  parliamentary	  conventions	  and	  fair	  means.”	  
NTR	  controlled	  Andhra	  Politics	  handily	  for	  a	  half-­‐decade.	  NTR	  projected	  himself	  as	  an	  Anna	  (older	  brother)	  who	  would	  give	  benefits	  to	  the	  public	  from	  his	  schemes,	  a	  “donative	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discourse.”77	  After	  losing	  in	  1989,	  the	  TDP	  won	  once	  more	  with	  NTR	  at	  the	  perennial	  helm.	  His	  reign,	  however,	  was	  short-­‐lived.	  Within	  months,	  his	  own	  son-­‐in-­‐law,	  Chandrababu	  Naidu,	  would	  lead	  a	  revolt	  against	  him,	  pushing	  back	  with	  a	  claim	  for	  a	  mandate	  of	  pragmatism	  and	  economic	  reform.	  Naidu	  had	  the	  support	  of	  the	  elites	  in	  Andhra;	  as	  he	  had	  served	  as	  Finance	  Minister,	  he	  presented	  a	  new	  vision	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	  development,	  and	  those	  that	  became	  rich	  through	  his	  reforms	  in	  turn	  aided	  in	  his	  subsequent	  construction	  of	  the	  party	  structures.	  Even	  without	  the	  charisma	  and	  political	  clout	  of	  NTR	  (he	  would	  die	  within	  months	  of	  the	  political	  betrayal	  by	  Naidu),	  the	  TDP	  had	  somehow	  survived.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  two-­‐party	  system	  was	  here	  to	  stay	  in	  Andhra:	  
“The	  characteristic	  feature	  of	  this	  much	  hankered	  after	  political	  grace	  [referring	  to	  the	  two-­‐party	  system]	  is	  that	  there	  are	  two	  hardly	  distinguishable	  political	  formation	  each	  with	  its	  own	  constituency	  of	  loyal	  voters,	  while	  the	  non	  loyal	  voters	  shift	  from	  one	  to	  the	  other	  in	  sufficient	  measure	  from	  on	  election	  to	  the	  next…Critics	  lacking	  in	  the	  blessed	  spirit	  of	  charity	  will	  call	  it	  a	  Tweedledum-­‐Tweedledee	  political	  system.”78	  
2.4	  Andhra	  after	  Liberalization:	  Chandrababu	  Naidu	  and	  YSR	  
Chandrababu	  Naidu,	  too,	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  able	  negotiator	  of	  the	  careful	  balance	  between	  liberalization	  and	  welfare	  schemes	  that	  successful	  South	  Indian	  politicians	  need.	  Within	  weeks	  of	  taking	  office,	  his	  administration	  had	  constructed	  a	  White	  Paper,	  one	  that	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mirrored	  an	  independent	  World	  Bank	  undertaking,	  that	  called	  for	  fiscal	  prudence,	  curtailing	  subsidies,	  and	  cutting	  government	  programs	  that	  were	  deep	  in	  the	  red.	  79	  Governance,	  economic,	  and	  agricultural	  reforms	  ensued.	  In	  the	  health	  sector,	  primary	  reforms	  included	  a	  much	  larger	  role	  for	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  user	  charges	  to	  aid	  cost	  recovery	  efforts.	  The	  results	  of	  such	  reforms,	  though,	  were	  mixed.	  	  Communication	  and	  construction	  grew	  quickly,	  but	  failures	  were	  also	  large:	  the	  irrigation	  project	  was	  universally	  criticized.	  They	  were	  also	  mixed	  in	  their	  equitability:	  an	  urban	  middle	  class	  grew,	  but	  rural	  farmers	  were	  hit	  hard,	  leading	  to	  an	  epidemic	  of	  farmer’s	  suicides.80	  Debt,	  too,	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GSDP,	  increased	  ten	  percent.	  All	  his	  economic	  World	  Bank-­‐backed	  reforms	  were	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword:	  the	  ancillary	  effects	  included	  “the	  accentuation	  of	  poverty,	  growing	  income	  inequalities,	  unemployment,	  and	  unabated	  farmers’	  suicides.”81	  
Naidu,	  though,	  would	  feel	  the	  pain	  that	  comes	  from	  holding	  central	  power.	  	  The	  TDP	  started	  to	  fracture	  at	  the	  local	  level	  as	  party	  leaders	  began	  to	  feel	  their	  influence	  was	  underappreciated,	  and	  that	  Naidu	  solely	  listened	  to	  the	  bureaucratic	  machine	  in	  Hyderabad.	  After	  10	  years	  of	  consecutive	  rule,	  Naidu	  and	  the	  TDP	  lost	  the	  next	  election	  to	  the	  Congress	  Party.	  	  
Telugu	  Desam	  Party’s	  loss,	  however,	  had	  a	  number	  of	  causal	  factors,	  not	  least	  among	  them	  the	  dramatic	  rise	  of	  a	  dominant	  personality.	  One	  Congress	  Party	  parliamentarian,	  Y.S.	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Rajasekhara	  Reddy	  (YSR)	  had	  undertaken	  a	  padayatra,	  literally	  pilgrimage	  of	  the	  foot,	  which	  saw	  him	  cross	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  walking	  for	  three	  months	  and	  rallying	  rural	  troops.	  The	  publicity	  move,	  one	  that	  harked	  back	  to	  the	  Salt	  march	  of	  Gandhi,	  was	  a	  brilliant	  maneuver,	  not	  only	  presenting	  a	  populist	  counter-­‐image	  to	  Naidu,	  but	  also	  consolidating	  leadership	  in	  the	  Congress	  Party.	  “Dressed	  in	  a	  white	  shirt,	  dhoti,	  and	  a	  turban…YSR	  could	  easily	  establish	  rapport	  with	  the	  simple	  and	  poor	  rural	  folk.”82	  
It	  was	  a	  smart	  political	  move,	  and	  showed	  the	  keen	  political	  instinct	  of	  a	  budding	  Andhra	  icon.	  A	  physician	  by	  training	  from	  the	  water-­‐scarce	  districts	  of	  Rayalaseema,	  his	  wealth	  came	  from	  a	  mining	  operation	  that	  passed	  into	  his	  hands	  from	  his	  father,	  and	  allowed	  his	  rise	  as	  a	  politician.	  His	  father,	  Raja	  Reddy,	  was	  local	  mason,	  politician	  and	  strongman	  who	  had	  not	  been	  unopposed	  to	  using	  violence	  and	  murder	  to	  justify	  his	  ends	  in	  the	  anarchic	  Rayalaseema	  districts.83	  	  
Political	  discourses	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  TDP’s	  loss,	  as	  Srinivasulu	  points	  out.	  After	  an	  attempted	  assassination	  attempt	  on	  Naidu’s	  life	  by	  a	  Naxalite,	  the	  election	  took	  on	  a	  personal	  turn	  to	  be	  a	  referendum	  on	  Naidu’s	  rule.	  Congress,	  in	  turn,	  took	  this	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  tie	  farmer’s	  suicides	  and	  other	  failures	  of	  the	  liberalization	  process	  to	  Chandrababu	  Naidu	  and	  TDP	  by	  extension,	  promising	  free	  power	  for	  farmers.	  Despite	  Naidu’s	  laments	  about	  the	  impracticality	  of	  the	  proposal,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  previous	  attempts	  to	  use	  the	  same	  “free	  power”	  election	  gambit	  had	  failed,	  Congress	  continued	  to	  promote	  the	  promise,	  and	  did	  so	  with	  greater	  credibility.	  Smaller	  parties	  were	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marginalized	  in	  the	  process,	  and	  the	  election	  became	  a	  great	  battle	  between	  TDP	  and	  Congress.	  	  
Caste	  alliances	  have	  been	  important	  for	  intraparty	  construction.	  In	  recent	  years,	  there	  was	  a	  renewed	  call	  for	  a	  separate	  state	  for	  Telangana,	  harking	  back	  to	  the	  debate	  bubbling	  under	  the	  surface	  since	  Andhra’s	  inception.	  In	  Telangana,	  dominant	  castes,	  including	  the	  Reddys	  and	  Velmas,	  fell	  into	  the	  separatist	  movement	  too,	  lending	  it	  political	  clout.	  As	  a	  result,	  YSR	  provided	  a	  promise	  of	  a	  separate	  Telangana	  state,	  a	  common	  tactic	  to	  delay	  any	  action	  on	  the	  issue.84	  Congress	  also	  built	  a	  coalition	  with	  a	  minor	  but	  key	  player	  in	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India	  (Maoist),	  a	  marriage	  of	  convenience	  for	  both	  parties.	  
YSR	  would	  rule	  with	  a	  powerful	  hand,	  one	  of	  mass	  popular	  appeal	  that	  had	  not	  been	  seen	  since	  the	  days	  of	  NTR.85	  Still,	  at	  times	  he	  showed	  a	  capacity	  for	  deftness:	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  extreme	  communist	  Naxalites,	  he	  brought	  legitimate	  actors	  to	  the	  table,	  and	  launched	  welfare	  schemes	  and	  irrigation	  to	  tackle	  the	  root	  socioeconomic	  causes	  of	  their	  distress.86	  YSR’s	  padayatra	  had	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  his	  direct	  interaction	  with	  the	  people,	  enabling	  a	  direct,	  participatory	  link	  that	  had	  not	  existed	  in	  Chandrababu	  Naidu’s	  administration.	  The	  result	  was	  greater	  success	  of	  his	  schemes	  that	  required	  so,	  and	  more	  shaping	  of	  policy	  by	  the	  people	  directly,	  as	  would	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Janmabhoomi	  (an	  effort	  to	  facilitate	  grassroots	  involvement	  in	  development	  and	  make	  the	  administrative	  machinery	  accessible)	  and	  health	  reform	  schemes.	  He	  also	  built	  on	  TDP	  schemes	  that	  had	  already	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Pingle,	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  and	  Political	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  Sainath,	  P.	  The	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  following	  and	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set	  up.	  TDP’s	  Deepam	  (light)	  scheme	  aided	  the	  formation	  of	  self-­‐help	  committees	  directly	  by	  the	  people,	  including	  the	  Development	  of	  Women	  and	  Children	  in	  Rural	  Areas	  (DWCRA).	  YSR	  expanded	  on	  this	  foundation,	  providing	  the	  organization	  with	  cooking	  stoves	  and	  gas	  cylinders.	  	  
With	  rare	  examples,	  both	  Naidu	  and	  YSR	  showed	  a	  proclivity	  for	  reforms	  and	  schemes	  that	  were	  strategically	  targeted	  at	  certain	  voter	  groups,	  showcasing	  the	  consciousness	  that	  both	  felt	  under	  electoral	  pressure.	  The	  Deepam	  scheme	  was	  targeted	  directly	  at	  the	  women’s	  vote,	  while	  a	  Rosini	  scheme,	  one	  that	  allowed	  the	  renovation	  of	  old	  mosques	  and	  construction	  of	  marriage	  halls,	  was	  targeted	  at	  the	  Muslim	  vote.	  87	  
YSR’s	  rule	  was	  unprecedented	  in	  Andhra	  politics,	  perhaps	  only	  equaled	  in	  stature	  by	  the	  film	  star-­‐turned-­‐CM	  N.T.	  Rama	  Rao.	  Until	  his	  dramatic	  death	  in	  2009	  of	  a	  helicopter	  crash,	  he	  wielded	  a	  Machiavellian	  hand	  over	  Andhra	  politics,	  simultaneously	  corrupt	  (his	  son	  Jagan	  Mohan	  Reddy	  is	  under	  investigation	  by	  the	  Central	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation	  for	  amassing	  mass	  amounts	  of	  wealth	  under	  YSR’s	  tenure)	  and	  populist	  (described	  in	  a	  BBC	  News	  obituary	  as	  a	  “champion	  of	  social	  welfare	  schemes).88,89After	  a	  ten	  year	  period	  in	  the	  opposition	  to	  Chandrababu	  Naidu’s	  TDP,	  YSR’s	  Congress	  Party	  was	  finally	  in	  power	  after	  a	  landslide	  victory	  in	  2004,	  his	  Congress	  coalition	  having	  226	  seats	  to	  the	  BJP/TDP	  coalition’s	  49.90	  The	  “Cuddapah	  Tiger”	  had	  found	  his	  place	  of	  power,	  and	  stated	  upon	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  Elections	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	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inauguration,	  “I	  will	  not	  blindly	  remove	  all	  measures	  of	  my	  predecessor	  but	  I	  will	  ensure	  that	  all	  his	  anti-­‐common	  man	  policies	  will	  not	  find	  a	  place	  in	  the	  administration.”91	  
2.5	  Development	  of	  the	  Health	  Reform	  Policies	  
The	  political	  stage	  had	  been	  set	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  for	  further	  reforms,	  with	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  centralized	  power	  in	  the	  state.	  Unlike	  other	  states,	  like	  Karnataka,	  the	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  government	  had	  resisted	  decentralization	  of	  power	  in	  governance	  reform.92	  Even	  within	  the	  aforementioned	  DWRCA	  program,	  Naidu	  presided	  over	  all	  reforms,	  including	  water,	  and	  did	  so	  with	  significant	  funds	  from	  the	  World	  Bank.	  Once	  YSR	  came	  into	  power	  though,	  how	  did	  the	  health	  reform	  programs	  emerge	  in	  the	  governmental	  arena?	  What	  shape	  did	  they	  take,	  and	  how	  did	  institutional,	  cultural,	  and	  political	  legacies	  mold	  the	  reform	  process	  and	  ultimate	  policy?	  	  
In	  2007,	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  implemented	  the	  largest	  insurance	  scheme	  in	  the	  world	  with	  coverage	  of	  over	  fifty	  million	  below-­‐poverty	  line	  individuals,	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Community	  Health	  Insurance	  Scheme,	  with	  Star	  Health	  as	  the	  chosen	  insurance	  company.	  The	  unveiling	  of	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  the	  health	  coverage	  scheme,	  in	  which	  the	  financing	  itself	  was	  finalized,	  occurred	  on	  the	  two-­‐year	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Congress	  Party	  coming	  into	  power	  from	  2004.93	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  James.	  2007.	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   How	  does	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  work	  for	  below-­‐poverty	  line	  patients	  on	  the	  ground?	  An	  interview	  with	  Initially,	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Card	  itself	  must	  be	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  BPL	  individual.	  Per	  family,	  it	  affords	  two-­‐lakh	  INR	  ($3,600)	  of	  health	  financing	  for	  treatment.	  The	  cards	  are	  distributed	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  “White	  Card”	  rationing	  cards	  are,	  through	  district	  and	  local	  officers,	  and	  in	  some	  Aarogyasri	  camps	  the	  two	  are	  used	  interchangeably.	  	  The	  BPL	  patient	  has	  two	  options:	  either	  referral	  through	  the	  health	  outreach	  camps,	  or	  directly	  entering	  the	  tertiary	  care	  center.	  At	  the	  camps,	  if	  an	  individual	  is	  below	  the	  poverty	  line,	  but	  does	  not	  possess	  a	  card,	  the	  designated	  “CM	  Camp	  Officer”	  can	  draw	  directly	  from	  the	  Chief	  Minister’s	  Relief	  Fund.	  	  In	  tertiary	  care	  centers,	  the	  “Aarogya	  Mithra,”	  a	  government	  non-­‐medical	  bureaucrat,	  and	  the	  Rajiv	  Aarogyasri	  Medical	  Coordinator	  (RAMCO),	  a	  medical	  officer,	  directly	  greet	  the	  patient,	  and	  take	  photographic	  evidence.	  Throughout	  the	  entire	  process,	  there	  is	  no	  cash	  exchanged	  at	  all.	  After	  verification	  by	  the	  RAMCO,	  the	  patient	  is	  admitted	  into	  the	  hospital	  if	  there	  malady	  matches	  a	  list	  of	  preapproved	  diseases.	  	  The	  medical	  attendant	  fills	  out	  an	  authorization	  form	  ,with	  history,	  symptoms,	  and	  expected	  treatment,	  which	  is	  then	  electronically	  uploaded	  with	  the	  card	  and	  photograph.	  Each	  hospital	  has	  a	  dedicated	  staff	  for	  this,	  with	  shared	  officers	  of	  both	  the	  government	  and	  the	  hospital.	  After	  approval	  by	  a	  medical	  officer	  at	  the	  Trust,	  electronically	  sent,	  the	  treatment	  begins.	  In	  emergency	  cases,	  the	  treating	  doctor	  can	  call	  the	  medical	  officer	  at	  the	  Trust	  directly	  for	  verification	  to	  AS1	  and	  AS2.	  	  The	  patient	  is	  discharged	  after	  treatment,	  and	  provided	  food	  and	  transportation.	  Additionally,	  pharmaceutical	  drugs	  are	  provided	  for	  up	  to	  eleven	  days	  by	  the	  hospital,	  without	  charge	  to	  the	  patient.	  After	  eleven	  days,	  the	  Credit	  Collection	  Unit	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Trust,	  consisting	  of	  three	  officers,	  raises	  the	  claim.	  The	  Trust	  medical	  officer	  inspects	  the	  case	  and	  the	  treating	  doctor	  gives	  any	  clarification	  if	  necessary.	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YSR’s	  padayatra	  had	  initiated	  a	  trend	  in	  his	  own	  rapport	  with	  the	  citizenry	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  As	  Dr.	  Kiran	  Kumar	  Reddy,	  the	  Private	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  (a	  position	  analogous	  to	  a	  Chief	  of	  Staff)	  described,	  YSR	  made	  a	  point	  of	  meeting	  with	  hundreds	  of	  individuals	  daily	  at	  times.94	  These	  citizens	  would	  often	  come	  in	  with	  concerns	  of	  financial	  solvency,	  health	  bills,	  agricultural	  problems,	  and	  other	  woes.	  YSR,	  in	  turn,	  would	  aid	  many	  of	  them	  through	  a	  program	  called	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  Relief	  Fund	  (CMRF)	  a	  specific	  account	  with	  a	  set	  amount	  of	  funding	  set	  aside	  for	  the	  CM	  to	  use	  at	  will.	  It	  relied	  on	  donations	  and	  legislative	  allotment,	  and	  discretion	  of	  the	  fund’s	  use	  was	  completely	  up	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  executive	  branch.	  In	  its	  official	  mission	  statement,	  it	  cites	  addressing	  “health	  problems	  which	  require	  expensive	  medicare,	  loss	  of	  life	  of	  kin	  and	  kith,	  and	  loss	  of	  properties	  and	  sources	  of	  livelihood	  due	  to	  unforeseen	  incidents”	  as	  its	  central	  cause.	  The	  CMRF	  had	  existed	  since	  1990,	  preceding	  even	  liberalization.95	  
The	  financial	  insolvency	  of	  citizens	  due	  to	  health	  costs	  was	  a	  central	  driving	  force	  for	  the	  initiation	  of	  change.	  Financial	  protection	  from	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  healthcare,	  for	  which	  65%	  of	  Andhra	  citizens	  had	  to	  borrow,	  motivated	  those	  at	  the	  highest	  level.96	  Indebtedness	  was	  a	  central	  political;	  the	  spate	  of	  farmer	  suicides,	  which	  the	  Congress	  Party	  had	  highlighted	  in	  the	  last	  election,	  had	  resulted	  from	  the	  debt	  trap	  that	  had	  befallen	  so	  many	  farmers	  in	  Andhra’s	  rural	  areas.	  	  
What	  role	  could	  the	  public	  sector	  play	  in	  this,	  beyond	  the	  CMRF	  aid	  in	  hospitalization	  bills?	  Government	  played	  a	  majority	  role	  in	  primary	  and	  secondary	  care,	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but	  tertiary	  care	  centers	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  were	  ill	  equipped	  to	  deal	  the	  large	  volume	  of	  patients,	  and	  quality	  was	  far	  exceeded	  by	  hospitals	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  Congenital	  heart	  diseases,	  for	  example,	  where	  not	  treated	  at	  all	  in	  many	  government	  hospitals.97	  Vision	  2020,	  the	  plan	  for	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  reform	  system,	  specifically	  stated	  the	  governmental	  desire	  to	  be	  the	  first	  state	  to	  use	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  partner	  with	  public	  systems	  to	  achieve	  health	  objectives.98	  	  
The	  first	  step	  was	  using	  the	  existing	  system	  to	  its	  fullest	  but	  limited	  capacity.	  Claims	  in	  the	  CM	  Relief	  Fund	  were	  slow	  and	  laborious,	  and	  could	  take	  up	  to	  three	  to	  six	  months.	  Members	  of	  YSR’s	  executive	  office	  worked	  to	  reduce	  this	  time	  as	  more	  and	  more	  citizens	  began	  to	  utilize	  it.	  CMRF	  recipients	  came	  through	  either	  members	  of	  the	  legislative	  assembly	  (MLAs)	  or	  directly	  through	  the	  CM’s	  office.	  In	  a	  typical	  CMRF	  case,	  according	  to	  the	  fund	  was	  able	  to	  aid	  with	  40%	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  bill.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  program	  was	  bureaucratic	  though;	  forms	  detailing	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  procedures	  from	  the	  hospital	  had	  to	  be	  mailed	  directly	  to	  the	  CM’s	  office,	  and	  once	  sanctioned,	  the	  order	  returned	  to	  the	  hospital	  after	  being	  paid.	  	  
Gradually,	  the	  system	  was	  sped	  up	  through	  the	  addition	  of	  checks	  and	  balances	  and	  IT:	  administrative	  staff	  in	  the	  executive	  branch	  pushed	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  website	  for	  direct	  downloading	  of	  the	  order,	  and	  utilized	  cell	  phones	  and	  an	  SMS	  system	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  system	  further.	  Soon,	  the	  CMRF’s	  sanction	  process	  was	  down	  to	  within	  days.	  MLA	  referrals	  were	  also	  made	  electronically.	  Statistics	  were	  prepared	  to	  see	  the	  utilization	  of	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  Officer	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  Bandhyopadhyaya,	  D.	  (2001).	  Andhra	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  Vision	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the	  CMRF,	  and	  the	  results	  were	  stark.	  Despite	  the	  increased	  efficiency	  of	  the	  process,	  40%	  of	  the	  recipients	  still	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  pay	  the	  bills.	  Dr.	  Kiran	  Kumar,	  Private	  Secretary	  to	  the	  CM,	  informed	  the	  Chief	  Minister,	  and	  he	  describes	  the	  CM	  responding	  with	  a	  suggestion	  for	  an	  “insurance	  scheme”	  to	  be	  put	  in	  place.	  	  
The	  staff	  responded	  with	  detailed	  study	  of	  potential	  insurance	  schemes	  to	  draw	  on,	  including	  ones	  in	  Bangalore	  and	  Assam.	  Each	  alternative	  had	  its	  problems,	  though,	  and	  any	  insurance	  scheme	  for	  below	  poverty	  line	  (BPL)	  individuals	  in	  Andhra	  would	  be	  larger	  than	  any	  previous	  insurance	  scheme,	  with	  a	  target	  population	  of	  over	  50	  million	  people.	  However,	  in	  studies	  looking	  at	  the	  distribution	  of	  BPL	  Cards,	  the	  method	  through	  which	  many	  different	  social	  welfare	  schemes	  are	  administered,	  findings	  have	  pointed	  towards	  at	  least	  two	  of	  every	  five	  cardholders	  not	  being	  from	  impoverished	  households.99	  Administrators	  within	  the	  executive	  branch	  initiated	  the	  program,	  with	  consultations	  with	  “physicians,	  hospital	  representatives,	  and	  local	  politicians”.	  100	  
Dr.	  Kiran	  Kumar	  prepared	  a	  presentation	  for	  YSR,	  indicating	  target	  populations	  for	  the	  CMRF	  to	  expand	  to,	  and	  the	  major	  procedures	  and	  specialties	  to	  be	  covered.	  As	  he	  states,	  since	  the	  risk	  was	  defined,	  program’s	  coverage	  by	  the	  insurance	  company	  would	  be	  less	  than	  it	  would	  be	  otherwise.	  At	  this	  time,	  large	  corporate	  hospitals	  in	  the	  region	  were	  consulted	  as	  well	  by	  members	  of	  the	  inner	  circle	  of	  the	  executive.	  Dr.	  Bhaskar	  Rao,	  CEO	  of	  the	  Krishna	  Institute	  of	  Medical	  Sciences	  (KIMS)	  met	  with	  the	  Principal	  Secretary	  to	  the	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Department	  of	  Health	  Medical	  &	  Family	  Welfare	  (DoHMFW)	  and	  discussed	  the	  government’s	  need	  for	  6,000	  to	  7,000	  beds	  for	  the	  program.101	  
The	  structure	  for	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  the	  program	  was	  an	  expansion	  of	  insurance	  coverage.	  Based	  on	  the	  relief	  fund,	  the	  patient	  would	  be	  referred	  from	  a	  public	  primary	  health	  center,	  where	  a	  Aarogya	  Mithra	  (government	  official)	  and	  a	  paired	  medical	  officer	  would	  refer	  the	  patient	  to	  the	  tertiary	  care	  center,	  with	  travel,	  tests,	  food,	  treatment,	  and	  medicines	  covered.	  On	  a	  trial	  basis,	  120	  procedures	  were	  gradually	  phased	  in	  in	  3	  primer	  districts.	  They	  began	  expanding	  this	  first	  wave	  Aarogyasri	  1(AS1),	  gradually	  expanding	  the	  coverage	  5	  districts	  at	  a	  time	  to	  23	  districts.	  Using	  epidemiological	  data,	  the	  incidence	  of	  disease	  could	  be	  clearly	  seen.	  	  
The	  Star	  Health	  and	  Allied	  Insurance	  Company	  won	  the	  rights	  to	  insure	  the	  program,	  and	  the	  government	  paid	  the	  premium	  directly	  to	  them	  in	  2007.	  The	  company	  was	  Chennai-­‐based,	  and	  collected	  130	  million	  INR	  to	  provide	  a	  one-­‐year	  accident	  coverage	  to	  78.7	  million	  people,	  and	  an	  additional	  330	  million	  INR	  premium	  for	  surgical	  procedures.102	  Subsequently,	  two	  other	  separate	  health	  programs	  were	  introduced	  or	  expanded	  on,	  a	  centralized	  emergency	  service,	  EMRI,	  funded	  by	  the	  later	  bankrupted	  Satyam	  Corporation	  and	  the	  GVK	  charity	  fund,	  and	  the	  Health	  Management	  and	  Research	  Institute	  (HMRI),	  a	  call	  center	  to	  handle	  over	  50,000	  non-­‐emergency	  medical	  cases.	  	  
Information	  technology,	  data	  retrieval,	  and	  relative	  transparency	  were	  focused	  on	  from	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  program.	  According	  to	  members	  of	  YSR’s	  executive	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  Dr.	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  CEO	  of	  KIMS	  102	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  Hindu.	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staff,	  their	  initial	  goal	  was	  not	  to	  bolster	  corporate	  hospitals	  either;	  instead	  they	  wanted	  to	  gradually	  improve	  the	  tertiary	  care	  centers	  in	  the	  government	  while	  providing	  below	  poverty	  line	  individuals	  a	  steady	  and	  high-­‐quality	  source	  of	  healthcare.	  Tata	  Consultancy	  Services,	  from	  the	  massive	  Tata	  Corporation,	  aided	  in	  maintaining	  the	  website	  throughout,	  and	  promoting	  rapid	  referrals	  to	  hospitals.103	  
Information	  technology	  would	  be	  essential	  to	  the	  rapid	  turnaround	  time	  possible	  for	  urgent	  cases.	  With	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  medical	  databases	  in	  the	  world,	  the	  turnaround	  time	  after	  evaluation	  by	  a	  physician	  at	  Aarogyasri	  headquarters	  could	  be	  as	  short	  as	  six	  hours	  for	  oncology,	  and	  twelve	  hours	  for	  other	  cases.104	  
Eventually	  spawning	  into	  its	  own	  program,	  AS1	  was	  chiefly	  based	  through	  a	  separate	  insurance	  company,	  with	  government	  as	  an	  intermediary.	  AS2	  would	  take	  hold	  from	  the	  CMRF’s	  expansion,	  and	  would	  be	  based	  on	  a	  government	  trust.105	  Tens	  of	  millions	  of	  rupees	  were	  spent	  on	  the	  Aarogyasri	  program’s	  offices	  and	  staff	  in	  hospitals,	  and	  initially,	  the	  Aarogya	  Mithras	  (being	  politically-­‐appointed	  positions)	  had	  numerous	  allegations	  of	  corruption.	  Each	  hospital	  required	  a	  Rajiv	  Aarogyasri	  Medical	  Coordinator	  (RAMCO)	  as	  well	  to	  verify	  every	  claim.	  	  
These	  “network”	  hospitals	  had	  specific	  requirements	  in	  order	  to	  join	  the	  Trust.	  First,	  they	  needed	  to	  undergo	  an	  empanelment	  process	  by	  the	  government,	  with	  a	  government	  team	  sent	  to	  inspect	  the	  hospital	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  metrics.	  Among	  these	  were	  sufficient	  post-­‐operative	  care	  facilities	  and	  the	  requirement	  of	  at	  least	  fifty	  beds	  devoted	  to	  the	  Aarogyasri	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  105	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program.106	  Aarogyasri	  officers	  on	  the	  ground	  saw	  the	  goals	  as	  a	  larger	  part	  of	  a	  health	  movement;	  tertiary	  care	  from	  the	  private	  sector	  was	  needed,	  according	  to	  ground	  officers,	  because	  the	  public	  sector	  was	  ill-­‐equipped.107	  In	  interviews	  with	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Joint	  Executive	  Officer	  at	  NIMS	  government	  hospital,	  he	  stated	  that	  the	  trust	  would	  be	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  movement	  that	  would	  also	  devote	  funding	  to	  secondary	  and	  primary	  care.	  	  
AS1	  would	  eventually	  expand	  to	  cover	  942	  interventions	  with	  a	  maximal	  coverage	  of	  2	  lakh	  INR.	  This	  limit,	  however,	  was	  flexible	  and	  interventions	  that	  required	  further	  financial	  coverage	  could	  be	  requested	  through	  the	  CMRF	  directly.108	  Here,	  the	  government	  began	  to	  form	  a	  network	  of	  private,	  corporate	  hospitals	  that	  were	  included	  in	  the	  Aarogyasri	  1	  program	  to	  provide	  service	  to	  below	  poverty	  line	  patients	  (defined	  as	  60,000	  INR	  in	  rural	  and	  75,000	  INR	  in	  urban	  areas).109	  The	  Star	  Health	  Insurance	  Company,	  in	  turn,	  provided	  risk	  coverage	  and	  administrative	  aid.	  	  
Health	  camps	  also	  became	  an	  ancillary	  expenditure	  for	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  (funded	  for	  by	  directly	  by	  the	  state	  government),	  in	  which	  multi-­‐specialty	  camps	  would	  be	  set	  up	  in	  rural	  areas	  without	  access	  to	  care.	  These	  camps,	  while	  they	  provided	  many	  referrals	  to	  the	  hospitals,	  were	  controversial	  with	  physicians,	  especially	  specialized	  ones	  who	  came	  into	  camps	  without	  the	  needed	  infrastructure	  to	  practice.110	  By	  2008,	  Aarogyasri	  was	  rapidly	  expanding	  to	  new	  districts,	  and	  was	  launched	  in	  the	  Karimnagar	  district,	  totaling	  56	  “network”	  hospitals,	  with	  5000	  to	  6000	  million	  INR	  annually	  spent	  on	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  Interview	  with	  Joint	  Executive	  Officer	  at	  NIMS	  107	  ibid.	  108	  http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/04/stories/2010010452600300.htm	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  ibid	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  ibid.	  Interview-­‐	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the	  program.	  Aarogyasri	  I	  and	  II	  were	  implemented	  concurrently;	  Aarogyasri	  listed	  681	  specific	  procedures,	  the	  treatment	  for	  which	  it	  covered	  without	  any	  financial	  treatment	  at	  all.111	  
2008	  also	  saw	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  Rajiv	  Aarogyasri	  Awareness	  Camps	  to	  reach	  rural	  areas	  and	  an	  expansion	  to	  include	  344	  hospitals	  in	  the	  “network”.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2008,	  863	  disease	  were	  covered	  in	  both	  Aarogyasri	  I	  and	  II,	  and	  50,000	  surgeries	  had	  been	  conducted.112	  By	  the	  following	  year,	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  was	  attempting	  to	  secure	  further	  funding	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  (on	  a	  70:30	  cost-­‐sharing	  basis)	  in	  order	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  program	  while	  also	  not	  crossing	  his	  promise	  of	  not	  raising	  taxes.113	  
All	  in	  all,	  the	  coverage	  would	  increase	  from	  10	  to	  15	  percent	  in	  2006	  to	  85	  percent	  in	  2010.	  One	  study,	  conducted	  on	  80,000	  patient	  claims,	  saw	  significant	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  payment	  reductions	  in	  impoverished	  households.114	  In	  2010,	  the	  opposition	  first	  began	  to	  speak	  out	  in	  criticism	  of	  the	  program.	  	  
Chandrababu	  Naidu,	  leader	  of	  the	  TDP,	  started	  a	  walkout	  in	  a	  legislature	  session	  based	  on	  health	  funding	  for	  the	  prominent	  National	  Rural	  Health	  Mission,	  and	  the	  Lok	  Satta	  President,	  N	  Jayaprakash	  Narayan	  criticized	  the	  sitting	  government:	  “The	  government	  is	  unable	  to	  spend	  Rs	  100	  crore	  per	  annum	  on	  health	  care	  delivery	  but	  is	  giving	  Rs	  1500	  crore	  to	  corporate	  hospitals	  in	  the	  name	  of	  health	  insurance,"	  he	  alleged	  and	  registered	  his	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  to	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  more	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  June	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  112	  The	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  Arogyasri	  Awareness	  camp	  organized.”	  Aug	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  Times	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  2009.	  114	  Rao	  M,	  Ramachandra	  SS,	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  al.	  Addressing	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  needs	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  living	  below	  the	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  line:	  A	  rapid	  assessment	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  Pradesh	  Health	  Insurance	  Scheme.	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  J	  India	  2012;24:000–0.	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  “Andhra	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3.1	  Exogenous	  Factors	  for	  Policy	  
Andhra	  Pradesh	  had	  seen	  the	  structure	  of	  its	  health	  system	  fundamentally	  altered	  with	  the	  reform	  movement	  of	  2007.	  On	  every	  level,	  this	  was	  a	  “big	  R”	  reform:	  the	  Rajiv	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  was	  a	  flagship	  program	  of	  the	  sitting	  government	  that	  the	  Congress	  Party	  used	  across	  India	  in	  promotion,	  and	  one	  that	  impacted	  every	  “control	  knob”	  of	  the	  health	  care	  system	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  The	  insurance	  program	  altered	  health	  financing	  significantly,	  allowing	  patients	  to	  access	  the	  “networked”	  corporate	  hospitals	  via	  cashless	  transactions	  through	  a	  third	  party	  insurance	  agency.	  Organization,	  patient	  supply,	  and	  consumer	  behavior	  too,	  were	  transformed,	  as	  new	  below	  poverty	  line	  (BPL)	  patients	  flooded	  corporate	  hospitals.	  The	  actual	  organization	  of	  the	  corporate	  hospitals	  was	  changed,	  as	  the	  novel	  officers	  required	  of	  the	  program	  integrated	  within	  the	  hospital’s	  bureaucratic	  structure.	  	  Chapter	  2	  detailed	  the	  substantial	  impact	  of	  the	  reform	  on	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  	  
What	  factors,	  however,	  actually	  account	  for	  such	  transformative	  change?	  What	  explains	  why	  such	  an	  alteration	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system	  was	  possible	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  while	  similar	  movements	  have	  not	  occurred	  in	  other	  states	  in	  India	  or	  in	  Low	  and	  Middle	  Income	  Countries	  more	  generally?	  Furthermore,	  there	  are	  specific	  reasons	  why	  the	  reform	  occurred	  the	  way	  it	  did,	  rather	  than	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  	  
There	  are,	  undoubtedly,	  explicitly	  political	  factors	  for	  the	  transformation.	  That,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter.	  In	  this	  factor,	  there	  will	  be	  an	  effort	  to	  extricate	  factors	  existing	  outside	  of	  the	  political	  system	  that	  impacted	  the	  possibility	  and	  probability	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  unfolding	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  did.	  Gill	  Walt	  terms	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these	  factors	  “exogenous	  factors,”	  the	  range	  of	  factors	  outside	  of	  the	  political	  system	  that	  impact	  policy	  formulation	  and	  implementation.117	  Using	  Leichter’s	  model,	  Walt	  characterizes	  these	  extra-­‐political	  factors	  into	  four	  categories:	  situational,	  structural,	  cultural,	  and	  environmental.	  The	  insinuation	  is	  not,	  however,	  that	  these	  factors	  impact	  policy	  independent	  from	  political	  processes.	  They	  interact	  dynamically	  with	  the	  political	  factors	  that	  impact	  policy	  formulation,	  and	  work	  either	  in	  conjunction	  or	  counter	  to	  one	  another.	  To	  varying	  degrees,	  the	  exogenous	  factors	  impacted	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  Andhra	  health	  reform	  movement.	  	  
Each	  of	  these	  categories	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  Of	  the	  four,	  cultural	  factors	  hold	  the	  weakest	  explanatory	  power	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  health	  care	  reform	  movement.	  The	  caste	  politics	  that	  predominate	  electoral	  politics	  and	  underlie	  political	  coalitions	  across	  Andhra	  did	  little	  to	  impact	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  process.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  focus	  on	  culture	  will	  be	  primarily	  the	  political	  culture,	  and	  the	  resulting	  dialogues	  and	  discourses	  that	  were	  generated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that	  political	  culture.	  Still,	  full	  studies	  on	  the	  “language,	  religion,	  and	  traditional	  social	  values”	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  are	  undoubtedly	  important,	  but	  not	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  study	  here.	  	  	  
The	  culture	  value	  of	  health	  itself	  has	  been	  contested	  in	  politics	  since	  India’s	  inception.	  In	  a	  description	  of	  the	  Congress	  Planning	  Committee,	  the	  schizophrenic	  view	  of	  health	  was	  showcased:	  “The	  need	  for	  public	  health	  stemmed	  from	  an	  egalitarian	  commitment	  to	  welfare,	  and	  from	  a	  far-­‐from-­‐	  egalitarian	  fear	  of	  the	  rising	  numbers	  of	  the	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  Walt	  G:	  Health	  Policy:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Process	  and	  Power.	  	  London,	  Zed	  Books	  1994.	  p.	  30	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lower	  castes.”118	  Fluctuating	  in	  importance	  within	  the	  public	  debate,	  health	  began	  to	  emerge	  again	  in	  a	  rights-­‐based	  context	  in	  the	  past	  decade,	  a	  perspective	  expressed	  through	  civil	  society	  groups	  like	  the	  Jan	  Swasthiya	  Abhiyan,	  whose	  slogan	  is	  “the	  right	  to	  Health	  For	  All,	  Now!”	  While	  the	  constitution	  of	  India	  guarantees	  universal	  healthcare,	  the	  pragmatic	  reality	  on	  the	  ground	  is	  far	  from	  the	  ideals.	  	  
Of	  the	  four	  categories	  of	  exogenous	  factors,	  situational,	  structural,	  and	  environmental	  factors	  pose	  the	  most	  vexing	  questions	  and	  the	  most	  powerful	  explanatory	  power,	  and	  all	  three	  are	  interlinked.	  The	  external	  actors	  that	  influenced	  health	  policy	  aided	  in	  forming	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  policy	  realm	  through	  financial	  aid,	  and	  in	  turn	  affected	  large-­‐scale	  economic	  policies.	  	  
Situational	  factors	  are	  largely	  short-­‐term	  factors	  in	  the	  policy	  realm;	  war,	  crisis,	  natural	  disaster.	  In	  affecting	  policy,	  the	  farmer-­‐suicide	  crisis	  was	  undoubtedly	  a	  major	  factor.	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  policy	  formation	  process,	  stemming	  from	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  himself,	  was	  a	  desire	  to	  resolve	  the	  issue	  of	  financial	  insolvency	  and	  debt	  that	  was	  affecting	  the	  poor	  citizens.	  This	  was	  an	  issue	  that	  had	  reared	  its	  head	  during	  the	  elections,	  and	  had	  hurt	  Chandrababu	  Naidu	  considerably.	  The	  first	  citizens	  to	  meet	  YS	  Rajasekhara	  Reddy	  in	  his	  daily	  meetings	  were	  requesting	  financial	  aid	  for	  their	  health	  costs.119	  Reports	  during	  this	  time	  of	  over	  150,000	  farmers	  committing	  suicides	  shined	  a	  spotlight	  on	  the	  heavy	  load	  of	  debt	  and	  financial	  insecurity	  that	  inflicted	  suffering	  on	  the	  poorest	  citizens	  of	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  Amrith,	  Sunil	  (2007),	  “Political	  Culture	  of	  Health	  in	  India:	  A	  Historical	  Perspective”,	  Economic	  and	  Political	  
Weekly,	  13	  January.	  119	  Interview	  with	  Dr.	  Bhaskar	  Rao,	  CEO	  and	  Director	  of	  KIMS	  Hospital	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the	  state.120	  Although	  not	  directly	  correlated	  with	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  health	  system,	  the	  rising	  tide	  of	  farmer	  suicides	  provided	  a	  mandate	  for	  YSR	  to	  continue	  with	  a	  host	  of	  economic	  reform	  programs,	  free	  electricity,	  irrigation	  reform,	  and	  health	  reform.	  	  
The	  structural	  and	  environmental	  factors	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Andhra	  are	  intertwined.	  Economic	  regime,	  political	  regime	  type	  (procedural	  democracy)	  and	  technologies	  all	  played	  important	  roles	  in	  impacting	  how	  the	  Andhra	  health	  system	  could	  be	  changed.	  Structural	  factors	  are	  constant	  facets	  of	  the	  society,	  while	  environmental	  factors	  are	  ones	  that	  ”exist	  outside	  the	  boundaries	  of	  a	  political	  system	  but	  which	  influence	  decisions	  within	  it.”121	  	  
These	  externalized	  environmental	  factors	  are	  primarily	  the	  strong	  presence	  of	  international	  actors,	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Department	  for	  International	  Development	  (DFID)	  of	  the	  Untied	  Kingdom.	  The	  World	  Bank,	  in	  particular,	  has	  had	  a	  constant	  presence	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  that	  has	  transformed	  policy	  options	  over	  the	  last	  decade,	  and	  therefore	  has	  become	  a	  structural	  factor.	  Additionally,	  looking	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  private	  business	  and	  larger	  neoliberal	  dialogues	  of	  promoting	  private	  industry	  are	  helpful	  for	  understanding	  the	  structural	  forces	  that	  shaped	  Andhra’s	  health	  reform.	  Liberalization,	  since	  1991,	  has	  held	  sway	  in	  Indian	  national	  economic	  policy	  and	  affected	  the	  state’s	  options	  in	  terms	  of	  methods	  through	  which	  the	  health	  care	  system	  could	  be	  reformed.	  The	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  went	  through	  the	  existing	  tertiary	  care	  structures	  of	  private,	  corporate	  hospitals.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  type	  of	  insurance	  expansion	  are	  multivariable,	  but	  the	  legacy	  of	  liberalization	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  Andhra	  played	  a	  large	  role.	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  news.	  “1.5	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  farmers	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  and	  2005.”	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The	  health	  reform	  movement,	  too,	  was	  focused	  centrally	  on	  the	  proliferation	  of	  information	  technology	  and	  networking	  information	  rapidly	  from	  the	  care	  centers	  to	  the	  Aarogyasri	  offices	  for	  quick	  referrals.	  Hyderabad,	  the	  capital	  city	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  was	  second	  only	  to	  Bangalore	  for	  technological	  progress	  and	  sophistication.	  This	  fact	  aided	  in	  the	  technological	  nature	  of	  the	  reform:	  each	  network	  hospital	  had	  computer	  kiosks	  and	  had	  high-­‐speed	  Internet.122	  Additionally,	  Tata	  Consultancy	  Services	  was	  brought	  on	  board	  to	  build	  the	  website	  and	  maintain	  the	  complex	  web	  structures	  that	  would	  transfer	  patient	  information	  in	  a	  confidential	  manner	  from	  network	  hospital	  to	  central	  administration	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Trust	  and	  back	  again	  to	  the	  hospital.	  Without	  the	  existing	  technological	  infrastructure	  at	  disposal	  in	  Hyderabad	  and	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  the	  reform	  movement	  could	  not	  have	  integrated	  information	  technology	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  it	  did	  in	  the	  final	  reform	  movement.	  Even	  in	  the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  reform	  efforts,	  changes	  to	  make	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  Relief	  Fund	  (CMRF)	  more	  efficient	  were	  centered	  around	  the	  use	  of	  technology,	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  website	  to	  directly	  download	  forms	  for	  the	  sanction	  process	  and	  integrating	  cell	  phone	  and	  information	  technology	  capability.123	  	  
Still,	  while	  technology	  capacity	  undoubtedly	  factored	  into	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  reform	  process,	  the	  larger	  shape	  the	  reform	  took,	  as	  one	  that	  changed	  financing	  while	  funneling	  patients	  into	  the	  existing	  private	  tertiary	  care	  system	  had	  much	  deeper	  economic	  roots.	  	  
3.2	  Liberalization	  and	  its	  Response	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  Foundation:	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  Change:	  The	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“Government	  initiatives	  since	  1991	  to	  restructure	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Indian	  economy	  ‘ended	  four	  decades	  of	  planning	  and	  have	  initiated	  a	  quiet	  economic	  revolution’”	  
-­‐Rob	  Jenkins,	  Democratic	  Politics	  and	  Economic	  Reform	  in	  India124	  
The	  economic	  revolution	  of	  1999	  is	  not	  quiet	  any	  longer	  however.	  Transforming	  a	  near	  half-­‐century	  of	  economic	  policy,	  the	  debt	  crisis	  of	  1991	  forced	  Prime	  Minister	  P.V.	  Narasimha	  Rao	  and	  Finance	  Minister	  Manmohan	  Singh	  (soon	  to	  become	  the	  Prime	  Minister)	  to	  initiate	  neoliberal	  reforms,	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund.	  During	  that	  time,	  India	  sought	  between	  5	  and	  7	  billion	  USD	  from	  the	  IMF.125	  In	  return,	  the	  IMF	  would	  seek	  a	  radical	  restructuring	  of	  India’s	  economy	  that	  would	  have	  ripples	  in	  every	  sector	  and	  adjust	  India’s	  society	  drastically.	  	  
With	  Manmohan	  Singh	  at	  the	  helm	  of	  the	  financial	  ship,	  India	  would	  undertake	  the	  Adjustment	  Program.	  The	  structural	  reforms	  took	  three	  forms:	  industrial	  liberalization,	  trade	  liberalization	  and	  finance	  sector	  liberalization,	  and	  sought	  to	  remove	  regulations	  across	  the	  board.	  One	  study	  of	  the	  macroeconomic	  effects	  on	  health	  access	  stated,	  “In	  the	  output	  market,	  the	  pricing,	  sale,	  and	  moving	  of	  output,	  which	  had	  been	  severely	  regulated	  are	  being	  made	  to	  imbibe	  market	  principles…For	  a	  highly	  regulated	  economy	  such	  as	  that	  of	  India	  MAPs	  has	  brought	  about	  a	  sea	  change.”126	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  1999.	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  Cambridge	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  Cambridge	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  Press.	  125	  Weinraub,	  B.	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  Crisis	  Forcing	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  June	  19,	  1991.	  	  126	  Narayana	  D.	  Macroeconomic	  adjustment	  policies,	  health	  sector	  reform	  and	  access	  to	  health	  care	  in	  India.	  Draft.	  Thiruvananthapuram,	  India:	  Center	  for	  Development	  Studies,	  2001.	  
	   86	  
	   Since	  1991,	  then,	  the	  economic	  reforms	  have	  been	  a	  fundamental	  fact	  of	  the	  Indian	  landscape,	  and	  liberalization	  transformed	  the	  economy	  across	  sectors,	  including	  the	  health	  sector.	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  within	  this	  fabric,	  held	  a	  special	  role	  in	  liberalization.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  state	  in	  India	  to	  directly	  invite	  the	  World	  bank	  to	  implement	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Programs,	  what	  would	  later	  be	  termed	  the	  AP	  Economic	  Restructuring	  Program.	  The	  AP	  Economic	  Restructuring	  Program	  would	  initiate	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  that	  would	  change	  policy	  options	  and	  the	  economic	  outlook	  for	  the	  state.	  	  
Global	  forces	  were	  the	  primary	  initiator	  in	  spurring	  change	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  and	  India.	  It	  was	  a	  trickle-­‐down	  policy	  environment:	  pressures	  from	  the	  global	  financial	  organizations	  affected	  the	  policies	  at	  the	  central	  federal	  government,	  which	  in	  turn	  pressed	  on	  state	  governments	  to	  enact	  and	  implement	  the	  reforms	  themselves.	  The	  changes	  occurred	  to	  various	  degrees,	  but	  by	  most	  accounts,	  AP	  was	  a	  model	  state	  for	  the	  World	  Bank.	  These	  longstanding	  fiscal	  pressures	  would	  change	  the	  reform	  movement.	  	  
The	  result	  for	  healthcare	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  as	  overlaid	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  was	  a	  privatization	  of	  health	  delivery,	  with	  a	  predominantly	  corporate	  sector.	  In	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  the	  percentage	  of	  private	  hospitals	  grew	  from	  58.3	  to	  70.5%	  of	  all	  hospitals,	  while	  public	  hospitals	  fell	  from	  41.7	  to	  25.1%	  from	  1992	  to	  1998.127	  Without	  any	  government,	  AP’s	  health	  industry,	  especially	  at	  the	  tertiary	  level,	  has	  operated	  on	  a	  near	  pure	  free-­‐market	  basis	  with	  heavy	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  expenditures.	  Additionally,	  the	  state	  government	  has	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encouraged	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  private	  market,	  with	  reductions	  of	  tariffs	  on	  imports,	  subsidies,	  lending	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  loans,	  and	  land	  at	  reduced	  price	  or	  for	  free.128	  World	  Bank	  loans	  and	  projects	  encouraged	  marketization	  of	  the	  health	  care	  system,	  and	  sought	  user	  charges	  and	  referrals	  from	  government	  hospitals	  to	  private	  care	  centers,	  beginning	  in	  1996.	  	  
The	  result	  of	  increased	  corporatization	  can	  be	  seen	  through	  the	  example	  of	  the	  explosion	  of	  Apollo	  Hospitals.	  The	  subject	  of	  a	  case	  study	  at	  Harvard	  Business	  School,	  Apollo	  Hospitals	  tracked	  a	  rapid	  rise	  from	  its	  founding	  in	  1983	  as	  the	  first	  for-­‐profit	  hospital.	  By	  2003,	  it	  would	  include	  over	  33	  hospitals,	  and	  maintain	  14%	  of	  the	  total	  tertiary	  care	  market.129	  Apollo	  Hospitals	  Ltd.	  was	  worth	  311	  million	  USD	  in	  2004.	  It	  was	  based	  entirely	  on	  a	  fee-­‐for-­‐service	  model,	  with	  the	  average	  cardiac	  surgeon	  making	  a	  salary	  of	  300,000	  USD,	  a	  pay	  cut	  from	  the	  average	  salary	  of	  an	  American	  cardiac	  surgeon,	  but	  an	  enormous	  sum	  for	  the	  average	  Indian	  one.	  Apollo	  provided	  care	  that	  rivaled	  the	  best	  care	  in	  the	  developed	  world,	  including	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  was	  a	  major	  site	  of	  medical	  tourism.	  	  
Apollo	  Hospitals’	  rise	  was	  enabled	  by	  the	  spate	  of	  deregulation	  and	  the	  opening	  of	  markets,	  and	  an	  environment	  that	  eschewed	  a	  government	  role	  in	  providing	  health	  for	  the	  populace.	  The	  result	  is	  an	  astounding	  inequity	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits.	  Narayana	  states	  in	  looking	  at	  health	  access	  across	  India,	  “The	  differential	  impact	  of	  structural	  reforms	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  clear	  terms	  in	  Chennai.	  The	  workers	  in	  the	  informal	  sectors	  and	  lower	  level	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  ibid.	  129	  Oberholzer-­‐Gee	  F,	  Khanna	  T,	  Knoop	  CI:	  Apollo-­‐hospitals-­‐-­‐first-­‐world	  health	  care	  at	  emerging-­‐market	  prices.	  Harv	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  Sch	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industrial	  labourers	  are	  the	  ‘losers’	  and	  the	  higher	  income	  groups	  are	  the	  ‘winners’	  of	  liberalization.”130	  Liberalization	  enabled	  multinational	  corporations	  to	  take	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  health;	  Apollo	  Hospitals,	  for	  example,	  operates	  today	  across	  the	  globe,	  including	  Qatar,	  Nigeria,	  and	  Bangladesh.	  Oligopolies	  have	  developed	  within	  the	  health	  industry,	  focusing	  on	  high-­‐tech	  specialty	  hospitals.131	  	  
The	  ones	  who	  are	  left	  out	  were	  the	  poorest,	  most	  vulnerable	  groups.	  “Poorly	  regulated	  privatization	  may	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  access	  and	  affordability	  for	  the	  poor	  or	  for	  other	  groups	  that	  are	  socially	  disadvantaged	  or	  discriminated	  against.”132	  The	  health	  sector	  was	  left	  unprotected	  by	  the	  public	  sector	  post-­‐liberalization,	  leaving	  a	  radically	  transformed	  space	  in	  which	  a	  bifurcation	  of	  health	  care	  services	  resulted.	  Public	  health	  spending	  overall	  decreased,	  and	  other	  than	  one	  increase	  in	  capital	  spending,	  the	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  Reconstruction	  Project	  that	  allocated	  66.7	  million	  USD	  for	  primary	  health	  centers,	  spending	  on	  public	  health	  or	  healthcare	  overall	  has	  been	  scant.133	  The	  policies	  of	  liberalization	  have	  created	  deep	  structural	  features	  of	  the	  health	  care	  system	  that	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  the	  policy	  development	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust.	  	  
3.3	  External	  pressures:	  International	  Agencies	  and	  National	  Business	  Interests	  
	   How	  significant	  is	  external	  pressure	  in	  determining	  any	  changes	  to	  the	  health	  care	  system	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh?	  	  Numerous	  international	  financing	  agencies	  had	  long	  seen	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  Ibid.	  Narayana	  144	  131	  Baru,	  Rama	  V.	  Private	  Health	  Care	  in	  India-­‐	  Social	  Characteristics	  and	  Trends.:	  Sage	  Publications,	  1999.	  132	  Sen	  G,	  Iyer	  A,	  George	  A.	  Class,	  gender,	  and	  health	  equity:	  lessons	  from	  liberalizing	  India.	  In:	  Sen	  G,	  George	  A,	  Ostlin	  P,	  eds.	  Engendering	  international	  health.	  The	  challenge	  of	  equity.	  Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  2002.	  281–311.	  133	  Narayana	  D.	  Adjustment	  and	  health	  sector	  reforms:	  the	  solution	  to	  low	  public	  spending	  on	  health	  care	  in	  India?	  In:	  Haddad	  S,	  Baris	  E,	  Narayana	  D,	  editors.	  Safeguarding	  the	  health	  sector	  in	  times	  of	  macroeconomic	  instability.	  New	  Jersy	  and	  Ottawa:	  Africa	  World	  Press	  and	  International	  Development	  Research	  Center;	  2008.	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Andhra	  Pradesh	  as	  a	  foothold	  for	  health	  development	  within	  India,	  and	  a	  model	  state	  for	  the	  policies	  they	  sought	  to	  be	  introduced.	  According	  to	  Srivatsan	  et	  al.,	  “It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  impetus	  to	  set	  up	  universal	  healthcare	  in	  India	  comes	  from	  big	  business	  and	  the	  state’s	  agenda	  for	  growth…the	  Planning	  Commission	  constituted	  the	  [High	  Level	  Expert	  Group]	  (HLEG)	  and	  gave	  it	  the	  responsibility	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  way	  to	  spend	  2.5%	  of	  the	  GDP	  in	  the	  healthcare	  sector.	  This	  figure	  was	  presumably	  predetermined	  and	  this	  is	  likely	  the	  reason	  the	  report	  starts	  with	  the	  subject	  of	  finance	  (instead	  of	  ground-­‐level	  considerations	  
such	  as	  disease	  burden,	  health	  goals	  and	  system	  weaknesses)”	  134,	  emphasis	  mine.	  	  Clearly	  the	  predominant	  position	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  IMF,	  and	  other	  international	  donor	  agencies,	  like	  the	  DFID	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Rockefeller	  Foundation,	  affected	  agenda	  setting	  in	  the	  health	  care	  realm.	  	  
The	  World	  Bank	  has	  a	  long	  and	  profound	  history	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  From	  the	  beginning,	  Andhra	  was	  centered	  on	  as	  a	  “focus	  state,”	  which	  would	  “enjoy	  the	  widest	  and	  most	  lenient	  access	  to	  World	  Bank	  assistance,	  despite	  a	  ground	  reality	  of	  reform	  performance	  that	  fell	  short	  of	  its	  government’s	  often	  grandiose	  rhetoric.”135	  Kirk	  subsequently	  identifies	  two	  reasons	  for	  the	  status	  as	  a	  focus	  state:	  its	  leaders’	  commitment	  to	  reform,	  primarily	  through	  the	  “CEO”	  CM	  of	  Chandrababu	  Naidu,	  and	  the	  closeness	  of	  the	  state	  leaders	  to	  national	  leaders.	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  Srivatsan,	  R.,	  Shatrugna,	  V.	  Political	  Challenges	  to	  Universal	  Access	  to	  Healthcare.	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly.	  Feb	  25,	  2012:	  XLVII:8.	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  Kirk,	  J	  (2005)	  Banking	  on	  India’s	  States:	  the	  politics	  of	  World	  Bank	  reform	  programs	  in	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  and	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  Review	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Lending	  began	  in	  1998	  after	  Chandrababu	  Naidu	  pushed	  for	  an	  appointment	  he	  had	  not	  received	  to	  meet	  with	  World	  Bank	  President	  James	  Wolfensohn.136	  Subsequent	  World	  Bank	  programs	  imposed	  restructuring	  in	  the	  electricity	  board,	  increasing	  investments	  in	  infrastructure,	  education,	  and	  health,	  and	  levying	  user	  charges	  on	  public	  services.	  Officially,	  June	  1998	  saw	  the	  543.2	  million	  USD	  loan	  project,	  termed	  the	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  Economic	  Restructuring	  Project,	  followed	  by	  a	  210	  million	  USD	  loan	  in	  the	  next	  year.137	  By	  2004,	  a	  total	  of	  1.6	  billion	  USD	  would	  be	  loaned	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  Throughout	  this	  time,	  Naidu	  delicately	  balanced	  the	  sacrifices	  required	  of	  the	  structural	  programs,	  including	  slashing	  food	  subsidies,	  while	  simultaneously	  providing	  welfare	  schemes.	  Naidu	  implemented	  welfare	  and	  development	  projects,	  liberalized	  for	  the	  business	  interest,	  and	  was	  also	  highly	  corrupt.	  K.C.	  Suri,	  a	  political	  science	  scholar	  at	  the	  Central	  University	  of	  Hyderabad,	  stated	  that	  his	  successful	  handling	  of	  the	  mix	  of	  the	  three	  led	  to	  his	  popularity.138	  
	   Naidu’s	  combination	  of	  welfare	  schemes	  and	  implementation	  of	  liberalization	  policies	  afforded	  him	  political	  survival	  and	  a	  good	  relationship	  with	  the	  World	  Bank	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Naidu	  himself	  had	  admired	  Mahathir	  Mohamad’s	  reform	  policies	  in	  Southeast	  Asia,	  and	  modeled	  his	  own	  Vision	  2020	  plan	  after	  Mohamad’s.139	  An	  enthusiastic	  proponent	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  policies,	  he	  justified	  the	  Bank’s	  emphasis	  on	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  as	  a	  “focus	  state.”	  His	  electoral	  loss	  in	  2004,	  however,	  created	  ruffles	  for	  the	  World	  Bank’s	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  Dugger,	  Celia.	  “Indian	  Courts	  World’s	  Riches	  and	  Poor’s	  Vote.”	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  Sept	  10,	  1999.	  Retrieved	  May	  3,	  2012:	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  137	  Ibid.	  Kirk	  138	  Interview	  with	  KC	  Suri	  139	  HBL	  Bureau.	  “Naidu	  seeks	  Mahathir’s	  help	  to	  draw	  Malaysian	  Investors.”	  Hindu	  Business	  Line.	  Oct	  16,	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intentions	  in	  the	  state.	  YSR,	  as	  a	  candidate,	  pledged	  to	  give	  free	  power	  and	  create	  an	  irrigation	  network,	  bucking	  the	  World	  Bank	  trend	  of	  liberalization.	  His	  words	  provoked	  a	  bank	  response,	  threatening	  a	  cut	  off	  of	  loans	  to	  states	  that	  initiated	  free	  power	  schemes	  and	  the	  like.	  140,141.	  YSR	  subsequently	  had	  a	  turnaround,	  meeting	  with	  Michael	  Carter,	  the	  World	  Bank	  country	  director	  for	  India,	  and	  requesting	  financing	  for	  a	  urban	  development	  project,	  irrigation	  projects,	  and	  structural	  adjustments.	  142	  The	  Bank’s	  influencing	  power	  was	  once	  again	  firmly	  in	  place,	  but	  not	  as	  firmly	  as	  before.	  A	  225	  million	  USD	  adjustment	  loan	  went	  through	  in	  2007.143	  	  
The	  DFID,	  similarly,	  provided	  limited	  grants	  for	  many	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  projects,	  including	  the	  emergency	  services,	  and	  the	  initial	  Aarogyasri	  program.	  From	  2007	  to	  2010,	  the	  British	  development	  agency	  provided	  64.8	  million	  USD	  to	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  for	  various	  projects.	  The	  political	  impact	  of	  the	  DFID,	  however,	  is	  much	  more	  limited	  in	  scope	  and	  intention.	  Specific	  grants	  were	  allotted	  for	  partial	  aid	  with	  credible	  partners,	  and	  after	  the	  grant	  period	  is	  over	  the	  control	  of	  the	  program	  returned	  to	  the	  state	  government	  in	  order	  to	  build	  capacity.	  	  
How	  do	  these	  environmental	  factors	  contribute	  to	  the	  political	  discourse	  and	  the	  policy	  process?	  In	  terms	  of	  discourse,	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  influence	  and	  maintaining	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  autonomy	  was	  a	  prime	  point	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  2004	  election.	  Despite	  this	  fear,	  Naidu	  constantly	  painted	  himself	  as	  a	  populist	  to	  the	  electorate	  while	  simultaneously	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  World	  Bank,	  Unlocking	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  Growth	  Potential:	  An	  Agenda	  to	  Achieve	  the	  	  Vision	  2020	  Growth	  
Targets,	  August	  2004.	  Accessible	  via	  http://www.worldbank.org.	  	  141	  SubhomoyBhattacharjee,“WorldBankMayCutOffStateLoans,”Rediff.com,August9,	  	  2004.	  	  142	  “Heels	  Over	  Head:	  YSR	  turn	  pro-­‐World	  Bank,”	  The	  Economic	  Times,	  May	  18,	  2005.	  143	  Kirk,	  James.	  India	  and	  the	  World	  Bank:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Aid	  and	  Influence.	  Anthem	  Press,	  Apr	  1,	  2010.	  74.	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conferring	  user	  fees	  on	  public	  services	  and	  meeting	  with	  top	  global	  businessmen	  to	  build	  a	  top	  business	  school	  in	  Hyderabad.	  
In	  terms	  of	  policy,	  however,	  its	  clear	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  relationship	  has	  left	  a	  lasting	  imprint.	  By	  limiting	  the	  channels	  of	  possible	  policies	  to	  those	  that	  build	  on	  top	  of	  the	  already	  liberalized	  structure,	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  other	  international	  monetary	  and	  aid	  agencies	  had	  a	  significant	  role	  to	  play	  in	  shaping	  policy	  on	  the	  state	  level.	  The	  health	  reform	  movement	  had	  to	  build	  on	  top	  of	  a	  significantly	  liberalized	  and	  deregulated	  health	  sector,	  much	  as	  a	  result	  of	  macroeconomic	  policies	  passed	  down	  from	  the	  center	  and	  from	  the	  pressures	  of	  loans	  from	  international	  agencies.	  	  
3.4	  The	  Role	  of	  History,	  Civil	  Society,	  and	  the	  Policy	  Window	  Opportunity	  
	   The	  health	  reform	  may	  also	  come	  at	  an	  opportune	  moment	  in	  the	  political	  cycles	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  politics,	  and	  built	  on	  top	  of	  a	  history	  that	  was	  leading	  to	  a	  reform	  movement	  of	  some	  kind.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Tamil	  Nadu,	  for	  example,	  some	  scholars	  have	  attributed	  the	  success	  of	  its	  health	  care	  in	  terms	  of	  equity	  to	  “struggles	  over	  the	  last	  century	  with	  the	  problems	  of	  political	  representation,	  self-­‐respect,	  and	  Brahmin	  domination.”144	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  say	  that	  the	  same	  factor	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  health	  movement.	  Far	  from	  moving	  from	  a	  ground	  up	  way	  in	  the	  policy	  formation,	  the	  policy	  was	  a	  brainchild	  of	  the	  chief	  executive’s	  close	  team,	  and	  proceeded	  to	  be	  formulated	  downwards,	  interacting	  with	  hospital	  associations,	  medical	  associations,	  and	  insurance	  companies	  first.	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  Srivatsan,	  R.,	  Shatrugna,	  V.	  Political	  Challenges	  to	  Universal	  Access	  to	  Healthcare.	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly.	  Feb	  25,	  2012:	  XLVII:8.	  61-­‐63.	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   What	  may	  have	  aided	  YSR	  in	  his	  reform	  movement	  was	  a	  temporary	  weakness	  in	  an	  issue	  that	  had	  been	  bubbling	  under	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  surface	  since	  its	  inception:	  a	  separate	  state	  for	  the	  Telangana	  people.	  During	  the	  period	  from	  2004	  to	  2009,	  the	  Telangana	  issue	  remained	  in	  the	  backdrop	  as	  farmer	  suicides,	  starvation,	  and	  economic	  development	  stayed	  at	  the	  forefront.	  The	  Telangana	  separatist	  party	  that	  had	  traditionally	  held	  sway,	  the	  Telangana	  Rashtra	  Samithi	  (TRS),	  was	  weakened	  even	  further	  during	  the	  2004	  elections.	  When	  both	  Congress	  and	  TRS	  members	  formed	  a	  coalition,	  they	  were	  criticized	  universally,	  including	  by	  the	  BJP.145	  The	  result	  was	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  YSR	  to	  push	  through	  reforms	  without	  the	  distraction	  of	  the	  Telangana	  separatist	  issue	  on	  his	  plate.	  	  
	   Finally,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  civil	  society	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  policy,	  but	  it	  is	  undoubtedly	  limited.	  In	  defining	  a	  civil	  society,	  Hoeber	  defines	  it	  as	  the	  “the	  idea	  of	  a	  non-­‐state	  autonomous	  sphere;	  empowerment	  of	  citizens;	  trust-­‐building	  associational	  life;	  interaction	  with	  rather	  than	  subordination	  to	  the	  state.”146	  In	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  and	  across	  India,	  NGOs,	  social	  movements,	  and	  civic	  associations	  (including	  employment	  based	  associations)	  would	  fall	  under	  this	  purview.	  However,	  they	  played	  little	  role	  in	  the	  actual	  shaping	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  
	   In	  describing	  the	  health	  sector	  reforms	  of	  Latin	  America,	  Fleury	  et	  al.	  described	  two	  modes	  of	  civil	  society-­‐state	  interaction:	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  Congress,	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  on	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  The	  Hindu.	  http://www.hindu.com/2004/10/08/stories/2004100808570400.htm	  146	  Hoeber	  Rudolph,	  Susanne	  (2000)	  ‘Civil	  Society	  and	  the	  Realm	  of	  Freedom’,	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly,	  May	  13,	  pp.	  1762-­‐1769.	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“The	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  vision	  to	  reshape	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  different	  groups	  of	  civil	  society	  may	  come	  either	  from	  organized	  civil	  society	  groups,	  as	  in	  Brazil,	  or	  from	  government	  authorities,	  as	  in	  Argentina	  and	  Mexico”147	  
In	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  case,	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  policy	  formulation	  gives	  credence	  to	  the	  latter,	  one	  which	  was	  executive	  directed,	  while	  it	  may	  have	  been	  inspired	  by	  interactions	  with	  the	  populace.	  After	  initial	  foundations	  of	  the	  policy	  were	  set	  up,	  however,	  civil	  society	  played	  an	  enlarged	  role:	  non-­‐profit	  hospitals,	  like	  Srikirin	  Institute,	  are	  also	  networked	  and	  trade	  associations	  are	  necessary	  signatories	  for	  the	  policy’s	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding.	  	  
The	  media’s	  role	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  health	  policy	  transformation,	  too,	  was	  probably	  limited.	  In	  describing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  media	  at-­‐large,	  Aggarwal	  says,	  “Serious	  journalism	  has	  become	  a	  high	  risk	  area	  which	  only	  the	  brave	  can	  tread.	  Dissent,	  by	  and	  large,	  is	  not	  tolerated	  in	  most	  of	  the	  Indian	  States…”148	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  vested	  interest	  present	  in	  the	  state’s	  media	  apparatus.	  There	  is	  little	  independence	  among	  newspapers;	  Sakshi,	  the	  large	  media	  group	  that	  owns	  the	  second	  largest	  newspaper	  and	  a	  major	  TV	  channel,	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  organ	  of	  the	  Congress	  Party.	  The	  firm	  that	  owns	  the	  paper,	  Jagathi	  Publications,	  is	  partially	  owned	  by	  Y.S.	  Jaganmohan	  Reddy,	  YSR’s	  son,	  who	  would	  later	  make	  an	  ill-­‐fated	  run	  for	  the	  position	  of	  Chief	  Minister	  himself.	  Controversially,	  major	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  Fleury	  S,	  Belmartino	  S,	  Baris	  E,	  eds.	  Reshaping	  health	  care	  in	  Latin	  America:	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  health	  care	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  Research	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  S.K.	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cement	  companies,	  pharmaceutical	  groups,	  and	  other	  Andhra	  corporations	  made	  investments	  in	  Sakshi,	  a	  favor	  returned	  with	  prime	  government	  contracts	  and	  land	  deals.149	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4.1	  Introduction	  and	  Policy	  Analysis	  Frameworks	  
In	  the	  past	  three	  chapters,	  the	  various	  reasons,	  both	  instrumental	  and	  intrinsic,	  that	  nations	  undergo	  the	  health	  reform	  process	  have	  been	  elucidated.	  After	  exploring	  the	  reasons	  for	  health	  reform,	  the	  case	  study	  of	  reform	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  was	  contextualized	  historically,	  the	  actual	  process	  of	  health	  reform	  described,	  and	  the	  	  “exogenous”	  factors,	  that	  lie	  outside	  of	  the	  political	  system,	  were	  characterized	  and	  evaluated	  for	  impact	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Rajiv	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust.	  
The	  titular	  political	  context	  will	  be	  described	  and	  analyzed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  A	  number	  of	  theoretical	  explanations	  for	  why	  such	  massive	  reform	  occurred	  the	  way	  it	  did,	  rather	  than	  in	  another	  way,	  will	  be	  compared	  for	  their	  empirical	  usefulness	  in	  explaining	  the	  case	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  Doing	  so	  will	  require	  drawing	  heavily	  on	  Chapter	  2,	  further	  interviews	  with	  high-­‐level	  officials	  within	  the	  Andhra	  government	  and	  network	  hospitals,	  and	  secondary	  sources.	  	  
Policy	  analysis	  has	  largely	  moved	  beyond	  seeing	  the	  creation	  of	  public	  policy	  in	  a	  simplistic,	  linear	  model:	  a	  rational,	  sequential	  process	  in	  which	  the	  issue	  is	  recognized	  and	  subsequently	  makes	  it	  onto	  the	  agenda	  for	  key	  actors	  to	  make	  policy	  decision	  on.	  In	  Indian	  and	  developing	  world	  policymaking,	  the	  motives	  and	  processes	  are	  not	  so	  cut	  and	  dry;	  a	  clearer	  and	  more	  powerful	  model	  need	  to	  take	  into	  account	  networks	  and	  narratives,	  of	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individuals	  and	  organizations,	  and	  the	  relative	  power	  within	  institutional	  frameworks,	  as	  Sutton	  notes.	  150	  
In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  specific	  and	  unique	  facets	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  need	  to	  be	  highlighted.	  Aarogyasri	  targeted	  below-­‐poverty-­‐line	  (BPL)	  individuals,	  using	  the	  existing	  BPL	  evaluation	  system.	  In	  addition,	  the	  trust	  was	  paid	  for	  with	  general	  taxes,	  in	  which	  the	  payments	  of	  the	  patient	  to	  the	  healthcare	  provider	  were	  removed	  altogether	  (a	  cashless	  transaction).	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  and	  impactful	  feature	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  program	  was	  that	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  meaningful	  examples	  across	  Indian	  sectors	  of	  the	  much-­‐discussed	  “public-­‐private	  partnership”	  (PPP).	  	  
It	  has	  been	  seen	  in	  other	  health	  schemes	  in	  India,	  but	  why	  did	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  realizing	  the	  2002	  National	  Health	  Policy	  guideline	  of	  “partnering	  with	  private	  sector	  for	  service	  delivery	  with	  public	  financing	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  feasible	  approaches	  to	  universal	  coverage”?151	  Aarogyasri	  combined	  the	  forces	  of	  high-­‐quality	  tertiary	  care	  hospitals,	  a	  newly	  created	  government	  bureaucracy	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  executive	  branch,	  a	  private	  health	  insurance	  company,	  and	  public	  and	  nonprofit	  hospitals	  to	  compose	  a	  fully-­‐formed	  example	  of	  a	  public	  private	  partnership	  in	  constant	  evolution.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  political	  role	  in	  initiating	  transformative	  change,	  the	  “policy	  triangle”	  has	  been	  employed.152	  The	  three	  points	  of	  Walt	  and	  Gilson’s	  policy	  triangle	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  118.	  Overseas	  Development	  Institute,	  London	  151	  Maurya,	  D.	  “Politics	  of	  Adoption	  of	  Public	  Private	  Partnership:	  Healthcare	  Sector	  1950-­‐2010”	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew	  School	  of	  Public	  Policy	  at	  the	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore.	  Presented	  at	  the	  Political	  Science	  Association	  Conference	  in	  Belfast.	  April	  3-­‐5	  2012.	  	  152	  Buse	  K,	  Mays	  N,	  Walt	  G	  (2005).	  Making	  Health	  Policy.	  Understanding	  Public	  Health	  Series	  Open	  University	  Press.	  
	   99	  
are	  content,	  context,	  and	  process,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  each	  of	  the	  following	  points	  has	  been	  probed	  throughout.	  The	  content	  itself	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  has	  been	  described,	  as	  has	  the	  non-­‐political	  context.	  Political	  context	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  policy,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	  the	  political	  actors	  that	  make	  up	  the	  central	  policy	  formulators	  and	  implementers,	  will	  be	  described	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
In	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  health	  reform	  at	  least,	  the	  view	  will	  be	  primarily	  “top-­‐down”	  rather	  than	  “bottom-­‐up.”	  The	  policies	  reflect	  the	  role	  of	  the	  governing	  elite,	  presenting	  greater	  value	  in	  interviews	  with	  elite	  actors.	  As	  Dye	  argues,	  policy	  development	  reflects	  the	  values,	  interests,	  and	  preferences	  of	  the	  governing	  elite.153	  This	  may	  not	  be	  true	  in	  all	  nations	  and	  for	  all	  policy	  proposals,	  but	  it	  largely	  was	  true	  for	  the	  Andhra	  health	  reform	  movement.	  This	  same	  governing	  elite,	  however,	  is	  under	  electoral	  pressures	  and	  institutional	  pressures.	  To	  get	  a	  full	  picture	  of	  a	  policy’s	  implementation	  and	  formulation,	  bureaucrats	  and	  civil	  service	  staff	  that	  act	  at	  the	  front	  lines	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  need	  to	  be	  consulted	  as	  well.	  
4.2	  Political	  Hypotheses	  and	  Explanations	  for	  Large-­‐Scale	  Reform	  
How	  is	  large-­‐scale	  reform	  possible	  in	  any	  sector?	  What	  political	  theories	  exist	  to	  explain	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  transformative	  public	  redistribution	  projects	  are	  imported	  into	  public	  policy?	  Looking	  at	  analyses	  of	  various	  sector	  reforms,	  including	  the	  past	  economic	  reforms	  in	  India,	  the	  political	  frameworks	  that	  were	  used	  to	  explain,	  and	  provide	  context	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for,	  enormous	  policy	  changes	  can	  be	  used	  and	  evaluated	  for	  empirical	  justification	  in	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Aarogyasri.	  	  
Although	  a	  powerful	  explanation	  for	  understanding	  HIV/AIDS	  policy	  in	  comparative	  perspective,	  Lieberman’s	  “boundary	  institutions”	  theory,	  which	  states	  “boundary	  institutions	  are	  those	  sets	  of	  rules	  that	  regulate	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  group	  categories	  and	  intergroup	  behavior,”	  plays	  only	  a	  minor	  role	  in	  understanding	  health	  reform.	  Caste	  politics	  and	  group-­‐membership	  did	  not	  factor	  directly	  into	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  reform	  team	  as	  they	  sought	  to	  change	  the	  health	  system	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  Additionally,	  the	  final	  shape	  of	  the	  reform	  was	  different	  than	  many	  reforms	  undertaken	  in	  the	  past	  by	  Chief	  Ministers	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  including	  the	  sitting	  one,	  Y.S.	  Rajasekhara	  Reddy	  (YSR).	  Efforts	  like	  the	  
Deepam	  light	  scheme	  and	  the	  Rosini	  scheme	  for	  Muslim	  marriage	  halls	  and	  mosques	  were	  explicitly	  targeted	  at	  voting	  blocs	  and	  played	  directly	  at	  identity	  politics.	  Unlike	  these	  efforts,	  Aarogyasri	  covered	  a	  broad	  swath	  of	  below	  poverty	  line	  (BPL)	  citizens,	  giving	  near	  universal,	  while	  limited,	  tertiary	  care	  coverage	  to	  those	  citizens.	  	  
Many	  of	  the	  theories	  surrounding	  the	  political	  reasons	  behind	  the	  economic	  reforms	  of	  1991	  in	  India	  serve	  a	  useful	  comparison	  point	  in	  understanding	  the	  health	  reform	  program’s	  inception	  as	  policy.	  Political	  explanations	  for	  the	  radical	  economic	  reform	  ranged,	  from	  attributing	  it	  to	  the	  micro-­‐scale	  of	  individual	  reformers’	  skill	  to	  the	  societal	  explanations	  that	  sought	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  a	  transformed	  class	  structure.	  In	  the	  following	  pages,	  explanations	  that	  seek	  their	  causality	  in	  the	  intentions	  and	  motivations	  of	  the	  reformers	  will	  be	  explored	  for	  veracity	  in	  the	  case	  of	  AP:	  the	  role	  of	  reform	  in	  building	  the	  political	  image	  of	  the	  reformers,	  the	  possibility	  that	  reform	  was	  cloaked	  from	  the	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electorate,	  and	  an	  attribution	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  reform	  to	  the	  political	  management	  and	  skills	  of	  the	  reformers	  themselves.	  Mass	  societal	  and	  institutional	  structures	  will	  be	  studied	  as	  well:	  national	  policy,	  electoral	  politics,	  political	  party	  dynamics,	  and	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  sitting	  government.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  question	  of	  cui	  bono,	  who	  profits,	  from	  the	  new	  arrangement	  of	  the	  health	  care	  system’s	  structure	  is	  informative.	  	  
Did	  a	  liberalizing	  India	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  middle	  class	  enable	  the	  reform	  movement?	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  middle	  class,	  with	  new	  discourses	  and	  desires,	  is	  economic	  fact:	  in	  a	  ten	  year	  period	  after	  1998,	  the	  number	  of	  IT	  companies	  grew	  rapidly,	  especially	  in	  Hyderabad,	  increasing	  employment	  twenty	  times.154	  With	  this	  new	  class	  have	  come	  new	  sociocultural	  and	  political	  concerns:	  consumerism,	  employment	  in	  a	  global	  marketplace,	  and	  concerns	  tied	  with	  a	  geography	  that	  is	  primarily	  urban.	  This	  new	  middle	  class	  has	  fundamentally	  restructured	  the	  labor	  market,	  not	  only	  in	  Andhra,	  but	  also	  across	  India.155	  
However,	  how	  much	  political	  influence	  does	  this	  middle	  class	  actually	  hold?	  In	  Hyderabad,	  The	  Times	  of	  India	  reported	  on	  the	  “Hamletian	  dilemma”	  of	  the	  new	  middle	  class,	  with	  central	  issues	  of	  “footpaths,	  street	  lights,	  green	  patches	  among	  others”	  lacking	  from	  party	  platforms.156	  Despite	  its	  vast	  economic	  strength,	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  at	  least,	  the	  middle	  class	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  translate	  this	  strength	  to	  political	  influence.	  	  
Such	  a	  class	  movement	  would	  have	  not	  suggested	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  program.	  Growth	  of	  a	  middle	  class’s	  sway	  in	  the	  political	  processes	  would	  not	  have	  led	  to	  a	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social	  welfare	  scheme	  that	  would	  only	  serve	  patients	  of	  the	  lowest	  income	  quintile.	  While	  undoubtedly	  there	  was	  an	  enormous	  growth	  of	  a	  middle	  class	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  due	  to	  rapid	  proliferation	  of	  a	  service	  sector	  and	  multinational	  corporation	  involvement	  in	  the	  economic	  activity	  of	  the	  state,	  their	  impact	  on	  health	  policy,	  especially	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  health	  reform	  program	  that	  would	  serve	  another	  segment	  of	  the	  population,	  was	  little.	  This	  society-­‐centered	  explanation,	  while	  intriguing,	  does	  not	  align	  with	  the	  expected	  outcome.	  A	  rising	  middle	  class	  would	  not	  have	  been	  electorally	  enticed	  by	  a	  large-­‐scale	  health	  program,	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  program	  being	  outside	  the	  middle	  class	  largely.	  Arguments	  that	  a	  strong	  and	  rising	  middle	  class	  affected	  reform	  movements	  have	  been	  made	  in	  South	  Korea,	  Taiwan,	  China,	  and	  Chile.	  Stemming	  from	  Barrington	  Moore’s	  Social	  Origins	  of	  Dictatorship	  
and	  Democracy,	  sociologists	  and	  political	  scientists	  have	  sometimes	  sought	  factors	  of	  class	  relations	  behind	  political	  facts	  of	  history;	  in	  this	  case,	  however,	  it	  does	  not	  hold	  true.	  	  
Did	  federal	  policy,	  stemming	  from	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  (Congress	  Party)’s	  rule	  at	  the	  center	  in	  Delhi,	  affect	  state-­‐wide	  concerns	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  and	  did	  concerns	  about	  national	  political	  views	  weigh	  heavily	  on	  the	  minds	  of	  reformers	  and	  those	  interest	  groups	  at	  play?	  In	  the	  Eleventh	  Five	  Year	  Plan,	  highlighting	  policies	  from	  2007	  to	  2012,	  explicit	  recommendations	  for	  contracting	  in	  and	  out,	  subsidies,	  and	  further	  privatization	  were	  made,	  along	  with	  an	  overall	  encouragement	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnerships.157	  In	  addition,	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  Health	  Care	  recommended	  a	  reduction	  in	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  financing	  of	  healthcare	  through	  “a	  combination	  of	  public	  finance	  and	  private	  contribution	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  Planning	  Commission,	  Government	  of	  India.	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Family	  Welfare.	  “11th	  Five	  Year	  Plan	  2007-­‐2012.”	  Available	  at:	  http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/11thf.htm.	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by	  establishing	  various	  collective	  financing	  options....pool	  together	  the	  various	  sources	  of	  financing	  and	  manages	  it	  for	  ensuring	  all	  the	  members	  access	  to	  comprehensive	  healthcare.”	  	  
Still,	  despite	  such	  concordant	  statements	  from	  the	  annals	  of	  national	  policy,	  did	  these	  words	  trickle	  down	  to	  the	  reformers	  at	  the	  state	  level?	  Interviews	  with	  political	  and	  health	  sector	  actors	  involved,	  including	  the	  Private	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Chief	  Minister,	  suggest	  that	  the	  policy	  was	  conceived	  and	  formulated	  on	  a	  mostly	  state	  level:	  the	  dominance	  of	  corporate	  hospitals,	  the	  desire	  to	  expand	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  Relief	  Fund,	  and	  prevent	  indebtedness.158,159	  While	  potential	  models	  for	  the	  health	  reform	  program	  were	  evaluated	  in	  Bangalore,	  Assam,	  and	  across	  the	  nation,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  national	  directives	  from	  the	  ruling	  federal	  government,	  as	  well	  as	  national	  platforms	  of	  the	  Congress	  Party	  were	  not	  consulted	  heavily	  in	  the	  policy	  formation	  process.	  	  
Still,	  national	  pressures	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  financial	  bearings	  of	  the	  final	  project,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  public	  statements	  of	  the	  CM	  YSR.	  In	  the	  official	  unveiling	  of	  the	  program,	  YSR	  stated,	  “Andhra	  Pradesh	  should	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  strengthening	  the	  hands	  of	  Ms.	  Sonia	  Gandhi,”	  referring	  to	  the	  reigning	  All	  India	  Congress	  Committee	  President	  (the	  “decision-­‐making	  assembly”	  of	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress)	  and	  wife	  of	  former	  Congress	  Party	  Prime	  Minister,	  the	  slain	  Rajiv	  Gandhi.	  	  
The	  2004	  election	  manifesto	  of	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  stated,	  “some	  state	  governments	  administered	  by	  the	  Congress	  have	  introduced	  innovative	  health	  insurance	  programmes.	  A	  national	  scheme	  of	  health	  insurance	  for	  families	  living	  below	  the	  poverty	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  Interview	  with	  Kiran	  Kumar	  Reddy,	  former	  Private	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  159	  Interview	  with	  G	  Krishnamurthy,	  Financial	  Advisor	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Health,	  Medical	  and	  Family	  Welfare	  (DoHMFW)	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line	  will	  be	  proposed.”160	  Even	  preceding	  the	  creation	  of	  Aarogyasri,	  the	  national	  government,	  led	  by	  INC,	  were	  seeking	  state	  experimentation	  before	  taking	  political	  leadership	  on	  the	  issue.	  In	  Aarogyasri,	  they	  realized	  these	  hopes	  of	  state	  experimentation.	  
In	  reality,	  the	  causal	  arrow	  was	  flipped;	  far	  from	  national	  policy	  influencing	  state	  policy,	  the	  federal	  system	  and	  other	  states’	  health	  policies	  were	  subsequently	  changed	  by	  the	  implementation	  of	  Aarogyasri	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  The	  initiation	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  spurred	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  federal	  program,	  the	  Rashtriya	  Swasthya	  Bima	  Yojna	  (RSBY)	  a	  year	  after	  in	  2008	  and	  the	  Tamil	  Nadu	  state	  government	  program,	  Kalaignar’s	  Insurance	  Scheme.161	  Both	  mimicked	  aspects	  of	  Aarogyasri;	  for	  RSBY,	  for	  example,	  utilized	  a	  maximum	  amount	  of	  coverage	  for	  tertiary	  coverage.	  Congress	  Party,	  in	  addition,	  utilized	  the	  scheme’s	  political	  advantages	  in	  its	  succeeding	  platform,	  promising	  health	  insurance	  for	  all	  BPL	  families	  for	  three	  years.162	  
Two	  of	  the	  following	  theories	  use	  similar	  structures	  to	  explain	  why	  politicians	  could	  push	  through	  reform:	  either	  by	  skillful	  political	  cloaking	  by	  the	  elite,	  or	  through	  a	  distracted	  mass	  politics.163	  In	  describing	  a	  “fooled”	  electorate,	  Varshney’s	  theory	  of	  a	  distracted	  mass	  politics	  was	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  economic	  reforms	  of	  1991,	  and	  succeeding	  reforms.	  “Reforms	  that	  touch,	  directly	  or	  primarily,	  elite	  politics	  have	  gone	  farthest:	  a	  large	  devaluation	  of	  the	  currency,	  a	  restructuration	  of	  capital	  markets,	  a	  liberalization	  of	  the	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  Indian	  National	  Congress.	  “Manifesto	  of	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress:	  Lok	  Sabha	  Elections	  2004.”	  Attained	  at:	  http://www.qbtpl.net/congress/congress_menifesto.htm#Education%20and%20Health	  161	  Selvaraj,	  S.	  and	  Karan,	  AK.	  Why	  Publicly-­‐Financed	  Health	  Insurance	  Schemes	  Are	  Ineffective	  in	  Providing	  Financial	  Risk	  Protection.	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly/	  XLVII:	  2.	  March	  17,	  2012.	  P	  60	  162	  Nilesh,	  CT.	  “Congress	  Party	  issues	  campaign	  platform.	  Asia	  News	  IT.	  March	  26,	  2009.	  	  163	  Mooji,	  Jos.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Economic	  Reform	  in	  India.	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trade	  regime,	  and	  a	  simplification	  of	  investment	  rules.”164	  Here,	  reform	  is	  not	  a	  central	  campaign	  issue	  for	  reformers,	  and	  is	  instead	  benefiting	  the	  vested	  interest	  in	  an	  underhanded	  way.	  Political	  coalitions	  and	  alliances	  are	  not	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  reform;	  instead	  caste	  and	  religion	  play	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  mass	  politics	  for	  Varshney,	  and	  mask	  the	  creation	  of	  reform.	  	  
	   Like	  Varshney,	  Jenkins’s	  theory	  of	  skillful	  political	  cloaking	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  reform	  movement’s	  success	  relies	  on	  the	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  stealth,	  in	  which	  the	  reform	  movement	  is	  formed	  within	  the	  state,	  with	  the	  political	  knowledge	  of	  lack	  of	  support	  from	  the	  citizenry.	  Jenkins	  explains	  the	  liberalization	  efforts	  by	  stating,	  ““The	  reformers	  tried-­‐	  successfully-­‐	  to	  cloak	  change	  in	  the	  disguise	  of	  continuity.	  By	  claiming	  one	  thing	  but	  doing	  another,	  and	  by	  introducing	  de	  facto	  reforms	  when	  official	  policy	  statements	  stress	  continuity,	  reforms	  could	  be	  introduced	  without	  much	  opposition.”165	  The	  argument	  presupposes	  a	  broader	  argument,	  one	  that	  divides	  the	  public	  officials	  that	  form	  policy	  from	  the	  electorate,	  and	  especially	  so	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Stemming	  from	  the	  ideas	  of	  Grindle	  and	  Thomas,	  the	  argument	  goes	  that	  developing	  nations	  “tend	  to	  be	  more	  insulated,	  and	  they	  play	  a	  more	  central	  and	  intrusive	  role	  in	  managing	  the	  economy…relevant	  policy	  information	  and	  expertise	  tends	  to	  be	  contained	  within	  governmental	  circles.”	  166	  It	  is	  essential	  to	  parse	  out	  the	  assumptions	  of	  each	  espoused	  theory	  before	  evaluating	  it	  on	  its	  relative	  merits	  to	  the	  political	  record	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	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  Ibid.	  Mooji.	  165	  Ibid.	  Bates	  	  166	  Porter,	  R.	  and	  Hicks,	  R.	  	  Knowledge	  Utilization	  and	  the	  Process	  of	  Policy	  Formation:	  Toward	  a	  Framework	  for	  Africa.	  SARA	  Project-­‐	  HRAA	  Project	  of	  USAID.	  Retrieved	  from:	  http://sara.aed.org/publications/cross_cutting/knowledge_utilization/html/utilization.htm	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The	  policy	  process	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  as	  stated	  before,	  should	  be	  viewed	  from	  a	  “top-­‐down”	  perspective;	  the	  policy	  was	  designed	  and	  adjusted	  completely	  at	  an	  elite	  level.	  The	  initial	  events	  that	  motivated	  the	  policy,	  however,	  came	  from	  daily	  meetings	  with	  below	  poverty	  line	  individuals.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  significant	  evidence	  that	  the	  reform	  movement	  was	  not	  enacted	  in	  an	  underhanded	  manner.	  A	  reform	  effort	  that	  seeks	  to	  provide	  health	  camps,	  even	  in	  far-­‐reaching	  rural	  areas,	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  one	  that	  slips	  the	  collective	  mind	  of	  the	  electorate.	  Instead	  this	  reform	  was	  of	  the	  opposite	  way:	  balancing	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  elite	  stakeholders	  while	  also	  providing	  a	  large-­‐scale	  social	  welfare	  scheme	  in	  the	  form	  of	  health	  insurance	  for	  tertiary	  care.	  YSR	  himself	  publicized	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  at	  the	  level	  of	  campaign	  events,	  even	  bringing	  Sonia	  Gandhi	  to	  launch	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  program,	  Aarogyasri-­‐II.167	  	  
Instead	  of	  being	  an	  underhanded	  reform	  process,	  the	  Aarogyasri	  scheme	  was	  used	  as	  an	  image-­‐building	  program	  for	  the	  political	  actors	  to	  bolster	  their	  credentials	  as	  reformers.	  The	  INC	  candidates	  for	  re-­‐election	  in	  2009	  pointed	  to	  the	  Aarogyasri	  health	  program	  as	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  their	  accomplishments	  in	  office	  over	  the	  last	  five	  years,	  even	  bristling	  at	  suggestions	  that	  the	  health	  reform	  program	  might	  be	  flawed.	  During	  election	  season,	  the	  Finance	  Minister,	  K.	  Rosaiah,	  criticized	  the	  opposition	  party,	  TDP,	  for	  petitioning	  the	  Election	  Commission	  against	  issuing	  Aarogyasri	  cards.168	  The	  Aarogyasi	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  was	  explicitly	  used	  for	  electoral	  purposes;	  in	  the	  same	  statement,	  Rosaiah	  defended	  the	  use	  of	  card	  issuance	  during	  the	  election	  season.	  The	  ambitiousness	  of	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  The	  Hindu.	  “Sonia	  Launches	  Rajiv	  Arogyasri	  scheme”	  Jul	  18,	  2008.	  168	  The	  Hindu.	  “TDP	  slammed	  for	  petitioning	  against	  Arogyasri.”	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the	  ultimate	  scope	  of	  Aarogyasri	  and	  publicity	  with	  which	  its	  development	  was	  paired	  serves	  to	  discredit	  “stealth”	  in	  the	  reform	  process.	  	  
The	  reformers	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  were	  undoubtedly	  important	  in	  pressing	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  policy.	  To	  what	  extent	  were	  their	  own	  political	  skills,	  personality,	  and	  expertise	  in	  navigating	  within	  the	  political	  system	  attributable	  for	  the	  ultimate	  reform	  and	  shape	  of	  the	  reform?	  In	  the	  health	  reform	  literature,	  much	  of	  the	  analysis	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  specific	  attributes	  and	  “political	  will”	  bridled	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  technocratic	  change	  makers.	  169	  These	  “change	  teams”	  are	  central	  to	  the	  ultimate	  feasibility	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  occurring	  at	  all.	  “Change	  teams	  have	  been	  described	  as	  technocratic	  because	  their	  leverage	  relies	  on	  the	  mix	  of	  skills	  their	  members	  bring	  to	  them	  –	  partly	  technical,	  partly	  political	  –	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  operate	  effectively	  both	  in	  policy	  formulation,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  political	  manoeuvring	  [sic].”170	  
Undoubtedly,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  executive	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  stemming	  from	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  to	  his	  executive	  team,	  was	  essential	  to	  forming	  the	  health	  reform	  movement.	  Coming	  from	  a	  landslide	  victory	  in	  2004,	  with	  broad	  electoral	  mandate	  and	  an	  electoral	  promise	  to	  initiate	  sweeping	  reform	  in	  a	  number	  of	  sectors,	  the	  CM	  and	  his	  team	  felt	  limitless	  in	  power.	  Sainath	  described,	  in	  an	  obituary,	  “YSR	  was	  dynamic	  and	  effective,	  ruthless	  and	  authoritarian.	  An	  idea	  he	  liked	  would	  translate	  into	  an	  order	  shortly	  after	  he	  heard	  it…The	  suggestion	  that	  the	  Land	  Development	  Work	  under	  the	  NREGS	  in	  the	  State	  be	  prioritised	  to	  first	  benefit	  Dalit,	  Adivasi	  and	  women-­‐headed	  households	  was	  such	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  Rossetti,	  AG.	  Mogollon,	  O.	  “Enhancing	  the	  Political	  Feasibility	  of	  Health	  Reform:	  The	  Mexico	  Case.”	  Harvard	  School	  of	  Public	  Health.	  Health	  Sector	  Reform	  Initiative.	  June	  2000.	  	  170	  Ibid.	  Rossetti	  et	  al.	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idea.”171	  The	  idea	  to	  expand	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  Relief	  Fund	  into	  a	  broader	  welfare	  scheme	  that	  would	  be	  revolutionary	  in	  nature	  was	  quickly	  implemented	  by	  the	  executive	  team	  of	  the	  Chief	  Minister.	  	  
An	  additional	  reason	  for	  the	  success	  and	  shape	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  was	  that	  it	  largely	  did	  not	  affect	  vested	  interest.	  In	  this	  cynical	  theory,	  the	  Aarogyasri	  reform	  did	  not	  truly	  disadvantage	  the	  political	  position	  of	  the	  Congress	  politicians	  in	  charge	  of	  policy	  formulation,	  and	  could	  therefore	  be	  transformative	  while	  still	  preserving	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  politicians	  while	  also	  satisfying	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  various	  interest	  groups	  that	  would	  be	  otherwise	  incensed:	  private	  hospitals,	  public	  hospitals,	  medical	  associations,	  and	  other	  stakeholders.	  Jenkins	  ascribes	  the	  economic	  reform	  movement’s	  success	  to	  “survivor”	  politicians	  “’Actually	  existing’	  democratic	  governments	  are	  often	  more	  ‘accountable’	  to	  the	  powerful	  than	  to	  the	  powerless,	  a	  fact	  which	  affects	  their	  operation	  in	  times	  of	  reform	  no	  less	  than	  it	  does	  in	  times	  of	  stasis”172	  	  
The	  health	  reform	  movement	  worked	  through	  the	  existing	  channels	  of	  power,	  offending	  no	  single	  stakeholder	  and	  thereby	  enabling	  its	  success.	  Using	  general	  taxes,	  votes	  were	  gained,	  hospitals	  pulled	  a	  larger	  patient	  influx	  at	  no	  cost	  to	  them,	  and	  BPL	  citizens	  were	  afforded	  the	  use	  of	  the	  best	  quality	  tertiary	  care	  centers.	  Financing	  was	  detached	  from	  the	  actual	  supply	  of	  care,	  and	  the	  winner-­‐take	  all	  bidding	  system	  that	  was	  used	  allowed	  the	  sole	  insurance	  company,	  Star	  Health	  and	  Allied	  Insurance,	  to	  rake	  in	  massive	  profits.	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  Sainath,	  P.	  “The	  Congressman	  with	  a	  mass	  following	  and	  appeal.”	  The	  Hindu.	  Op-­‐Ed.	  September	  4,	  2009.	  	  172	  Jenkins,	  Rob.	  1999.	  Democratic	  Politics	  and	  Economic	  Reform	  in	  India.	  Cambridge	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	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But	  there	  were	  also	  institutional	  dynamics	  at	  work:	  parties,	  electoral	  processes,	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  within	  the	  branches	  of	  the	  government	  allowed	  for	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  to	  be	  created	  and	  implemented	  with	  relative	  ease.	  The	  concentration	  of	  executive	  power,	  the	  form	  of	  the	  party	  coalition	  that	  the	  Congress	  Party	  formed	  in	  the	  legislative	  assembly,	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  cohesion	  within	  the	  parties,	  and	  federalism	  all	  impacted	  the	  agenda-­‐setting	  process.	  All	  of	  these	  institutional	  factors	  help	  to	  explain	  why	  Aarogyasri	  itself	  was	  formed	  without	  contention	  in	  the	  legislative	  body	  itself,	  with	  many	  of	  the	  complaints	  coming	  much	  after	  the	  unloading	  of	  the	  policy	  during	  the	  2009	  election.	  It	  also	  helps	  explain	  the	  dominance	  of	  YSR	  and	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  in	  the	  legislature	  and	  public	  policy	  during	  this	  time.	  	  
In	  Lijphart’s	  Patterns	  of	  Democracy,	  he	  seeks	  to	  explain	  how	  party’s	  can	  dominate	  government	  and	  have	  complete	  control	  over	  policy.	  In	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  case	  of	  health	  policy,	  this	  was	  clearly	  true	  of	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  with	  YSR	  at	  the	  helm.	  A	  number	  of	  structural	  features	  of	  the	  political	  institutions	  themselves	  lent	  YSR	  more	  control	  once	  in	  power	  to	  push	  forward	  his	  health	  reform	  agenda	  and	  make	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  insurance-­‐based	  scheme	  covering	  fifty	  million	  in	  AP	  a	  reality.	  Lijphart	  lays	  out	  two	  dimensions	  of	  democracy,	  executive-­‐parties	  and	  federal-­‐unitary,	  and	  accordingly	  identifies	  characteristics	  of	  cabinets	  and	  legislatures	  that	  lend	  itself	  to	  party	  control.173	  “Minimally	  winning	  coalitions,”	  for	  example,	  he	  identifies	  as	  a	  cabinet	  large	  enough	  to	  control	  a	  parliamentary	  majority,	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  “consensus”	  democracy	  rather	  than	  a	  majoritarian	  one.	  Additionally,	  the	  cabinets	  themselves	  were	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  YSR	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around:	  they	  trumpeted	  policy	  that	  came	  from	  the	  close	  confidants	  of	  YSR,	  including	  his	  executive	  team,	  rather	  than	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  Lijphart.	  1999.	  Patterns	  of	  democracy.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	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generating	  wide-­‐reaching	  policy	  transformations	  themselves.	  YSR	  and	  his	  chief	  executive	  team	  generated	  not	  by	  the	  ministries,	  but	  all	  the	  free	  electricity	  scheme,	  irrigation	  proposals,	  and	  health	  reform	  schemes.	  	  	  
To	  clarify	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  AP,	  the	  power	  was	  explicitly	  concentrated	  in	  the	  executive	  branch	  by	  the	  INC.	  Every	  single	  member	  of	  24	  members	  of	  the	  YSR	  cabinet	  in	  2004	  was	  a	  Congress	  Party	  member,	  while	  he	  struck	  a	  balance	  of	  castes	  and	  geographies.174	  This	  situation	  would	  yield	  YSR	  even	  more	  power	  to	  form	  his	  own	  agenda	  without	  opposition.	  In	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  the	  party	  in	  power	  had	  relative	  political	  leeway	  to	  accomplish	  their	  agenda	  as	  they	  saw	  fit,	  characterizing	  it	  as	  a	  majoritarian	  democracy.	  While	  a	  multi-­‐party	  system,	  the	  Andhra	  legislative	  assembly	  was	  dominated	  by	  two	  parties:	  the	  INC	  and	  the	  TDP	  and	  largely	  functioned	  as	  a	  two-­‐party	  system	  with	  hangers-­‐on	  parties	  that	  had	  little	  chance	  of	  taking	  power,	  such	  as	  the	  Left	  Party,	  TRS	  (a	  separatist	  Telangana	  Party),	  and	  BJP	  (a	  small	  force	  within	  Andhra	  but	  larger	  nationally),	  but	  could	  influence	  policy	  on	  a	  minor	  level.	  Other	  part	  The	  cabinet	  size	  of	  24	  was	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  the	  294	  total	  seats	  in	  the	  assembly.	  The	  personality	  driven	  electoral	  politics,	  in	  addition,	  pitting	  YSR	  an	  his	  padayatra	  against	  the	  sitting	  Chandrababu	  Naidu,	  also	  shaped	  the	  governing	  style	  once	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  was	  sworn	  in.	  The	  personalization	  of	  politics	  within	  the	  party	  contributed	  heavily	  to	  the	  cohesive	  aspects	  of	  Congress.	  
During	  the	  2004	  election,	  YSR	  and	  INC	  pulled	  a	  landslide	  victory,	  taking	  185	  electoral	  seats,	  while	  TDP	  and	  Chandrababu	  Naidu	  fell	  from	  power	  to	  attain	  only	  47	  seats.	  It	  was	  a	  drastic	  and	  overwhelming	  victory,	  with	  62.9%	  of	  the	  vote	  before	  any	  coalition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  Kumar,	  S	  Nagesh.	  “24	  Ministers	  inducted	  into	  YSR	  Cabinet.”	  The	  Hindu.	  May	  22,	  2004.	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forming.175	  This	  gave	  the	  Congress	  Party	  relative	  free	  will	  once	  in	  power	  to	  choose	  cabinet	  ministers	  and	  gave	  the	  opposition	  party	  little	  voice	  to	  protest	  on	  the	  initiation	  of	  large	  social	  programs.	  This	  was	  no	  “minimally	  winning	  coalition,”	  or	  a	  grand	  coalition.	  The	  Congress	  Party’s	  utter	  dominance	  over	  the	  electorate,	  one	  that	  would	  decrease	  in	  the	  2009	  election	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  twenty-­‐nine	  seats,	  afforded	  it	  complete	  control	  over	  the	  policy	  process	  over	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  	  
Additionally,	  the	  party	  cohesion	  within	  the	  Congress	  Party	  was	  extremely	  high,	  with	  little	  dissention	  of	  voices	  of	  opposition.	  This	  allowed	  the	  policy	  to	  be	  implemented	  relatively	  quickly	  without	  any	  criticism	  intraparty.	  What	  factors	  led	  to	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  party	  discipline?	  YSR’s	  personal	  charisma	  and	  role	  in	  bringing	  Congress	  back	  to	  power	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  did	  play	  a	  large	  role,	  and	  the	  temporary	  fractioning	  within	  the	  party	  after	  his	  death	  in	  2009	  supports	  this	  hypothesis.	  However,	  there	  are	  larger	  political	  forces	  at	  work	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  strong	  party	  cohesion	  within	  the	  INC	  that	  allowed	  Aarogyasri’s	  formulation	  and	  implementation.	  Congress	  Party	  in	  AP	  had	  ideological	  cohesion	  over	  the	  juxtaposition	  to	  a	  pro-­‐World	  Bank	  agenda	  of	  pure	  liberalization,	  as	  the	  previous	  government’s	  agenda	  was	  characterized.	  Cohesion	  around	  the	  message	  of	  populism	  and	  representation	  for	  the	  poorest	  citizen	  provided	  enough	  party	  unity	  to	  allow	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  program	  from	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  a	  larger	  CM	  Relief	  Fund.	  This	  ideology	  was	  expressed	  during	  the	  election,	  when	  the	  pro-­‐poor	  inclinations	  of	  YSR’s	  Congress	  Party	  were	  expressed	  through	  his	  dramatic	  walk	  across	  the	  state.	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How	  did	  YSR	  deal	  with	  dissension	  within	  the	  Congress	  Party?	  Looking	  to	  YSR’s	  handling	  of	  the	  often-­‐decisive	  issue	  of	  Telangana,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  separatist	  political	  party	  TRS,	  is	  insightful.	  An	  issue	  for	  decades	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  politics,	  its	  re-­‐emergence	  worried	  Telangana-­‐area	  politicians	  within	  the	  Congress	  Party.	  YSR	  skillfully	  manipulated	  and	  satisfied	  the	  TRS,	  providing	  them	  two	  minor	  ministerial	  positions,	  preventing	  the	  larger	  Telangana	  movement	  while	  simultaneously	  silencing	  Telangana	  politicians	  within	  the	  Congress	  Party.176	  	  
Studies	  on	  cohesion	  and	  coalition	  formation	  in	  parliamentary	  democracies	  have	  poked	  through	  the	  assumption	  that	  parties	  are	  unitary	  actors.	  Theorists	  have	  stated	  that	  party	  leaders	  in	  general	  seek	  party	  cohesion	  due	  to	  their	  leadership	  position	  being	  at	  risk,	  and	  also	  that	  high	  leadership	  control	  over	  decisions	  increases	  likelihood	  of	  a	  party	  being	  in	  government.177	  This	  was	  a	  factor	  in	  YSR’s	  Congress,	  with	  YSR’s	  interest	  in	  remaining	  leader,	  and	  his	  dictatorial	  rule	  over	  the	  party,	  enabling	  the	  party’s	  success	  in	  2004	  and	  subsequent	  initiation	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  reform	  program.	  Democratic	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  were	  not	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  Congress	  Party	  under	  YSR.	  
What	  other	  electoral	  constraints	  push	  party	  cohesion	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh?	  In	  studies	  on	  Portuguese	  parliamentary	  elections,	  factors	  such	  as	  party	  headquarters	  selecting	  candidates,	  parties	  being	  seen	  as	  the	  only	  election	  agent,	  and	  an	  emphasis	  on	  national	  parliamentary	  mandate	  are	  all	  important.178	  However,	  unlike	  the	  Portuguese	  case,	  Andhra	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Congress	  Party	  politicians	  did	  not	  express	  dissension	  in	  voting	  behavior,	  being	  even	  further	  constrained.	  All	  of	  the	  above	  factors	  are	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  as	  well.	  	  
In	  the	  debate	  between	  executive	  and	  bureaucratic	  control	  over	  the	  policy	  process,	  in	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  clearly	  shows	  the	  power	  dynamic	  being	  swayed	  towards	  the	  former.	  In	  the	  policy	  process,	  the	  executive	  dominated	  and	  set	  jurisdiction	  over	  competing	  branches	  of	  government	  as	  well	  as	  the	  massive	  bureaucratic	  structures	  within	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  In	  discussions	  with	  bureaucrats	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Family	  Welfare,	  the	  directive	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  was	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  implementing	  the	  policy	  desires	  passed	  on	  from	  the	  policy	  formulators	  in	  the	  executive	  branch.179	  While	  there	  was	  some	  back	  and	  forth,	  especially	  regarding	  the	  public	  sector’s	  role	  in	  delivering	  tertiary	  care,	  it	  was	  clear	  this	  issue	  was	  brought	  up	  far	  along	  the	  policy	  process.	  The	  bureaucracy	  itself	  was	  left	  to	  discussing	  the	  administrative	  details	  of	  the	  plan	  once	  its	  general	  shape	  took	  place,	  with	  “proactive	  discussions	  of	  the	  financial	  requirements	  with	  the	  Finance	  department	  regarding	  the	  budget	  cap;”	  ones	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  final	  indicative	  figure	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  budget	  to	  be	  voted	  on	  for	  the	  state	  legislature.	  As	  Walt	  states,	  “In	  those	  countries	  of	  the	  Third	  World	  where	  political	  leadership	  is	  personal	  and	  unaccountable-­‐	  where	  constitutional	  rule	  is	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  the	  norm-­‐	  most	  major	  policy	  decisions	  will	  be	  left	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  chief	  executive.”180	  
4.3	  Stakeholder	  Analysis	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How	  useful	  is	  a	  retrospective	  stakeholder	  analysis?	  Despite	  the	  policy	  stemming	  from	  a	  small	  advisory	  circle	  of	  the	  Chief	  Minister,	  other	  interest	  groups	  were	  still	  affected,	  and	  the	  actual	  policy	  formulation	  involved	  consulting	  with	  the	  various	  parties	  that	  would	  be	  affected	  and	  anticipating	  the	  political	  impact	  on	  these	  various	  interest	  groups.	  Varvasovszky	  and	  Brugha	  detail	  the	  approach	  of	  stakeholder	  analysis	  as,	  “a	  tool	  or	  set	  of	  tools	  for	  generating	  knowledge	  about	  actors-­‐	  individuals	  and	  organizations-­‐	  so	  as	  to	  understand	  their	  behavior,	  intentions,	  interrelations	  and	  interests;	  and	  for	  assessing	  the	  influence	  and	  resources	  they	  bring	  to	  bear	  on	  decision-­‐making	  or	  implementation	  process.”	  A	  long-­‐term,	  reflective	  look	  at	  all	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  ways	  they	  were	  impacted	  by	  the	  transformation	  in	  health	  delivery	  and	  financing	  as	  well	  as	  patient	  behavior	  is	  informative.	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  groups’	  political	  power	  will	  come	  from	  both	  tangible	  and	  intangible	  resources,	  ranging	  from	  money	  and	  people	  to	  visibility,	  legitimacy,	  and	  access	  to	  legislators.181	  Seeing	  these	  interest	  groups	  in	  their	  context	  of	  electoral	  and	  financial	  relevance	  to	  the	  policymaker	  is	  also	  important,	  along	  with	  evaluating	  their	  public	  statements	  along	  with	  private	  interests.	  	  
In	  Roberts	  et	  al.’s	  Getting	  Health	  Reform	  Right,	  they	  list	  groupings	  of	  potential	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  health	  reform	  process,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  and	  others	  that	  are	  not.	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pharmaceutical	  companies,	  and	  equipment	  manufacturers;	  
o Consumer	  groups:	  disease-­‐based	  organizations,	  local	  and	  regional	  consumer	  groups,	  women’s	  organizations,	  unions	  representing	  insured	  workers,	  retirees,	  and	  military	  groups;	  
o Economic	  groups:	  businesses	  with	  health	  insurance	  schemes,	  industries	  affected	  by	  health	  policies	  (e.g.,	  tobacco	  farmers,	  drug	  sellers),	  and	  workers	  who	  gain	  or	  lose	  jobs;	  
o Ideological	  groups:	  political	  parties,	  reform	  organizations,	  single-­‐issue	  advocates	  (e.g.,	  environmentalists,	  anti-­‐abortion	  activists);	  
o Health	  development	  groups:	  multilateral	  development	  banks,	  bilateral	  aid	  agencies,	  international	  health	  organizations,	  non-­‐governmental	  development	  organizations.”182	  
In	  the	  Andhra	  context,	  economic	  groups	  (insurance	  companies,	  health	  workers,	  hospitals),	  ideological	  groups	  (political	  parties),	  and	  producer	  groups	  (physicians	  associations)	  held	  the	  most	  immediate	  political	  power.	  Along	  with	  groups	  within	  this	  category,	  the	  mass	  resources	  of	  the	  consumer	  groups	  also	  factoring	  into	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  of	  the	  CM’s	  executive	  team,	  mostly	  through	  individual	  citizens	  holding	  the	  power	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  counsel	  with	  the	  CM	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  With	  the	  added	  pressure	  of	  presenting	  themselves	  as	  a	  populist	  juxtaposition	  to	  the	  TDP	  from	  the	  previous	  election,	  the	  Congress	  Party	  and	  the	  CM	  had	  this	  interest	  group	  and	  serving	  politically	  tenable	  benefits	  to	  the	  BPL	  patient	  population.	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4.4	  The	  Importance	  of	  Political	  Factors	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  
International	  pressure	  from	  the	  Bretton-­‐Woods	  institutions	  and	  other	  donor	  agencies	  undoubtedly	  played	  a	  large	  role	  in	  influencing	  Andhra	  politics.	  These	  larger	  cultural	  and	  economic	  forces,	  however,	  influence	  the	  intuitional	  limitations	  and	  discourses	  within	  the	  political	  sphere.	  A	  liberalized	  health	  sector	  was	  the	  playing	  field	  with	  which	  the	  political	  actors,	  primarily	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  YSR	  and	  his	  executive	  team,	  had	  to	  work	  within,	  and	  also	  some	  international	  pressure	  to	  reinforce	  private	  distribution	  of	  tertiary	  care.	  Additionally,	  economic	  facets	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  economy,	  like	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  information	  technology	  sector,	  also	  impacted	  the	  way	  in	  which	  reform	  took	  place	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  movement.	  Rapid	  transfer	  and	  confirmation	  of	  patient	  records	  from	  hospital	  to	  the	  state	  government	  offices	  and	  enormous	  record-­‐keeping	  and	  best	  practices	  evaluation	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  significant	  IT	  infrastructure	  already	  present	  in	  Hyderabad.	  The	  crisis	  situation	  of	  the	  farmer	  suicides	  highlighted	  indebtedness	  as	  an	  issue	  for	  the	  2004	  electoral	  cycle,	  and	  was	  on	  the	  top	  of	  the	  newly	  initiated	  government	  leaders’	  minds	  as	  they	  took	  office,	  including	  the	  Chief	  Minister,	  YSR.	  	  
Essential	  in	  enabling	  the	  reform,	  too,	  were	  the	  macroeconomic	  factors.	  “These	  measures	  became	  possible,	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  revenue	  of	  the	  state	  government	  due	  to	  expansion	  in	  economic	  activity	  during	  the	  growth	  years	  after	  2005	  and	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the	  increase	  in	  tax	  revenue	  as	  percentage	  of	  gross	  state	  domestic	  product	  (GSDP)	  from	  5.2%	  in	  1995-­‐96	  to	  10.1%	  in	  2007-­‐08.”183	  
However,	  the	  specific	  facets	  of	  the	  proposal,	  both	  its	  limitations	  and	  wide-­‐reaching	  scope,	  are	  due	  to	  the	  political	  forces:	  domination	  of	  the	  executive	  over	  the	  legislature,	  Congress	  Party’s	  vast	  electoral	  mandate	  in	  2004,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  individual	  “change	  team,”	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  use	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  as	  a	  prominent	  publicity	  scheme.	  Beyond	  targeting	  specific	  portions	  of	  the	  population	  and	  subgroups,	  the	  program	  was	  ambitious	  in	  scope	  and	  sought	  to	  reach	  all	  below-­‐poverty-­‐line	  individuals,	  numbering	  over	  50	  million	  in	  AP,	  and	  subsequently	  tie	  the	  program	  to	  the	  Congress	  Party’s	  success	  in	  power.	  Instead	  of	  being	  influenced	  by	  federal	  policy	  that	  might	  have	  called,	  somewhat	  vaguely,	  for	  programs	  of	  Aarogyasri’s	  type	  to	  be	  tried	  and	  tested	  on	  a	  state	  level,	  Aarogyasri	  ended	  up	  influencing	  federal	  policy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  health	  policy	  of	  neighboring	  states,	  from	  Karnataka	  to	  Tamil	  Nadu.	  Rather	  than	  having	  a	  distracted	  and	  fooled	  electorate,	  Congress	  relied	  on	  an	  electorate	  that	  would	  utilize	  the	  newly	  created	  social	  welfare	  reform	  program,	  and	  tie	  the	  use	  of	  this	  program,	  even	  in	  far-­‐reaching	  rural	  health	  camps,	  to	  the	  Congress	  Party	  and	  YSR.	  Through	  intra-­‐governmental	  dominance	  and	  appeasing	  vested	  interests,	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust	  was	  created	  and	  passed	  without	  much	  opposition,	  either	  from	  the	  Telugu	  Desam	  Party	  or	  from	  the	  various	  interest	  groups	  in	  the	  health	  sector.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  Srinivasulu,	  K.	  “Y	  S	  Rajasekhara	  Reddy:	  A	  Political	  Appraisal.”	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly.	  Sept	  19,	  2009.	  8-­‐11.	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This	  appraisal	  of	  thehealth	  reform	  program	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  borne	  of	  studies	  at	  the	  Srikirin	  Institute	  of	  Ophthalmology,	  was	  undertaken	  with	  an	  eye	  for	  the	  political	  factors	  behind	  the	  structure	  and	  policy	  process	  behind	  it.	  The	  initial	  exploration	  of	  what	  the	  ends	  usually	  are	  in	  health	  reform	  served	  to	  inform	  the	  health	  reform	  experience	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  and	  seek	  an	  answer	  for	  what	  the	  motivations	  and	  desires,	  or	  at	  least	  stated	  desires,	  were	  for	  reformers.	  Borne	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  indebtedness	  and	  financial	  insolvency,	  a	  major	  issue	  in	  the	  2004	  election,	  the	  health	  reform	  program	  took	  on	  a	  gradually	  expanding	  role	  due	  to	  a	  multitude	  of	  factors.	  Limitations,	  institutional	  and	  structural,	  within	  India	  and	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  expressed	  themselves	  through	  this	  process.	  Fundamentally	  equity	  focused	  and	  a	  “pro-­‐poor”	  reform,	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  reform	  trust	  transformed	  Andhra’s	  health	  care	  system	  by	  opening	  up	  the	  doors	  of	  private	  and	  public	  tertiary	  care	  hospitals	  to	  below	  poverty	  line	  patients.	  	  
Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  political	  history	  gives	  insight	  into	  the	  possible	  ways	  the	  reform	  could	  have	  been	  structured,	  and	  the	  policy	  process	  itself.	  A	  description	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Aarogyasri,	  as	  the	  major	  part	  of	  the	  reform	  process,	  transformed	  AP’s	  health	  care	  delivery,	  financing,	  patient	  behavior,	  and	  infrastructure,	  provided	  the	  necessary	  facts	  to	  provide	  backing	  for	  the	  political	  analysis.	  
In	  Chapter	  3,	  “exogenous”	  factors	  for	  health	  policy	  change	  were	  explored,	  structural,	  situational,	  external,	  and	  economic.	  The	  dismissal	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  caste	  politics,	  and	  cultural	  factors,	  along	  with	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  farmer	  suicide	  crisis	  and	  the	  strong	  legacy	  of	  liberalization	  stemming	  from	  a	  “focus	  state”	  relationship	  with	  the	  World	  Bank	  were	  showcased.	  These	  factors,	  combined	  with	  an	  opportune	  political	  time,	  allowed	  and	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limited	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  reform.	  Aarogyasri	  benefitted	  private	  tertiary	  hospitals	  with	  a	  new	  patient	  pool.	  These	  hospitals	  were	  created	  from	  a	  deep	  trend	  in	  AP’s	  health	  sector	  and	  across	  sectors:	  an	  inclination	  towards	  privatization	  of	  health	  services.	  	  
Chapter	  5	  saw	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  political	  analysis	  and	  an	  application	  of	  various	  theories	  of	  reform	  to	  the	  case	  study	  of	  health	  reform	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  Public	  policy	  was	  not	  cut	  and	  dry	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh;	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  influences	  that	  flowed	  through	  the	  halls	  of	  the	  state	  government.	  Explaining	  the	  private-­‐public	  partnership,	  of	  unheard	  of	  scope,	  of	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  care	  Trust	  required	  digging	  into	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  central	  interest	  groups	  and	  actors	  involved	  in	  policy.	  The	  executive	  team	  of	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  were	  the	  primary	  formulators	  and	  initiators	  of	  policy	  change,	  and	  therefore	  a	  “top-­‐down”	  policy	  analysis	  was	  undertaken.	  Class	  structures,	  boundary	  institutions,	  the	  influence	  of	  federal	  policy,	  and	  cloaking	  of	  the	  policy	  are	  dismissed	  as	  plausible	  explanations	  for	  the	  massive	  reforms	  of	  the	  health	  care	  system.	  Instead,	  the	  reforms	  served	  as	  publicity	  for	  the	  electoral	  campaigns	  of	  the	  Congress	  Party,	  and	  were	  so	  successful	  since	  they	  did	  not	  impact	  the	  vested	  interest	  at	  hand.	  Finally	  institutional	  explanations	  were	  explored,	  ranging	  from	  party	  cohesion	  to	  concentration	  of	  power	  in	  the	  executive	  branch.	  	  
5.2	  Overall	  Impact:	  From	  Procedural	  to	  Substantive	  Democracy?	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  program	  is	  part	  of	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  procedural	  democracy,	  in	  which	  the	  electoral	  process	  is	  undertaken	  but	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  citizenry	  is	  little,	  to	  a	  substantive	  democracy,	  one	  of	  true	  representation	  of	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people,	  may	  have	  been	  too	  ambitious	  and	  was	  not	  vilified	  by	  the	  ultimate	  outcome	  of	  the	  program	  or	  succeeding	  elections.	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   Still,	  such	  massive	  redistributive	  efforts	  in	  the	  health	  sector	  could	  be	  one	  portion	  of	  a	  larger	  movement	  of	  democratization.	  Indian	  states	  have	  a	  sizable	  gap	  to	  overcome	  between	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  programs,	  and	  large-­‐scale	  health	  and	  education	  programs	  can	  allow	  more	  states	  to	  achieve	  Kerala-­‐like	  social	  mobilization	  and	  development	  indicators.	  	  
	   More	  likely	  than	  a	  movement	  towards	  greater	  and	  more	  substantial	  democratization	  is	  a	  shift	  from	  “clientelist	  politics	  toward	  a	  welfare	  regime,”	  as	  outlined	  by	  Carolyn	  Elliot	  when	  studying	  the	  Andhra	  2009	  elections:	  
“The	  historical	  practice	  of	  clientelism	  has	  lost	  its	  capacity	  to	  bring	  victories,	  either	  because	  there	  are	  too	  many	  claimants	  or	  the	  rewards	  demanded	  by	  claimants	  have	  risen	  too	  high.	  Therefore	  incumbent	  governments	  have	  regularly	  been	  ousted	  from	  power	  by	  dissatisfied	  voters,	  the	  so-­‐called	  anti-­‐incumbency	  wave	  (Nooruddin	  &	  Chhibber,	  2008).	  In	  what	  one	  observer	  (Manor,	  2010)	  has	  called	  the	  ‘post-­‐clientelist’	  regimes,	  politicians	  have	  had	  to	  seek	  other	  ways	  of	  attracting	  votes…This	  shift	  to	  provision	  of	  welfare	  without	  revenue	  caps	  has	  been	  enabled	  by	  a	  dramatic	  rise	  in	  government	  revenues	  (Centre	  for	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Studies,	  2007:	  43).”184	  
The	  patronage	  links	  and	  voter	  perception	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  requires	  further	  study.	  These	  study	  focused	  on	  political	  factors	  of	  the	  central	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  movement;	  voter	  identification	  and	  electoral	  perception	  studies	  could	  shed	  more	  light	  on	  how	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  was	  perceived	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  in	  the	  ballot	  box.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  Elliot,	  C.	  “Moving	  from	  clientelist	  politics	  toward	  a	  welfare	  regime:	  evidence	  from	  the	  2009	  assembly	  election	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.”	  Commonwealth	  and	  Comparative	  Politics.	  Feb	  2011.	  49:1:	  48-­‐79.	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5.3	  Closing	  Remarks	  
The	  health	  transformation	  that	  occurred	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  has	  impacted	  many	  individual	  lives.	  Individual	  health	  costs	  that	  would	  have	  been	  incurred	  have	  been	  avoided	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  large-­‐scale	  health	  reform	  program	  in	  the	  Aarogyasri	  Health	  Care	  Trust,	  and	  other	  health	  programs	  that	  emerged	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  In	  this	  project,	  the	  political	  context	  behind	  the	  health	  reform	  movement	  was	  explored,	  a	  context	  that	  is	  lacking	  in	  exploration	  in	  the	  literature.	  While	  means	  and	  ends	  have	  been	  researched	  fully,	  understanding	  why	  certain	  regions	  undergo	  this	  policy	  process,	  while	  others	  do	  not,	  is	  an	  essential	  task,	  not	  an	  incidental	  one.	  	  What	  aspects	  of	  this	  study	  are	  generalizable	  for	  practitioners	  and	  researchers	  of	  the	  health	  reform	  process,	  and	  reform	  policy	  more	  broadly?	  There	  are	  undoubtedly	  many	  factors,	  situational,	  cultural,	  historical,	  and	  political,	  that	  allowed	  for	  a	  scheme	  of	  such	  massive	  proportion	  to	  take	  place	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  However,	  there	  are	  also	  important	  lessons	  to	  take	  away	  for	  other	  health	  reform	  movements,	  and	  for	  studying	  health	  reform	  policies	  internationally.	  	  First,	  exogenous	  factors	  are	  enormously	  influential	  in	  affecting	  the	  shape	  of	  reform.	  In	  Andhra’s	  case,	  World	  Bank	  legacies	  of	  liberalization	  created	  a	  health	  system	  within	  which	  only	  certain	  kinds	  of	  reform	  were	  politically	  tenable.	  Crisis,	  and	  one	  that	  tied	  indebtedness	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  health	  reform,	  was	  also	  important	  for	  the	  policy	  opportunity	  window,	  and	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  an	  essential	  precursor	  to	  massive	  reform.	  Lack	  of	  crisis,	  in	  the	  ethnic	  and	  regional	  tensions	  that	  had	  been	  existent	  in	  the	  region	  for	  decades,	  was	  also	  a	  central	  factor	  to	  preventing	  loss	  of	  policy	  focus	  on	  health	  reform.	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Politically,	  the	  differences	  in	  causal	  factors	  between	  the	  economic	  reform	  of	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  the	  succeeding,	  reactive	  social-­‐service	  expansion	  that	  included	  Aarogyasri	  are	  important	  to	  distinguish.	  Obviously,	  some	  of	  the	  explanatory	  theories	  fit	  better	  than	  others.	  Class,	  cultural,	  and	  institutional	  divisions	  can	  be	  overcome	  in	  the	  reform	  process,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  vested	  interests	  (in	  this	  case,	  private	  hospitals,	  insurance	  companies,	  and	  the	  below-­‐poverty	  line	  patients)	  are	  provided	  benefits	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  reform	  process.	  	  Only	  from	  understanding	  both	  the	  specific	  and	  generalizable	  factors	  of	  policies	  such	  as	  Andhra	  Pradesh’s	  health	  reform	  program	  can	  other	  health	  reform	  movements	  be	  impacted	  and	  initiated.	  Additionally,	  further	  research	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  policy	  itself	  is	  necessary.	  Did	  Aarogyasri	  impact	  financial	  risk	  protection	  as	  intended?	  How	  widespread	  is	  its	  use,	  and	  is	  it	  being	  actually	  utilized	  by	  below-­‐poverty-­‐line	  patients?	  	  In	  comparative	  perspective,	  is	  this	  the	  best	  way	  in	  which	  to	  deliver	  universal	  healthcare,	  or	  are	  there	  better	  health	  insurance	  models?	  These	  questions,	  and	  more,	  require	  answers	  if	  whole	  societies	  and	  individual	  lives	  are	  undergoing	  paradigmatic	  change	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  healthcare	  system.	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